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This work is dedicated to all those young men and women born in Somalia since 1991, who 
will have difficulty describing what peace is, because peace is a strange phenomenon in 
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A fundamental driving factor to contemporary international terrorism is the role of 
religion. Since the 1980s, there have been not only a rise in the number of Islamist 
terrorist incidents but also of a more globalized and intense dimension. The casualties 
have risen to unprecedented levels. Africa, and the Horn of Africa, in particular, has 
experienced its fair share of terrorist activities. For instance, in December 1980 
terrorists sympathetic to the PLO bombed the Norfolk Hotel, owned by an Israeli, in 
Nairobi, Kenya, killing sixteen people and injuring over a hundred. The 7 August 
1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 
were more deadly: 240 Kenyans, 11 Tanzanians and 12 Americans died, with over 
5,000 Kenyans and 86 Tanzanians injured. There was yet another terrorist attack on 
another Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa and an attempt on a passenger plane on the 
runway at the Mombassa International Airport, Kenya. Both incidents happened in 
November 2002. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 1998 and 2002 attacks. With 
rising terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the reality of the Somali state failure, there 
is a growing concern that the Somali environment is supporting terrorist activities in 
the region. The activities of the al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and later the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU), the Somali Islamist fundamentalist organizations, with their 
feared international connections and the security implications, are of concern not only 
to the region but also to global security monitors. 
 
There is not much debate regarding the level of collapse of the Somali state and the 
possible security implications of the territory as a congenial terrorist safe haven. Most 
experts have presented Somalia as a clear example of a completely failed state. 
Rotberg (2002:131) describes Somalia as “the model of a collapsed state: a 
geographical expression only, with borders but with no effective way to exert 
authority within those borders”.  Jhazbhay (2003: 77) quoted Ali Mazrui as saying 
that „the situation in Somalia now is a culture of rules without rulers, a stateless 
society‟.  Menkhaus (2003: 27) has singled out protracted and complete state collapse, 
protracted armed conflict and lawlessness as aptly representing the Somali situation. 
“Somalia‟s inability to pull together even the most minimalist fig-leaf of a central 








It was Jason Franks who wrote that “„terrorism‟ has become the plague of the 21st century 
[and] has seemingly penetrated all quarters of international society, especially in the wake of 
the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and the subsequent „war on terrorism‟” (Franks 
2006: 1). The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States brought international 
terrorism to the centre stage of issues of grave significance, threatening global peace and 
security. Soon to follow were other high-profile attacks in Madrid, Spain, and the subway 
attacks in Britain. The global reactions to this new wave of threat were to greatly impact the 
global security architecture, with an unprecedented level of securitization in the global 
system, as it affected domestic matters of individual countries as well as international 
engagements. 
 
Much of the debate by policy-makers, scholars and commentators on international relations 
has, for the most part of the past decade and half, dwelt more on finding common ground on 
the definition of terrorism and which actor qualifies to be dressed as a terrorist. Franks (2006: 
3) observed that this “orthodox” approach constitutes a major problem not only because it 
approaches and deals with terrorism at the level of “symptomatic management of the 
violence” but also, and more importantly, because of its inability to provide the basis for 
“enacting long-term solutions that attempt to solve the root causes” of terrorism.  
 
The spate of attacks and the selective choices of western targets – primarily American – and 
their allies have opened a wide debate of the issue of motives in terrorist attacks.  With the 
demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, terrorism associated with 
revolutionary struggles had almost disappeared. It is pertinent to note that contemporary 
terrorism is mostly driven by fundamentalist Islamism.  Contemporary international 
terrorism, therefore, tends to portray a conflict between cultures – the Judo-Christian/Western 
culture on one side and the Arab/Islamic culture on the other. The terrorist worldview of the 
global Islamic Jihad, represented by al-Qaeda, always appeals to the cultural conflict motif, 
taking terrorism as a response to aggression. Osama bin Laden, quoted in Schweitzer and 
Shay (2003: 27), charged that much when he said that “a Christian crusader-Jewish coalition 
has been formed which is expressed in the alliance between the United States and Israel… 
which has conquered Islam‟s most sacred lands of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem and aspires 
to crush it… this alliance methodically and intentionally massacred Muslims”. Bin Laden in 
1998 called on “every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply 
with God‟s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money” (Gunaratna 2002: 1). This is 
the tone of the “conflict”. 
 
The September 11 attack has drastically redefined the US domestic and foreign policy 
direction, by having both homeland security and the security of its citizens and interests 
abroad prioritized (US Congressional Report Service 2002: 1). While its projection 
domestically is the defeat of violent extremism, which pose a threat to the way of life of US 
citizens and its society, it assigns to itself the responsibility of “creating a global environment 
inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them” (US National Strategy 2006:7). 
It introduced the PATRIOT Act to deal with domestic security concerns and launched the 
Global War on Terror to advance its international counterterrorism agenda of preventing 
attacks by terrorist networks.  Additionally, it sought the following objectives: denying 
terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; denying terrorists control of any nation 
they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and laying the foundation and building 
institutions and structures needed to pursue the fight and guarantee an ultimate success (US 
National Strategy 2006:1). This internationalization of its antiterrorism posture saw the US 
launching a full-scale war on Afghanistan, where it was believed the leadership of al-Qaeda, 
including Osama bin Laden, enjoy the full protection of the Taliban government. Iraq was 
also attacked and its leader, Saddam Hussein, deposed on the allegation of possession of 
weapons of mass destruction, which has since been found to be untrue (Franks 2006: 14). 
Many other countries came under the severe pressure of the US regarding their perceived 
roles in either harbouring or supporting terrorists; among them were Syria, North Korea, 
Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan and Libya, which was already in the “black book” of the US for its 
alleged involvement in the 1988 Lockerbie Pan Am bombing. 
 
In Africa, while the US War on Terrorism was aimed at securing the United States‟ interests 
all over Africa, the Horn of Africa, and particularly Somalia, has been of utmost security 
interest (Pope 2004: i. d; Wycoff 2004: i. d). This special interest in Somalia seems not to be 
unfounded. Somalia was believed to be serving as a staging ground for the al-Qaeda terrorists 
who attacked the embassies of the US in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, in 
1998. It is also believed that some of the terrorists who carried out the attacks are still 
protected within Somalia. The “ungoverned” environment of the collapsed state of Somalia 
and the growing Islamist fundamentalism there heightens the security concerns of the United 
States and its allies that Somalia presents a congenial safe haven and an attractive 
environment for incubating and exporting terrorism. By this calculation, Somalia poses a 
regional and global security threat. There has been debate on how grave a security threat 
Somalia poses and whose security is under threat (Menkhaus 2003:8). Hamre (2002: 85), 
speaking of Somalia, stresses that: 
 
One of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed 
states matter – not just for humanitarian reasons but for national security as 
well. If left unattended, such states can become sanctuaries for terrorist 
networks with a global reach. As such, failed states can pose a direct threat 
to the national interests of the United States and to the stability of entire 
regions. 
 
This argument raises a critical question on the current world order, how it is shaped, the 
factors that shape it, and the extent to which the interests of the entire global population are 
taken care of in the global status quo. It tends to brush aside humanitarian issues which such 
state failure imposes on the citizens of a collapsed state and securitizes the whole situation by 
projecting the “national interests of the United States” and regional stability as being of 
paramount importance. This explains the US involvement in counterterrorism in the Horn of 
Africa, in particular, and Africa as a whole. Kinfe Abraham, writing on the “Challenge of 
Terrorism to Africa and Perspectives of African States” emphasizes that: 
 
United States policy for Africa since September 2001 has been one      of 
supporting security forces and intelligence establishments to hunt down 
terrorists and eliminate the threat of terrorism.  The policy is based on a 
“use fire to eliminate fire” approach.  But this approach only addresses the 
symptoms without dealing with the causes. Nevertheless, what the United 
States needs to do is help eradicate poverty, illiteracy and diseases from the 
Third World, including Africa (Abraham 2005: i. d).  
 
He believes the above proposal will be crucial in combating terrorism, adding that 
“poverty, oppression and hopelessness” drive people to violence in the current 
global economic system that is “exploitative and unjust; and that global citizens 
desire “a fair share of the wealth of the world” (Abraham 2005: i. d).   
 
It is in the light of US policy and the expectation of the “global margin” that an assessment of 
the US counterterrorism encounters in Somalia are X-rayed including: its decision to float 
and bankroll the coalition of discredited Somali warlords as the Alliance for the Restoration 
of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT), charged with the surveillance and arrest of 
suspected terrorists; its backing and use of direct Ethiopian military involvement inside 
Somalia; and its eventual use of direct force. This is important in order to assess the 
complexities of the failed state environment of Somalia with a view to understand why the 
antidotes applied failed to improve the regional and global security, which supposedly 
informed the engagement in the first place.  
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
In this research, Somali political history will be analyzed critically with a view of situating it 
within the contemporary geopolitical significance of the Horn of Africa and the global 
security attention it has attracted. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States of America, the Horn of Africa and Somalia, in particular, have attracted greater 
attention than ever before in the global security strategy. Somalia has slid into a state failure, 
where all the institutions of governance and social services have collapsed. Clan formations 
under contending warlords replaced constitutional levels of government and the rule of law 
has become a casualty. The Transitional National Government (TNG), put in place in May 
2000 with the support of the AU and the United Nations, hardly controls beyond a small part 
of Mogadishu (Cornwell 2004:6; Anonymous 2002:247). This situation has enabled the 
activities of Islamist fundamentalists to go unhindered for years. Poverty and hunger are 
ravaging Somali society. These Somali realities have great implication for the recruitment, 
training, transit and hiding of terrorists within Somalia. 
Somalia is positioned by the mouth of the Red Sea, at the Gulf of Aden, and with a very long 
Indian Ocean coast (Little 2003:7; Bryden 1999: 137; Wycoff 2004: i. d). This, together with 
its proximity to the Middle East, tends to heighten the security implications of the events in 
Somalia. The stability in the Horn of Africa, East and Central Africa cannot be said to be 
guaranteed with the Somali failed-state and conflict not addressed. The availability of small 
arms and the porous borders compound the problem for the entire continent, which is riddled 
with armed conflicts. The World Peace Foundation (2005: 19) observed that “the [Somalia 
situation is the] perfect storm. It‟s [sic] got everything an Islamic terrorist would want – a 
long, unpatrolled coastline, unpatrolled borders leading to interesting targets, an Islamic 
country with a radical movement, immiseration and desperation”. These present grave global 
security problems beyond the African continent and calls for more serious attention. 
1.3 Objectives of the research 
In the face of the lingering civil conflict in Somalia, the institutions of governance collapsed. 
The borders have remained porous, Islamist activities thrive uninhibited and there is wide 
availability of small arms. The research problem that this work addresses is to analyze the 
prevailing socio-cultural, political and economic conditions of Somalia and the extent to 
which these conditions shape that country‟s security environment. The objectives of the study 
therefore include: 
o To identify the prevailing conditions which characterize Somalia as a failed state;  
o To determine the extent to which the dynamics of state failure renders Somalia not 
only a transit route but also a recruiting and training ground as well as a safe haven 
for terrorists; and  
o To assess the efforts that have been made or are being made to counter the security 
implications of the above conditions.  
 
1.4 Scope of the study 
 
The thesis concerns itself with assessing the environment of the failed state of Somalia with a 
view to establishing the extent to which such an environment supports the development and 
spread of terrorism. The work concentrates on the prevailing conditions imposed on Somalia 
by the collapse of the Somali state since 1991, which tend to generate and sustain the regional 
and global security interests that Somalia has attracted since the middle of the 1990s. These 
conditions include: the absence of acceptable legitimate institutions of governance, social 
services and law enforcement; the wide availability of arms; the unmanned borders and ports; 
the continuing conflicts; and the rise of fundamentalist Islamism.  
 
The work further focuses on the trends of fundamentalism in Somalia and how it mutated 
over the years. It explores the activities of the radical Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami (AIAI), which 
operated inside Somalia in the 1990s and had so much impact on political Islam in Somalia. 
Al-Itihaad is also mentioned as the al-Qaeda cell inside Somalia. The investigation of the 
extent of the global al-Qaeda connection and/or presence falls within the scope of this 
research. 
 
Also of currency is the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the activities of which 
are believed to have made an unprecedented fundamental impression on the politics of 
Somalia, which may last for many years to come. The present study examines its rise and fall 
from power and tries to explain the dynamics that determined the turn of events for the ICU. 
 
Finally, the work examines the interests of US counterterrorism in Africa, with greater 
attention to the Horn of Africa and Somalia, in particular. It tries to evaluate those 
counterterrorism initiatives, including those of the IGAD, from the standpoint of the extent to 
which they have achieved (so far) their touted motives for venturing into Somalia, which are 
to rid Somalia of domestic terrorists and suspected international terrorists hiding there and to 
prevent Somalia from sliding into a more complex security environment.     
         
 
1.5 The significance of the study 
The need to research terrorism and issues surrounding it cannot be over emphasized. With 
new scientific discoveries, the impact of globalization, which has decimated national 
boundaries, narrowing the global space to a village, and the increasing social tensions 
occasioned by different shades of global human insecurity, a study like this becomes 
invaluable. 
 
The interest in Somalia is stimulated by its protracted state failure – since 1991 – which has 
left in its wake a battered society that has drifted into anarchy and a population which faces a 
dire situation of hopelessness and frustration, occasioned by the highest level of insecurity, in 
every sense of the word, yearning for a mindful and genuine rescue. Therefore, this study is, 
highly valuable in shedding more light on the real-life issues that affect the Somalis and will 
act as a tool in formulating policies to address this on-going human security calamity.  
 
The significance of this research is further bolstered by its in-depth focus on the issues of 
regional and global security. Somalia featured prominently in all the major terrorist incidents 
that have occurred in the region, be it the US embassies bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998, or the airport and hotel attacks in Mombassa in 2002. In the early and mid-1990s 
Ethiopia reportedly suffered repeated cross-border attacks, believed to be launched from 
Somalia by the al-Itihaad. Apart from the danger of direct cross-border attacks on 
neighbouring states, there is also the fallout effect of the conflict and worsening humanitarian 
situation in Somalia, such as the influx of refugees into neighbouring states, which has the 
propensity of triggering internal discontent within the host state. All these experiences, 
coupled with the geo-strategic positioning of Somalia at the mouth of the Arabian Peninsula, 
a gateway into the all-important Indian Ocean, raises the security profile of Somalia and 
makes events taking place inside it assume more than domestic categorization. Throwing 
light on the above was the preoccupation of this research and justifies the need for this study 
of Somalia. 
 
Counterterrorism scholars and students alike, especially those with interest in 
counterterrorism in Africa, the Horn of Africa and Somalia, in particular, will find this work 
very useful. It carefully analyses the various counterterrorism initiatives that have been 
targeted on Africa in general, narrowing its focus to the Horn of Africa and then to Somalia. 
The analyses of the intricate US counterterrorism maneuvers in Somalia make an interesting 
tool for policy evaluation by the US government and policy-makers. Developing states‟ 
governments and policy-makers will find it handy reference material in their quest to engage 
initiatives such as the counterterrorism programmes, which have far-reaching implications, in 
ways they will produce transformative change domestically, regionally and globally. 
 
This work is, therefore, fundamentally significant as it promises to extend the frontiers of 
knowledge in the areas of terrorist/security implications of state failure, international 
terrorism and American foreign policy -- giving an insight especially into the US Global War 
on Terrorism as it affects Africa, the Horn of Africa and Somalia in particular.                     
 
1.6 Theoretical framework 
As this research project is aimed at establishing the extent to which the lingering failure of 
the Somali state disposes it to becoming a terrorist operational environment, I shall be 
examining the Realist Theory of State, the Frustration-Aggression Theory, and Relative 
Deprivation Theory, to show how the enduring Somali state failure, its fallout in social and 
psychological terms predispose Somalia as a congenial terrorist operational environment. 
This will also enable us to understand the roles which the US, Ethiopia and other regional 
states are playing in Somalia.      
 
Frustration-Aggression Theory has been widely employed in the study of terrorism. The 
theory states that aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dollard et al. 1939: 27; 
Selg 1971: 9), where frustration is taken to be the inhibition of an organism‟s “path to a goal” 
and aggression the response, which injures another “organism or its substitute” (Selg1971: 
10). Seen through this prism, terrorism becomes an aggressive action occasioned by 
frustration, and the terrorist becomes an individual whose goal(s) in life is/are blocked by 
certain societal circumstances. The situation in Somalia seems frustrating, creating a measure 
of permissive psychological disposition to terrorism. Abraham Kinfe (2005: i. d), 
commenting on the terrorist threat in Somalia, observed that the situation in Somalia is 
frustrating and that it is “poverty, oppression and hopelessness” that motivate people to “die 
with those whom they perceive as living in luxury at their expense.”  
 
Ted Robert Gurr‟s Relative Deprivation Theory complements the one above. This theory 
assumes that when an individual‟s or a group‟s progressive advancement is frustrated and its 
replaced with one which runs counter to the individual‟s or group‟s expectation, such an 
individual or group may resort to adopting violence to achieving the original “vision” or 
simply to register discontent (Gurr 1970: 46). To apply this theory to the study of terrorism 
may suggest that changes in the social and or political progress contrary to expectations of 
individuals or groups (or the neglect of individual and group expectations) may lead to 
terrorism in order to reverse the undesirable change (Kuznar and Lutz 2007: 347).  
 
Both Frustration-Aggression and Relative Deprivation theories are useful to the extent that 
they can be applied in explaining certain behavioural factors that may have casual 
implications on terrorism, or why some individuals or groups may resort to violence when 
inhibited from desired expectations as in the case of Relative Deprivation. While the 
Frustration-Aggression theory over generalizes the psychological implications of cultural and 
political experiences across societies (as in the case Somalia), with inadequate evidence to 
suggest that most of the contemporary high profile terrorists are frustrated individuals, 
Relative Deprivation (as Kuznar and Lutz (2007: 348) argue) may be an important 
contributing factor but “not a sufficient condition” for violence with political motive. Somalia 
presents a peculiar case, a territory without a government. An analytical tool which will suit 
the Somali situation must be that which addresses the attendant realities of challenges to the 
cohesion of the Somali state.     
             
In dealing with the core of this thesis that borders on condition of the “stateness” of Somalia 
and the activities of foreign powers in its affairs and that of the region, Political Realism 
becomes very relevant. Major twentieth-century proponents of Realism include Hans 
Morgenthau, George Kennan, Kenneth Waltz, E.H. Carr and Rienhold Niebuhr. Thomas 
Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli are considered in the history of Western political thought to 
be great realists (Donnelly 2005: 30). Realism in its classical sense as an international 
relations theory presupposes an international environment where the survival of the 
individual state is of paramount concern, necessitating a selfish application of power in 
pursuit of national interest, forsaking every form of morality; this is known as power politics 
(Donelan 1990: 26; Donnelly 2005: 29). Furthermore, Donnelly (2005: 31) observes that 
realism has been equally adopted by “a few theorists” as being “a general theory of politics”. 
In this case, realism is used to analyze the domestic organization of the state which shapes 
and equips this state to participate in the international power politics. Donelan (1990: 23-24) 
portrays this dual nature of the state when he suggests that at the domestic level, the state 
makes individuals moral in their association as “a people” and members of a state.   By 
contrast, in international relations where interaction is on the basis of “association to 
association” (state to state), an individual association‟s survival becomes the central issue; 
morality is put aside. As Donelan (1990: 24) succinctly puts it, “the central point in Realism 
is then, this [sic]. Sometimes we are as persons and, still more important, as association, are 
made moral; for we have a common power over us, the state. Sometimes, we are not made 
moral; there is no common power; and that is international relations”.         
 
For the purpose of this thesis, both characteristics of which the state is recognizable shall be 
applied. Realism as a theory of international relations helps us to understand the behaviour of 
the US in its counterterrorism activities in the Horn of Africa and Somalia. It equally helps to 
explain why Ethiopia and Eritrea are acting in the manner they are acting in the Somali 
conflict. In an endeavour to analyze the implication of the failure of the Somali state on the 
regional and global security, the realist perception of the state as an association of persons 
that are subjected to moral responsibility for one another and the state (Donelan 1990: 24) 
becomes applicable.  
 
Though understanding Realism primarily as a theory of international relations emphasizes 
that the ultimate success of the state resides with its ability to navigate the international 
relations arena where states confront one another in an intense power politics, it is the 
observation in this work that the participation of a state in international relations suffers a 
fatal setback when the basic foundation of existence and function of such a state domestically 
is either under a severe challenge or non-existent as in the case of Somalia. Realists hold that 
states are not just the principal actors in the international arena but are recognized as 
possessing the monopoly of sovereignty, and with the sole capacity to make laws and 
administer them within their jurisdictional territories. They are also vested with the sole claim 
to right of legitimate use of coercive force within their territories (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 
Jr. 1990: 23; Uzodike 2007: 16). The loss of these basic attributes by any territory strips it of 
the name and category “state” and invests it with a situation of “anarchy”. This condition 
exposes such a territory to many possibilities resulting from the collapse of order, the rule of 
law and moderating influence of any sort.  
 
The Somali state failure in 1991 has resulted in the collapse of all forms of central control 
and authority. Law enforcement under this situation has become impossible. In the above 
scenario, common interests and values collapse as individual survival becomes paramount. 
The existence – indeed, the relevance – of a state is not only reflected in its basic structures 
and functions (as already enumerated) but also embodies a set of values (a collection of 
deeply held principles) which moderate the thinking and actions of its members. Apart from 
defining the individual‟s perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the state, values shape the 
lives and the expectations of citizens within the context of the state. This very important 
factor, so crucial for social cohesion and development, is now lost in Somalia. Dempsey 
(2006: 15) observes that the experience of Somalia has shown that evolving terrorist hubs can 
easily operate safely in failed states. He posited that the “environment of such states provide 
what may be the greatest level of protection available to terrorist organizations...”    
 
In light of the fore-going, and given its assumptions about the workings of the state and 
rationale for its actions, Realist Theory can be a very useful and sound tool of analysis not 
only of the measure of terrorist threat facing Somalia but also the global security implications 
of such a threat in the shaping of counterterrorism strategies of other governments in the 
Horn region and around the world.  
 
1.7 Methodology 
This research is undertaken using the tool of qualitative textual analysis of relevant    
scholarly works on the subject. These will include books and academic articles published by 
research institutions focusing on politics, security, peace and conflict issues. Relevant online 
research articles and papers will also be used. The strength of qualitative textual analysis is in 
its ability to allow for the presentation of a wide range of views on an issue and making an 
informed conclusion after a critical analysis. 
 
In the quest to provide an answer to the research question on the failed state of Somalia and 
its predisposing environment, a spectrum of relevant works will be surveyed. The 
establishment that Somalia is a failed state takes the form of analyzing the basic 
characterizing features of a state as put forward by scholars in journal articles and books. The 
collapse of the institutions of governance and social services, the continuing clan conflict, 
porous borders, wide availability of arms, the activities of Islamists, the unsecured coastal 
Somali boundaries and proximity to the Middle East are the realities of present day Somalia. 
The reports of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia of 2006 and 2007 are to be reviewed. 
An analysis of scholarly articles, books and presentations of organizations (such as 
International Crisis Group) that work inside Somalia will be engaged.  
 
The research question on the failed state of Somalia and the rise of Islamist fundamentalism, 
will lead to an analysis of a wide range of writings, discussions and debates on the history of 
Islamism in Somalia and the dynamics of its development, how they played out following the 
collapse of the state and their fallouts. A critical analysis of policy papers, conference 
presentations by government officials and agencies and reported testimonies of apprehended 
terrorist is deemed very helpful in addressing the alleged link between the radical Islamists 
inside Somalia and the global terrorist network – al-Qaeda -- and establishing the threat level 
Somalia poses to regional and global security.   
 
To answer the question on the counterterrorism efforts that have been, or are being made, the 
author will rely on academic articles, position papers and conference communiqués on the 
peace process and counterterrorism initiatives of the UN, AU, IGAD, states of the Horn of 
Africa, individual or groups of foreign or African states and non-state actors. A great focus 
will be placed on the US national policy on, and its strategy for, countering terrorism. An 
analysis of the US National Strategy on Terrorism, the reports and testimonies to the US 
Congress on the various counterterrorism initiatives in Africa will be undertaken in order to 
understand fully the behaviour of the US with regard to its counterterrorism activities in 
Africa, the Horn of Africa and, particularly, Somalia.   
 
The author shall then be in a position to evaluate the possible dimensions of the Somali 
political and security prospects based on sound deductions from sound and critical evaluation 
of all arguments that have been canvassed.   
  
1.8 Structure of the study  
Chapter One: “Introduction”. This chapter is directed at the general focus of the thesis. The 
introduction provides an overview of the full work, including the rationale, the central 
objectives and significance as well as the theoretical and methodological underpinnings and 
breakdowns of the constituting chapters.  
 
Chapter Two: “A Review of Literature”. This chapter is concerned with a review of a wide 
range of literature on global terrorism. It navigates through the various definitions of 
terrorism as well as the problems posed by those definitions in examining the arguments 
concerning the nature and causes, the trends and driving forces of contemporary global 
terrorism 
 
Chapter Three: “The failed state of Somalia and its predisposing environment”. In this 
chapter, justification for the categorization of Somalia as a failed state is made. It goes further 
to discuss the porous borders, the lingering conflict, the collapse of the institution of 
governance and the ready availability of weapons as the prevailing environment of Somalia 
occasioned by the state failure which synergize to make Somalia a congenial environment for 
the domestication terrorism and an attractive staging ground for foreign terrorists seeking a 
safe haven for their international terrorist activities.  
 
Chapter Four: “The failed state of Somalia and the rise of Islamist fundamentalism”. This 
chapter examines the various strands of Islamism in Somalia and the emergence of radical 
Islam. It focuses attention on the activities of the al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI), the emergence 
and rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) on the political scene of Somalia, with special 
attention on their involvement in terrorism and their connections to international terrorists 
and terrorism through their al-Qaeda connections. 
 
Chapter Five: “Counterterrorism Initiatives in Somalia”.  This chapter takes an overview of 
the US counterterrorism initiatives in the various regions in Africa. It then concentrates on 
the Horn of African with special attention on the role of Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), and goes ahead to focus on counterterrorism in Somalia. The various 
counterterrorism efforts of the US and Ethiopia in Somalia are analyzed as they affect the 
Somali conflict in general and the growing Islamist insurgency in particular.  
 
Chapter Six: “Summary and conclusion”. This chapter stitches together all the key issues that 
are discussed in the various chapters of the work and illuminate the conclusions generated 




A REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
2.1 Introduction 
In a discourse on contemporary global issues, terrorism may well come up as one of the top 
three issues; the others being the environmental issue of global warming and the HIV and 
AIDS pandemic. When it comes to security matters, there may not be any word that is more 
frequently used today than terrorism. This chapter will examine terrorism with regards to 
defining the concept. It will also X-ray the arguments around the nature, causes, trends and 
the driving force behind contemporary global terrorism. Finally, it will introduce the 
connection of Somalia with international terrorism, highlighting the socio-cultural and 
political dynamics in Somalia that appear to explain its vulnerability to terrorist activities.  
 2.2 The definitional issues with terrorism  
There is no consensus among scholars and commentators concerning the standard definition 
of terrorism (Franks 2006: 1; Kapitan 2003: 47; Crenshaw 2000: 406). In fact, to argue a 
comprehensive and generally agreed-on definition of terrorism seems virtually impossible, 
because a wide spectrum of violent actions, circumstances and competing causes lend well to 
such definition (Laqueur 1977: 10; Kiras 2005: 480). There is even the argument in some 
quarters that the elevation of terrorism to the level of global significance is just a ploy by the 
West, aimed at diverting the attention of the global public from the pervasive impact of the 
globalization of western values and its destructive implication around the world (Weinberg 
2005: 2). 
The definitions of terrorism have also suffered from their inability to be value-neutral. The 
statement, “one man‟s terrorist is another‟s freedom fighter” is commonplace.  This assumed 
subjectivity compounds the already definitional difficulties. Another serious problem in 
defining terrorism is the seeming difficulty in drawing a clear line between acts considered as 
terrorism and other legitimate political actions geared towards the exercise of the right to self-
determination, freedom and independence (Chomsky 2003:70). For example, Kapitan (2003 
in Sterba et al., ed.2003: 48) defines terrorism as “the deliberate use of violence, or the threat 
of such, directed upon civilians in order to achieve political objectives”. Wilkinson (2000:12-
13) has also defined terrorism as “the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to 
service political ends” and commonly targeting “innocent civilians.”  Some commentators 
believe that the above distinction is very necessary, considering the political experiences of a 
great number of peoples in history. This explains why the historical, political, religious and 
ideological contexts in which certain acts are committed then condition, in most cases, the 
categorization of such acts as whether they are terrorist acts or not. This explains why the use 
of the above adage “one man‟s terrorist is another‟s freedom fighter” is very common.  But 
most of the definitions encompass the goal (motive), method and the target as the 
characterizing definitional contents of terrorism.  
 
Pojman (2003 in Sterba et al., eds. 2003:140) defines it thus: “Terrorism is a type of political 
violence that intentionally targets civilians (non-combatants) in a ruthlessly destructive, often 
unpredictable, manner, employing horrific violence against unsuspecting civilians, as well as 
combatants, in order to inspire fear and create panic which, in turn, advances the terrorist‟s 
political and religious agenda”. „The use of violence or the threat of it‟ occurs in almost all 
the many definitions of terrorism. But what qualifies an act as terrorism lies beyond this. 
There seems to be a convergence around the view that for an act to qualify as a terrorist act, 
the motive and the target are of significant importance. These seem to be the factors that 
distinguish terrorism from other common crimes. The motive is mainly agreed to be, in most 
cases, „political‟. Sterba (2003: 1) observes that the use of violence or the “striking of terror” 
may not be enough to categorize an act as terrorist. Horgan (2005: 34) argues that “the 
terrorist‟s use of violence is instrumental”, all with the intent of achieving the goal of creating 
“widespread fear, arousal and uncertainty” beyond the direct victim(s), with the aim of 
“influencing political process” and the outcome. Weinberg (2005: 7) feels that, rather than 
being a goal, terrorism is a “tactic” employed in the course of pursuing a goal, which, in most 
cases, is political. The act of choosing civilian targets is carefully made to possibly create a 
feeling of general insecurity within a society among the civilian population (Weinberg 2005: 
4). It is also aimed at attracting attention and publicity, where a single terrorist act can 
“catapult” an obscure terrorist group into the international limelight, and bring about not only 
the acknowledgement of their existence but also the discussion of their grievances, however 
unpopular they may be (Weinberg 2005: 5).  
 
Some scholars suggest that sometimes terrorist acts are targeted at forcing the government 
into an over-reaction, as a result of panic which may become counterproductive, such as 
taking stern security measures that compromise individuals‟ freedom, resulting in a backlash 
from civil right groups and the general public (Wilkinson 1979: 111; Smith 2004: 74; 
Weinberg 2005: 7). The situation in Pakistan is a clear example of this scenario. The 
government of the United States has had to contend with constant challenges from within 
Congress, public outcries and sometimes outright condemnation, following a number of the 
security measures it put in place in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. 
An example is the selective phone-tapping measure granted the FBI, authorizing it to 
selectively intercept phone-calls coming into or going out of the US, a measure which has 
received enormous challenges, including court actions, as having greatly infringed on the 
individual‟s right to privacy. Terrorist acts may not always be aimed at changing an existing 
political landscape but may also be aimed at forestalling a possible reversal of a status quo. 
An example of this tactic was Hamas‟ and Islamic Jihad‟s use of consistent terrorist attacks 
on Israel to scuttle the 1993 Oslo peace deal between Israel and Palestine. Most scholars 
agree that for an act to be termed terrorist, it must be a violent act, committed for political 
reason(s), targeted at victims that may not be direct sources of anger, and aimed at creating 
fear, therefore, upholding motive and target as central to the definition of terrorism (Horgan 
2005: 3; Wilkinson 2001: 16; Pojman 2003: 135; Kapitan 2003: 48; Kiras 2005: 482). 
 
2.3 Nature of terrorism 
Weinzieri (2004: 31) tries to distinguish between a terrorist and a guerrilla group and, by 
extension, acts of terrorism and those by guerrilla fighters. He posits that terrorists as much as 
practicable avoid face-to-face combat with states‟ regular security forces. They concentrate 
rather on committing acts of violence against civilian populations to engender fear, 
influencing political change by coercion. By contrast, guerrilla fighters confront government 
soldiers and despoil whatever they can in such attacks, ranging from advantaged positions to 
military equipment. Hoffman (1989), quoted in Horgan (2005: 11), stresses that terrorism is 
never a war tactic. He asserts that: 
 
even in wars there are rules and accepted norms of behaviour that prohibit 
the use of certain types of weapons…, prescribe tactics and outlaw attacks 
on specific categories of targets …The rules of war … not only grant 
civilian non-combatants immunity but also prohibit taking civilians as 
hostages; impose regulations governing the treatment of captured or 
surrendered soldiers (POWs); outlaw reprisals against either civilians or 
POWs; … and uphold the inviolability of diplomats and other accredited 
representatives. 
 
Contrary to the above known “norms”, weak states that sponsor terrorism see it as an 
instrument of war against the West (Hoffman 1998: 28). Whether terrorism is seen as a tactic 
of war or not, as a strategy, it has, over the years, served the motives of the user. This may 
explain its continued employment as a viable line of action. 
     
Cilliers and Sturman (2002: i. d) raise the issue of the efforts at domain restriction or 
broadening. They argue that countries that perceive themselves as terrorist targets or 
organizations in areas where they have overwhelming influence tend to broaden the crimes 
and acts of violence categorized as terrorist. Conversely, countries and organizations that see 
themselves as possible targets of such “over-broadened” definitions tend to cautiously and 
consciously narrow the defining features of terrorism. A good example of this is the OAU 
1999 Algiers Convention, which clearly excluded actions conducted in the struggles for self-
determination from its definition of terrorist acts. In Article 3 of the Convention, it provides 
that „armed struggles against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign 
forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts‟. This standpoint can be understood when a 
number of African states fought wars of independence and political decolonization, but this is 
at variance with the Western perception of armed struggles as terrorist acts and some 
liberation organizations, including organizations like the anti-apartheid African National 
Congress, as terrorist organizations. There still exists a measure of consensus regarding issues 
such as hijackings, hostage-taking and diplomatic attacks as terrorist acts. 
 
As can be seen from the definitions and/or attempts at defining terrorism as diversely as is 
represented above, all seem to view terrorism from the orthodox theoretical perspective. This 
perspective is state-centric, in that it looks at terrorism as “illegitimate” acts committed 
against an established authority or a state. Franks (2006: 1) has observed that defining or 
understanding terrorism “relative to the legitimacy of state governance” (as being an illegal 
or illegitimate act) restricts most works on terrorism at categorization of “what is” or “what is 
not”. He argued that the orthodox, traditional, state-centric approach leaves out an important 
ingredient, the roots of terrorism, in its definitions. Such inclusion would amount to 
legitimizing non-state violence, terrorism already seen primarily as “a challenge and threat to 
state authority by an illegitimate body” that has no locus whatsoever to contest whatever it is 
canvassing (Franks 2006: 3). William Laqueur (1987: 72) emphasized that the “disputes 
about a detailed, comprehensive definition of terrorism will continue for a long time and will 
make no noticeable contribution towards the understanding of terrorism”.  For example, 
while the US Defense Department defined terrorism to be “unlawful use of force or violence 
against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments to accept political, 
religious or ideological objectives”, the spiritual leader of the Hezbollah, Sheikh Fadlallah, 
defined it as “fighting with special means against aggressor nations in religious lawful 
warfare against world imperial powers” (Franks 2006: 13). This kind of mixed signals has led 
some scholars to suggest the need to move the definition of terrorism away from the moral 
legitimacy environment, to a more value free landscape. This approach canvasses for 
terrorism to simply be seen in the realm of conflict. In line with this approach, Gurr (1988: 
116) defines terrorism as “a doctrine about the efficacy of unexpected and life-threatening 
violence for political change and strategy of political action which embodies that doctrine”. 
Franks (2006: 17) simply defines it as: “an act of lethal violence for a political agenda”.  
 
2.4 Origin and trends of terrorism                  
The use of the word “terrorism” dates back to 1793-1794 when the French revolution was 
called “the Reign of Terror”. This describes the situation during the reign of Jacobin, when 
the “Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal” were given broad 
powers to deal with counter-revolutionaries. Violence was employed by the government as an 
instrument to consolidate the revolution and power against the enemies of the state and the 
people (Hubshle 2006: 3; Weinberg 2005. 3; Weinzieri 2004 in Nyatepe-Coo and Zeisler-
Vrasled 2004: 33). Weinzieri (2004) in Nyatepe-Coo and Zeisler-Vrasled (2004: 34), pointed 
out that there exists a clear difference between the nature and trend of the „state terrorism‟ of 
the then French state and the ancient and medieval period, to the effect that the French state‟s 
use of violence was done as a socio-political platform to safeguard the revolution in the name 
and or „interest‟ of the people – the masses or proletariat – and not in the name of God. It was 
a secular phenomenon, a deviation from the nature of group religious fundamentalism that 
was before it, and was to come centuries later, in the contemporary global, transnational and 
international terrorism. The French Revolution and its „violent‟ defense sparked nationalism 
and intellectual (ideological) revolution across the world, especially in Europe.  
 
Earlier acts of organized violence were not called terrorism. The earliest recorded organized 
violence was associated with the Jewish extremist Zealot sect, the Sicarii. This sect, whose 
motive was to provoke a revolt by the Jews against the “occupying” Roman government and 
bring it to an end, employed assassination by dagger against the Romans and moderate Jews, 
who were regarded as collaborators with the Roman authorities. The Roman authorities and 
Greeks were equally targeted (Weinzieri 2004: 31). The Jewish revolt of AD 66-70 is 
ascribed to the Zealots. Its failure not only inflicted great destruction on the Jewish nation but 
also marked the end of the Sicarii. In the medieval period, between 1090 and 1275, the 
Assassins, a radical Shiite Ismaili sect waged a violent campaign aimed at purifying Islam 
(Weinzieri 2004: 31). They operated in the region occupied by the modern day Iran, Syria 
and Israel. The Assassins targeted mainly the Sunni Muslim religious and political leaders, 
who they accused of hijacking and corrupting Islam (Weinberg and Davis 1989: 19; 
Weinzieri 2004: 31). Many Christians were also victims of their activities. Weinzieri (2004: 
32) observes that one of the intriguing elements of their operations was their readiness to die 
after killing their victims. The Assassin would trail and “kill the enemy and, rather than flee, 
would calmly await capture and execution” in a fashion depicting martyrdom. This attitude is 
viewed as the origin of suicide terrorism (Weinberg and Davis 1989: 21).    
 
Before World War 1, terrorism was associated with left-wing revolutionaries in their contest 
for power and control of the state. Citing the anarchist Narodnaya Volya (meaning the 
people‟s will) in Russia (1879), (Hubshle (2006: 5) observed that these organizations were 
not part of the core socialist revolutionary strategy, but rather a product of perceived 
“necessity in raising the consciousness of the masses”. Laqueur (1987: 62) pointed out that 
Lenin charged that left-wing revolutionary terrorism restricted itself to group action, as 
opposed to mass action by the working class and the peasants, thereby complicating the 
efforts at galvanizing the masses. The end of World War I coincided with the rise in right-
wing groups that engaged in terrorist acts, either to scuttle rising revolutionary activities or to 
guard the status quo. For example, the activities of the ultra-right Ku Klux Klan, formed in 
the United States in 1865, became more prominent after WWI, spreading hate against non-
Anglo Saxons (especially blacks and Jews) in the US and organizing violence against them to 
inspire fear and intimidate the rising black consciousness and Jewish influence (Weinzieri 
2004: 35). In Europe, some governments that feared the incursion of communism reacted to 
the 1917 Russian revolution by initiating activities aimed at stemming it. The Nazi movement 
in Germany and the Fascist Movement in Italy resorted to the use of state terror against 
suspected „enemies of the state‟ (Hubschle 2006: 6; Townshend 2002: 54). The trend shifted 
again to a new phase of terrorism associated with revolutionary motives by the end of World 
War II. Nationalist movements emerged in many colonial territories in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and the Middle East in the 1940s and 1950s. These groups waged struggles for 
independence and self-determination, with some employing violent means. While such 
groups saw themselves and were also seen by anti-colonial forces around the world as 
freedom fighters, most colonial powers and some other Western countries regarded them as 
terrorists. Hubschle (2006: 9) quoted Yassir Arafat, the former chairman of the PLO, as 
having reasoned that: “The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the 
reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom 
and liberation of his land ….cannot possibly be called terrorist.”  This argument, which was 
made on the floor of the UN General Assembly in 1974, prompted a debate aimed at drawing 
a distinction between anti colonial groups and nationalist-separatist groups operating “outside 
colonial and neocolonial framework” in the 1960s and 1970s. The Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Basque separatist group (ETA) 
fall into this category (Hubschle 2006: 9).   
 
The notion of „international terrorism‟ made its way into security discourse in the 1980s. 
Townshend (2002: 28) traces it to Alexander Haig, a former American Secretary of State, 
who accused the Soviet Union in 1981 of being a sponsor of “International Terrorists”. This 
was to be followed in 1982 by The Terror Network, a book written by Claire Sterling, 
outlining how the Soviet Union was involved in organizing international terrorist networks, 
especially in the Third World. While it is not within the scope of this work to discuss the 
veracity of the above accusation against the Soviet Union, there is the need to observe that 
America‟s reaction to the accusation led to a step-up in overt and covert military and political 
engagements around the world, especially in countries that leaned towards the communist 
East. By the middle of the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, left-wing motivated terrorism almost disappeared around the world, launching the 
contemporary world into a new phase of global terrorism inspired by religious motives 
(Hubschle 2006: 10-11).                      .            
 
When terrorism is mentioned today, greater thought is given to non-state actors. The US State 
Department defined terrorism as „the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually to 
influence an audience‟ (Hoffman1999: 38). „The use of violence or the threat of it‟ occurs in 
almost all the definitions of terrorism. But what qualifies an act as terrorism lies beyond this, 
in the motive and the target. Most scholars agree that for an act to be termed “terrorist”, the 
act must be violent, committed for political reason(s), targeted at victims that may not be 
direct sources of anger and aimed at creating fear. (Horgan 2005: 3; Wilkinson 2001: 16; 
Pojman 2003: 135; Kapitan 2003: 48; Kiras 2005: 482).  One major difficulty in defining 
terrorism is the difficulty in drawing a line between acts considered as terrorism and other 
legitimate political actions geared towards the exercise of the right to self-determination, 
freedom and independence (Chomsky 2003: 70).       
 
Weinzieri (2004: 30) posits that acts of terrorism are “well-planned, organized actions” and 
“not random” in the strict sense of the word. For him, they are clearly mapped-out combat 
methods engaged in by groups that may not be able to stand contemporary conventional wars. 
While Pojman (2003:140) calls terrorism “a type of political violence that intentionally 
targets civilians, Kapitan (2003: 46) calls it “the deliberate use or threat of violence” upon 
civilians and Hoffman (1999: 43) defines it as “the deliberate creation of fear.”  One of the 
many definitions of terrorism by US agencies is that which defines terrorism as “the use of 
violence or the threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in 
nature” (US Army 1984. TRADOC Pamphlet 525: 37). The juxtaposition of these points of 
view brings us face-to-face with what is assumed to be the psychological state of a terrorist, 
especially the suicide terrorist. The investigation into the personality of the terrorist has 
attracted attention to working out possible personality traits that may be associated with 
terrorist tendencies. Scholars have continued to engage in research of, and debate over, the 
psychology or the mindset of the terrorist. Victoroff (2005: 9) points out that terrorists have 
been associated with certain personality or psychological dispositions that include being 
violent, alcoholic, deeply religious, sexually shy, poor social achievement, ambivalence 
towards authority, defective insight, strong adherence to convention, emotional detachment 
and low education, but was quick to conclude that these traits have not been able to clearly 
distinguish terrorists from non-terrorists. Equally, the contemporary terrorist trend and profile 
seem to have nullified some of these assumptions, such as in the areas of education and 
achievement. Wilkinson (2001: 27) argues that terrorism is „a rational‟ course of action taken 
by a „relatively weak group in an asymmetric conflict with a high stake‟. Smith (in Nyatepe-
Coo and Zeisler-Vralsted eds.2004: 71) feels that terrorism should not be categorized with 
other forms of crime and „psychopathological actions‟. He points out that most terrorists are 
„extremely shrewd and rational‟ persons who execute clinically, well-designed plans, and in 




2.5 Causes of terrorism            
The task of isolating any singular factor as the root cause of terrorism poses a serious 
difficulty. The character of the social formation that gives rise to terrorism may seem easy to 
configure, but an analysis of different terrorists known to history presents no clear evidence 
that a particular kind of environment would always produce terrorists. Diverse social systems 
have had terrorists grown from among them. There is a debate on the connection between 
terrorism and the prevailing economic conditions of a society. Strong argument is made on a 
clear correlation between terrorism and economic factors such as economic deprivation, 
poverty and income inequality (Li and Schaub 2004: 231; Kiras 2005: 485; Burgoon 2006: 
176). Through the studies on the patterns of terrorism and the individual attitudes and actions, 
scholars have tried to present a connection between economic conditions, such as poverty and 
income inequality‟ arguing that these, in a number of instances, have defined the “level of the 
feeling of deprivation and of injustice, and hence political tension” (Burgoon 2006:176). The 
US Department of State‟s report, „Counterterrorism Office: 2001 – Patterns of Global 
Terrorism – Report: Africa Overview‟ tends to lend support to this linkage. It identifies 
poverty, among other factors, as being responsible for the failure of the Somali state, a 
condition that has created an enabling environment for the growth of Islamist extremists and 
suspected terrorists. Analyzing the rise of terrorism in Algeria, Cilliers and Sturman (2002: 
i.d) state that the „economic stagnation and massive unemployment in the post-independence 
bidonvilles or shantytowns that ringed its cities provided the fertile seed for radicalism‟.     
 
Deductively, therefore, fighting negative economic conditions by „promoting economic 
growth and combating inequality‟ may well be the starting point for any effort at stamping 
out terrorism (Tyson 2001, in Li and Schaub 2004: 235). However, some scholars challenge 
this argument. Weinberg (2005: 66) feels that it is too simplistic to argue that economic 
conditions cause terrorism. If it was that simple terrorism would disappear if governments 
and international bodies take decisions and implement policies that promote economic 
development and present people with a „secured future‟. He stresses that if economic 
conditions were to be primary causes of terrorism, then sub-Saharan Africa and, indeed, most 
Third World countries would have been devastated by domestically grown terrorism, given 
their monumental economic crises. The official US position supports this view (The White 
House – CRS Report 2002). It challenges the linkage between poor economic conditions and 
terrorism, because the findings on the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States show the 
terrorists involved were educated Muslim youths with middle class backgrounds, supported 
and financed by very rich people (The White House – CRS Report 2002; Burgoon 2006: 
117). Again, other studies of the characteristics of terrorists tend not to support the poverty 
and deprivation connection. For example, in interviews conducted by Hassan (2001), quoted 
in Tessler and Robbins(2007:312), involving nearly 250 members of organizations that use 
terrorism, failed suicide terrorists and members of their families, it was found that none 
reported significant economic deprivation. In two separate studies, by Krueger and 
Maleckova (2002: 13), on the profiles of 129 Hezbollah militants killed in action, and Berribi 
(2003), on about 335 deceased Palestinian terrorists, the researchers could not establish 
association between poverty and the likelihood of becoming a terrorist. On the contrary, both 
studies found „that terrorists tend to be relatively well off by the standards of their societies‟ 
(Tessler and Robbins 2007: 310; Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perliger 2003: 18). Victoroff 
(2005:8) revealed that the result of a research conducted in 2001 by the Palestinian Centre for 
Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) involving about 1,357 adults living in the West Bank 
and Gaza, which tested the hypothesis that poverty and low level of education factor in 
influencing attitude towards political violence, found that „support for terrorism against 
Israeli civilians was even more among professionals than among labourers (43.3 vs. 34.6 
percent) and more common among those with secondary education than among illiterate 
respondents 39.4 vs. 32.3)‟. In fact, Pedahzur, Perliger and Weinberg (2003: 22) suggest that 
terrorist groups look for membership among individuals whose motivation are not monetary 
gains but rather a conviction and commitment to the cause of the group. Criticizing the US 
counterterrorism policy in Africa, Prof. Kinfe Abraham, the President, Ethiopian 
International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD) and The Horn of Africa 
Democracy and Development Authority (HADDA), reasons that the US support for security 
and intelligence network and capacity building in Africa since the September 11, 2001 attack 
is tantamount to a „“use fire to eliminate fire” approach‟. He feels that:  
 
this approach only addresses the symptoms, without dealing with the 
causes. Nevertheless, what the United States needs to do is help eradicate 
poverty, illiteracy and diseases from the Third World, including Africa. The 
above will help dry the swamp in which terrorists sprout and grow.  It is 
poverty, oppression and hopelessness that motivate people to die with those 
whom they perceive as living in luxury at their expense. Such people want a 
fair share of the wealth of the world. They see the current economic system 
as exploitative and unjust (Abraham 2005: i.d)    
 
Li and Schaub (2004: 238) counter-argue that sound reason prevails that economic 
development that positively impact people‟s wellbeing in a society may have an “indirect 
negative effect on transnational terrorism”.          
The role of democracy, or lack of it, in encouraging terrorism, is equally contentious. Some 
scholars feel that the absence of democratic governance in some countries is a prime cause of 
terrorism. These analysts opine that “extremism emerges partly out of frustration associated 
with a lack of political freedom” (Whitaker 2007: 1022). This argument, which is also the 
position of the West (especially the United States and Britain), is based on the premise that 
the lack of democracy in any state tends to block channels for political discourses and open 
participation which, in turn, can drive individuals to become violent and resort to terrorism as 
a form of expression. Weinberg (2005: 66) states: 
In countries where citizens are denied the right to participate peacefully in 
political process, they naturally turn to political violence. If all channels of 
open political expression are blocked, aggrieved individuals will turn [to] 
terrorism as the only means available to make themselves heard. 
Accepting this argument to be true is to agree that the introduction of democracy in 
“undemocratic” societies becomes a veritable weapon to solving the problem of 
terrorism. This particular conclusion appears to be central in the US global campaign against 
terrorism. The United States, therefore, champions efforts at sustaining democracies and, at 
the same time, supports campaigns for “democratization” of “undemocratic” states as the 
cornerstone of its war on terror.  But the link between the lack of democracy and the growth 
of terrorism does not help to explain the surge in homegrown Islamist terrorist activities in 
Britain (or even the US itself). Since 2005, Britain has experienced an upsurge in domestic 
terrorist activities linked directly to British citizens (HM Government 2006: 1). There is also 
conflicting signals to this point of view generated by certain key elements in the global war 
on terror, as they concern certain basic democratic principles such as the fundamental human 
rights of the individual and the treatment of detainees and the fact that the West still co-
operates with authoritarian and undemocratic regimes around the world, such as Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.   
A slightly different argument by some scholars tends to link the increase in the incidence of 
terrorism to the widening of democratic space, including the more liberal media, which 
become attractive to terrorists who are seeking publicity, constitutional provisions which 
guarantee freedoms of expression and organization, as well as individual freedom (Li 2005: 
281; Eugene 2004: 25). Writing on Spain, Weinberg (2005: 68) states that “the installation of 
democracy coincided with the sharp increase in ETA terrorism: the greater the opportunity 
for free expression in Spanish political life, seemingly the more terrorist violence occurs”. 
For their part, Wade and Reiter (2007: 331) feel that both the absence of democratic 
environment and the widening of democratic space can only present “permissive or enabling 
preconditions for terrorism rather than being an immediate precipitant” of terrorism.  
 
Concerning the sharp rise in the incidence in, and profile of, global terrorism since the 1980s, 
the issue regarding the extent to which coalesced efforts at stopping the perceived Soviet 
(communist) incursions into territories that were of significant global geopolitical interests in 
the 1980s has contributed to the rise in global terrorism, becomes part of the debate. Cilliers 
and Sturman (2002: i.d) point out that the surge in terrorist incidents in the 1990s was a 
product of the concerted efforts by the West aimed at „reversing Soviet expansion in central-
South Asia, Afghanistan in particular‟. They point out that the West, especially the United 
States, funded, trained and provided logistic support to the mujihadeens in Afghanistan. They 
blame the return of the majority of Afghan war veterans to North Africa (Egypt, Algeria and 
Sudan) at the end of the war in 1989, as marking a watershed in the history of international 
terrorism. In Algeria, for example, Cilliers and Sturman (2002: i.d) estimate that between 
1986 and 1989, six hundred (600) to one thousand (1000) „battle-hardened Algerian nationals 
returned home. They provided a nucleus for the terrorist movement that would follow.‟ 
Weinzieri (2004: 41) agrees with this position. He observes that the United States “actually 
engaged in state sponsorship [of terrorism] and helped train and fund al-Qaeda during the last 
phase of the Cold War, hoping to defeat the Soviets indirectly”. This illustrates the extent to 
which the global political environment may have influenced the character and shape of 
contemporary global and international terrorism. Thus, the saying „training for today‟s just 
warriors may become the benefit of tomorrow‟s terrorist‟ is apt.     
 
2.6 An overview of contemporary terrorism 
A fundamental driving factor to contemporary international terrorism is the role of religion. 
The religious factor becomes even more important when we look closely at contemporary 
terrorists, who they are, where they come from (their background) and their targets and 
motives. Islamist fundamentalism has configured the modern-day terrorism to the extent that 
some scholars have a category, “Islamist terrorism” (Dalacoura 2006: 507; Tessler and 
Robbins 2007: 307). Since the 1990s, terrorist activities have seen a shift from predominantly 
nationalist-separatists and social revolutionaries, in the 1970s and 1980s, to more Islamist 
fundamentalist terrorism (Bjorgo 2005: 4). Kiras (2005:484) observes that the end of the Cold 
War and the demise of the Soviet Union witnessed a rise in the emergence of religious 
terrorist groups following the sharp decline in global ideological polarization and by impact a 
corresponding sharp decrease of „revolutionary terrorists‟. To understand the Islamists‟ 
fundamentalist activities clearly, Dalacoura (2006: 510) subdivided it into three: transnational 
Islamist terrorism, Islamist terrorism associated with nationalist liberation movements, and 
Islamist domestic insurgencies.  The domestic fundamentalist terrorist insurgencies involve 
Islamist fundamentalists within Islamic countries, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which challenge national governments by 
attacking government officials and interests. The activities of these organizations are often 
focused on attacking the global impact of western values, especially as they affect the 
Muslim world including, crude materialism, sexual licentiousness and gender equality, which 
Western culture promotes. Islam, for them, has been corrupted and secularism has infected a 
number of Arab states and their leaders. The activities of the domestic insurgencies are aimed 
at changing the religious and political status quo and bringing the un-Islamic governments 
and leaders down, by Jihad.  
The Islamist terrorists that are involved in nationalist liberation movements are those that 
focus on national liberation struggles, such as Hamas and Fatwa Brigade of Palestine and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon (Dalacoura 2006: 510). These organizations are known to be both 
social and political platforms, not just for their membership, but also for struggles over 
established socio-political issues of national significance. The Hezbollah, for example, which 
came into existence during the civil war in Lebanon in the 1980s as a Shia militia, has since 
fought Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon on different occasions, has become a political 
party, participating in domestic national politics and elections and engages in social and civic 
roles among the Shiites in Lebanon. It has also become a rallying point for most Lebanese 
that oppose Israel (Dalacoura 2006: 216). This is also true of the Hamas and the Fatwa in the 
Palestinian struggle. Although they do not agree on the ideal path to achieving a settlement 
for the Palestinian state – while Hamas rejects a two-state solution, Fatwa sees that to be the 
feasible outcome of their struggle – both focus on the plight of the Palestinians and the 
struggle for an independent Palestinian state. These organizations resort to terrorist attacks in 
pursuit of their goals (Dalacoura 2006: 217).      
The transnational Islamist terrorists are those represented by the Islamic Front. Islamist 
organizations that fall under this group concentrate on the global unity of actions by all 
Muslims. At this level, both the members of domestic insurgencies and those concerned with 
nationalist struggles are united and connected to the global network of fundamentalist 
Islamist terrorists. The emergence of al-Qaeda as a global spearhead in international terrorism 
has injected much dynamism, co-ordination and precision into the planning, communication 
and execution of terrorist acts. Al-Qaeda is the „nexus‟ of contemporary global terrorism 
(Kiras 2005:485). It is a loose organization of Islamist fundamentalist groups scattered all 
over the Muslim world, pre-occupied with a war (religious, cultural and historical) against the 
enemies of Islam – the West and its Jewish alliance (Schweitzer and Shay 2003: 25; 
Weinberg 2000: 74). Groups that may not have any physical connection find themselves 
brought together by the al-Qaeda network in the synergy presented by “a common ideology, a 
common enemy, mutual support and sponsorship” (Kiras 2005:484). Al-Qaeda was formally 
instituted in February 1998, with the establishment of the International Islamic Front for the 
Jihad against the Crusader and Jews. Al-Qaeda‟s World View is contained in the Fatwa or 
religious edict which was signed by Osama Bin-Laden,  the head of al-Qaeda; Al-Zawahiri, 
the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad faction; Sheikh Mir Hamza, the secretary of the 
Gamat alal Ulma of Pakistan; Fasslul Rahman of the Jihad Bangladesh Movement and 
Ahmad Rifai Taha of Egyptian Gymea‟s a-Islamiyah, calling on all Muslim faithful 
throughout the world to take the killing of American and their allies (civilians and military 
alike) as personal duties geared toward liberating the holy temple in Mecca and the Jewish 
occupied lands, especially Jerusalem, from the „infidels‟ (Schweitzer 2005:26).   
It is important to highlight the worldview that was presented by Bin Laden, which informs 
the current escalation in the incidents of global Islamist terrorism since the mid 1990s. 
Schweitzer and Shay (2003: 27) quoted Bin Laden as declaring:   
the entire globe in general and the Middle East in particular constitute an 
arena in which a conclusive battle for survival  prevails between the three 
main religions. In the struggle, a Christian Crusader-Jewish coalition has 
been formed which is expressed in the alliance between the United States 
and Israel… which has conquered Islam‟s most sacred lands of Mecca, 
Medina and Jerusalem and aspires to crush it… this alliance methodically 
and intentionally massacred Moslems… the massacre of Moslem Iraqi 
population by American forces in the Gulf war of 1991, the bombing of 
Iraq on December 1998, the massacre in Sabra and Shatilla during the war 
in Lebanon  and the killing of the Palestinians in the lands occupied by 
Israel. 
Islamist terrorists are not only armed against perceived enemies of Islam such as the United 
States and Israel but also “corrupt and sultanate Arab regimes that is the Gulf States, headed 
by the Saudi monarchy” (Schweitzer and Shay 2003: 27). The above presentation of violent 
acts as a religious (divine) duty to the terrorist recruits heightens the deadliness of these 
terrorists as the Islamist terrorist is given “unlimited” grounds to legitimize and/or justify the 
act. It shatters every measure of constraint by human morality, leading the terrorist to go all 
out to murder, including taking his or her own life, as part of the „divine obligation‟ 
(Weinzieri 2004: 37; Hoffman 1998: 88) and recognizing no „ethical or human limits‟ (Smith 
2004: 71). This explains why the Middle East conflict (the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) has 
remained the most critical issue that encourages Islamist terrorism and shapes the 
contemporary international terrorism, whether transnational or domestic. As such, almost 
every single contemporary Islamist terrorist points at the Palestinian question as a grievance.  
The impact of globalization on the surge in global terrorism is an ongoing debate. Victoroff 
(2005: 3) contends that globalization in the areas of “commerce, travel, and information 
transfer” has greatly affected the nature and the threat level of terrorism in the contemporary 
global system. The main characterizing feature of globalization is the fact of „knocked down‟ 
boundaries, the reformatting of the world into a borderless community, compressing it in 
space and time, and greatly weakening and diminishing the sovereignty and influence 
wielded by states. Two major dimensions of the impact of globalization on terrorism seem to 
have played out over the years. Firstly, globalization can be said to have created and 
sustained an enabling environment for terrorists to operate, especially with the enhancement 
of terrorist operational efficiency through the use of modern technologies that are easily 
available to terrorists in the form of cheaper and more capable computers, software and 
wireless technologies, the uninhibited utility of the worldwide web, the unlimited electronic 
contact capacity, the advanced publicity enhancing globe-wide media and the lax 
international financial system (Kiras 2005: 489). Terrorists have been aided by this 
conduciveness of environment in their recruitment drives, ability to disseminate information 
to the widest possible audience and to control the content of their messages; tailoring the 
information they post on the websites to have the expected effect on the audience. It has 
become easier for terrorist groups to match and/or dilute external information (or 
propaganda), co-ordinate activities across the globe from a single base, evade security 
mounted against them and mount security on their detractors. Sourcing of funds and 
transactions are made more secure by the prevailing mode of international money transfers. 
Added to these is the revolution in the transport industry in the contemporary international 
system. Traveling is made easier, faster, safer and more secure, even for the terrorist.    
 
Secondly, the dissemination of Western socio-cultural, economic and political values not 
only as the dominant value system but also as the defining parameter for measuring currency 
or “up-to-dateness”, has created tension and resentment in some quarters across the globe. 
This tends to have greatly sharpened the antagonism against the West and Westerners by   
fundamentalist Islam in the contemporary global interchange. Victoroff (2005: 7) observes 
that the demise of the Soviet Union, which signaled the end of the Cold War, and 
inaugurating a triumphant neo-liberalism, caused an observable rise in the global profile of 
„radical Islamist terrorism‟. Islamist fundamentalism has emerged as an „aggrieved 
competitor with the market – economic, democratic and secular trends of modernity‟ 
(Victoroff 2005: 3). The vehemence with which the fundamentalist Islamists harp on about 
the issue of the perceived erosion of Islamic values shows the extent to which this has been of 
critical appeal to most Muslims. Hoffman (1998: 38) points out that a large percentage of the 
global population and most Arabs perceive the United States as imperialistic, spreading its 
liberal values and eroding values, thereby heightening tensions within and across cultures. 
The al-Qaeda principles said that much when Bin Laden was quoted as charging that the 
Middle East, which symbolizes the soul of Islam currently “constitutes an arena in which a 
conclusive battle for survival prevails”, a battle he sees the US and Israel as having 
“conquered Islam‟s most holy lands….”(Schweitzer 2005: 27). The military inversion of Iraq 
by the coalition led by the US received widespread reaction among Muslims across the 
world. It was viewed as a continuation of the strategy of the West to completely overwhelm 
Islam. The Iraqi conflict, therefore, added a new impetus to the galvanization of 
fundamentalist Islamists‟ challenge of the role of the West in the Middle East and its 
implications for Islam. This has become an issue which remains relevant even with those 
moderate Arab governments such as Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This was 
especially complicated with the discovery that the allegation of possession or capability of 
possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) leveled against Iraq, on the strength of 
which the coalition against Iraq was built, was a flux. Insurgents from among Iraqis, as well 
as foreign fighters, coordinated by al-Qaeda continue to fight the coalition forces inside Iraq 
and still target Western interests across the world.           
Since the 1980s there have been not only a rise in the number of Islamist terrorist incidents 
but also of a more globalized and intense dimension. The casualties have risen to 
unprecedented levels. Africa, the Horn of Africa in particular, has experienced its fair share 
of terrorist activities. For instance, in December 1980 terrorists sympathetic to the PLO 
bombed the Norfolk Hotel, owned by an Israeli, in Nairobi, Kenya, killing sixteen people and 
injuring over a hundred. The 7 August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, 
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were more deadly: 240 Kenyans, 11 Tanzanians and 12 
Americans died, with over 5,000 Kenyans and 86 Tanzanians injured. There was yet another 
terrorist attack on another Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa and an attempt on a passenger 
plane on the runway at the Mombassa International Airport, Kenya. Both incidents happened 
in November 2002. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 1998 and 2002 attacks. With 
rising terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the reality of the Somali state failure, there is a 
growing concern that the Somali environment is supporting terrorist activities in the region. 
The activities of the al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and later the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), 
the Somali Islamist fundamentalist organizations, with their feared international connections 
and the security implications, are of concern not only to the region but also to global security 
monitors (Golden and Weiser 2001: i.d). Commenting on the al-Itihad al-Islamiya in its 
report of 21 May 2002 on patterns of global terrorism, the US State Department warned that:  
  
Somalia, a nation with no central government, represents a potential 
breeding ground as well as safe haven for terrorist networks. …. one 
indigenous group, al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), is dedicated to creating an 
Islamic state in Somalia, has carried out terrorist acts in Ethiopia, and may 
have some ties to al-Qaeda. AIAI remains active in several parts of 
Somalia.         
In the face of lingering civil conflict, all institutions of governance have collapsed in Somalia. 
The borders have remained porous, making Somalia a transit route for terrorists, as was the 
case with those responsible for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (Otenyo 2004: 
78).  As noted by the US State Department, Islamist activities thrive and there is a wide 
availability of small arms in the hands of unemployed youths. This growing concern that the 
governance vacuum in Somalia renders the territory a potential terrorist haven has not abated, 
rather it increases by the day. The following chapters are focused on Somalia, assessing the 
protracted failure and investigating the extent to which this condition (protracted 










In order to assess the environment of failed or collapsed states, the issue of what confers the 
status of a state on a territory comes into question. A state is characterized by a defined 
territoriality, a government that controls that territory and “a resident population” that lays 
claim to the territory. Uzodike (2007: 16) observes that the notion of sovereignty of states is 
conveyed by “territorial control” and Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr. (1990: 23) emphasize the 
basic responsibility of “making and administering” laws within a territorial jurisdiction as 
paramount. While Fukuyama (2005: 8) stresses the monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical force as the basic characterizing element of stateness, Samuel Huntington, in his 
1965 work, Political Order in Changing Societies, states that the essence of any territory‟s 
stateness is the “adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and 
procedures” (Huntington 1965: 12), emphasizing not only territorial control but also the 
existence of a systemic order in the polity. Quaranto (2008: 8) feels that stateness does not 
only reside in the “control of a given territory, but also management of that territory‟s public 
goods and interests”, which, in itself, “gives the state a degree of both legitimacy and 
relevance”. The survival of statehood, therefore, revolves around the tripod of territory, 
population and government. The implications of the absence of, or tampering with, any of 
these conditions on the continued existence and/or effective functioning of a state have posed 
some difficulty. Indeed, many scholars have engaged the debate of what constitutes state 
failure or collapse. For example, while the disintegration or break-up of the component 
geographic parts of a state may result automatically in its cessation, as in the case of Bosnia, 
it was not the case with the break-up of the constituting parts of the former Soviet Union, 
which only resulted in the abolishment of the entity and the emergence of some new 
sovereign states.  In the latter instance, the Russian Federation retained and maintained all the 
institutions of the former Soviet Union without any disruption of the institutions of 
governance or breakdown of law and order.  
 
Quaranto (2008: 8) opines that underpinning the concept of state failure is the definition of 
“what a state entails or does”. In definitions of, and discussions on, failed states, most experts 
agree on focusing on governance and social, economic and legal institutions as being of 
primary importance for a territory to retain its “stateness”. Dorff (1999: 63), in his definition 
of failed states, highlights the basic characteristics of state failure thus: “the state loses the 
ability to perform the basic functions of governance, and it loses legitimacy … the inability of 
political institutions to meet the basic functions of legitimate governance is also accompanied 
by economic collapse”. Agreeing with Dorff, Susan Rice defines state failure as the inability 
of a central government to “maintain control over its territory and provide basic services to its 
citizens” (2003: 2).  Dempsey (2006: v) defines the security characterization of state failure 
as including (among other things) “the disintegration and criminalization of public security 
forces, the collapse of the state administrative structures responsible for overseeing these 
forces, and the erosion of infrastructure that supports their effective operation”.  Rotberg 
(2002: 130) associates state failure with the “collapse of the local justice system and the 
criminalization of the security services”. He makes a distinction between state failure and 
state collapse where the latter is characterized as “extreme failure” (Rotberg 2005: 10). 
Zartman (1995: 1) argues that state collapse results in “a situation where the structure, 
authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be 
reconstituted in some form, old or new”. The state, therefore, can be said to have failed or 
collapsed when it has suffered institutional collapse, giving rise to the break-down of law and 
order, collapse of the rule of law and moderating influence of any sort, even with the territory 
intact such as the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
 
The Somali state failure has not led to debate on its level of collapse and the possible security 
implications of the territory as a congenial terrorist safe haven. Most experts have presented 
Somalia as a clear example of a completely failed state. Rotberg (2002:131) describes 
Somalia as “the model of a collapsed state: a geographical expression only, with borders but 
with no effective way to exert authority within those borders”.  Jhazbhay (2003: 77) quoted 
Ali Mazrui as saying that „the situation in Somalia now is a culture of rules without rulers, a 
stateless society‟.  Menkhaus (2003: 27) has singled out protracted and complete state 
collapse, protracted armed conflict and lawlessness as aptly representing the Somali situation. 
“Somalia‟s inability to pull together even the most minimalist fig-leaf of a central 
administration over the course of twelve years places the country in a class by itself among 
the world‟s failed states”. In Somalia: state of collapse and the threat of terrorism, Menkhaus 
labeled Somalia “a failure among failed states” (2004: 17).  Even Little (2003:123), who 
points out that Somalia has not slid into anarchy, agrees that it is stateless. It is difficult to 
place the Somali political situation into any other known category, other than that of a 
territory in anarchy. The clans that were united around the single project of the removal of 
Siad Barre, who to them personified the Darod clan, could not collectively take over the 
power to establish authority over the country.  
 
The fall of Barre was followed by the collapse of the alliance and the factionalization of the 
groups and clans, leading to the balkanization of the entire Somali territory. The clans and 
sub-clans were becoming „self-governing entities‟, each carving out its own sphere of 
influence (Lewis 1994: 230; Vinci 2006: 77). The political environment in Somalia became 
very „volatile‟ (Little 2003: 150). Service delivery collapsed and the security situation 
continued to deteriorate. Fundamentalist Islamist organizations operate inside Somalia 
without any internal security monitoring, following the collapse of the institutions of law and 
order. The administration of the Somali territory had changed hands at different periods from 
one warlord to another, to a Transitional National Government, to a coalition of warlords, to 
the radical Islamic Courts Union, and to the Transitional Federal Government, with each 
lacking the legitimacy to assert authority over the population and to be recognized as their 
government by the Somali people. State collapse does not suggest the absence of any form of 
organizational system in its totality, but the absence of any legitimate power monopoly. 
Quaranto (2008: 9) stresses that “there may be other forms of governance within a collapsed 
state, but they do not have a monopoly in the given territory”.  This is the situation in 
Somalia. The environment created by this situation tends to predispose Somalia as an 
attractive terrorist destination. It readily presents an enabling environment for domesticating 
terrorists and a very attractive staging ground for international terrorists as a hiding place, a 
recruiting and training ground and a transit gateway to the region. This enabling environment 
is characterized by the lingering civil conflict, porous borders, the absence of institutions of 
governance, the indiscriminate availability of arms and the prevalence of young unemployed 
independent militiamen. The synergy of these factors produces a Somalia that looks very 
vulnerable to terrorism. 
 
3.2 The porous borders 
One of the factors that have continued to reoccur in the discussions on conflicts and crimes in 
Africa is the porous nature of the borders of most African states. This problem has much to 
do, in most cases, with the manner in which the boundaries of these states were drawn at 
independence. Many ethnic groups are often split over more than one state. National 
boundaries in most parts of Africa are, therefore, regarded as “artificial”. This has serious 
socio-political, economic and security implications for not only African states but also for the 
global community. Somalia has serious political and security problems presented by the 
porousness of its borders. To assess these border problems meaningfully, it is pertinent to 
understand the peculiar history of Somalia, which is manifesting in the border issues. Somalia 
presents a classical case of dismemberment of peoples using indiscriminate colonial 
administrative lines, which eventually endured in the post-independence African states, 
causing and/or aggravating conflicts in many parts of Africa.  
 
Somalis had a unique colonial experience. They were divided among four colonial powers, 
three European (Britain, France and Italy) and one African (Ethiopia). While the former 
French Somaliland became the independent state of Djibouti, Italian and British Somaliland 
metamorphosed into the Republic of Somalia. Ethiopia retains the territory it colonized (the 
Ogaden) to this day. Of the six major Somali clan families, the four largest are distributed 
across the borders into Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The Hawiya clan in southern Somalia is 
cut into south-eastern Ethiopia and north-western Kenya. The Darod clan of Somalia 
occupies the whole length of the east-central, through the north-eastern part of Ethiopia, as 
well as the north-central through the north-eastern part of Kenya. This region is the Ogaden, 
which Somalia has been claiming as part of its territory. The Ishaak clan is cut into Ethiopia, 
while the Dir clan is cut into Ethiopia and Djibouti. In all these cases, with the exception of 
the Hawiya clan, the clans live on both borders of the Somali boundaries. The state 
boundaries, therefore, mean little to these kith and kin, who see them as merely artificial 
demarcations which do not matter. This explains why these borders have been a problem to 
secure. Laitin and Samatar (1987: 53) state that “many of the problems faced by the post-
colonial Somali society were set in motion by the peculiar character of the colonial 
occupation of Somalia” and the manner in which the decolonization process was conducted. 
The fact that the population in this region is predominantly pastoralist compounds the 
situation, as the basic character of such a population is migration from one area to another in 
search of pastures and water.  
 
The exploitation of the porous nature of these borders for illegal activities and the smuggling 
of banned foreign products has existed for a very long time in the region (Little 2003: 102: 
Laitin and Samatar 1987: 54; International Crisis Group 2005a: 24). The failure of the Somali 
state and the consequent collapse of institutions of governance and law enforcement 
exacerbated the problem and heightened the security threat this situation poses to the region 
and to global security in general. The border towns inside Ethiopian and Kenyan territories 
grew in significance, with increased commercial activities and illegal cross-border traffic. 
Markets emerged and are thriving in Kenyan border towns, where Somali livestock is sold. 
Somali ports serve as transit entry ports for goods imported duty-free, such as cloths and 
electronics from Dubai, and then smuggled through the porous borders into Kenya (Bryden 
1999: 138).  
 
Somalia is adjudged as having one of the longest coastlines in Africa (Powell et al., 2006:11; 
Little 2003:7). There existed, even before the Somali state collapse, the problem of effective 
control of its vast international border, by the government. In the absence of government 
control on the Somali side of the border and with Somali towns under warlords who are only 
busy collecting money from vehicular traffic, the efforts on the other side of the border hardly 
solve any problems. The tightening of security across the border by Kenya and Ethiopia has 
usually yielded very little, owing to the activities of the “Somalis” living on both sides of the 
border. In an interview published on 7 November 2007 by the Council on Foreign Relations, 
a New York-based Peace and Conflict NGO, the Ethiopian ambassador to the US was quoted 
as stating that “to talk about commercial traffic in that part of the country is to talk about 
contraband. Contraband now means in this context weapons and explosives coming in – it is 
a very porous region, a 2000-kilometre border [with Somalia], very porous border and 
[contraband] comes in through many, many different points…” (Assefa, S. 2007: i. d).  
 
The difficulties in policing these borders include not only the fact that the borders are very 
long, but also those of the very rough terrain. The long expanse is sandy and bumpy, 
vegetated by arid savanna shrubs and palms. This makes both ground and air patrols near 
impossible. Added to this is the fact that the Kenyan and Ethiopian security forces are not 
well-equipped enough to face the trans-border smugglers, who use strong vehicles and are 
better armed, sometimes with “rocket propelled grenades and heavy machine guns” (Dexter, 
F. 2002: i. d). Corruption of officials across the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders with Somalia 
has also been revealed as a contributing factor to the porous nature of the border. The border 
guards, especially those on the Kenyan side, are believed to be in the habit of “cooperating 
with the smugglers in return for cash” (Dexter 2002:  i. d).  
 
The above scenario creates an enabling environment for possible movements of terrorist 
elements and arms in and out of Somalia, targeting the neighbouring states and Western 
interests in those states. Even though there is no consensus regarding the level of terrorist 
operations inside Somalia, there seems to be an agreement that it serves as a transit and shield 
for al Qaeda operatives in the region (International Crisis Group 2005a: 11; Menkhaus 2004: 
70; Menkhaus 2005: 42-43; Dempsey 2006: 14; International Crisis Group 2006:  9; 
International Crisis Group 2007: 4; Harper 2007; Quaranto 2008: 28). Somalia has been 
linked with terrorist attacks in the neighbouring states, in which cases al-Qaeda used the 
territory as a co-ordination outpost and transit route. In the 7 August 1998 terrorist bombings 
of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the November 2002 
hotel and international airport attacks in Mombassa (Kenya), for which al-Qaeda claimed 
responsibility, security reports confirmed the use of the Somali border for safe and shielded 
passage (Kagwanja 2006: 76; Otenyo 2004: 78).  
 
At present there are fears that foreign Islamist fighters move into Somalia through its 
numerous porous entry ports to join forces with the Islamist fundamentalists who are fighting 
for the control of Somalia. The International Crisis Group (2007: 4) points out that “late 2006 
… steady influx of jihadi volunteers from across the Muslim world (including numerous 
young radicals from Somali Diaspora)” was estimated to be “from several hundred to, less 
plausibly, several thousand”. This is in the wake of an on-going battle since December 2006 
between the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the Transitional National Government, backed 
by Ethiopian forces. Kenyan officials reported making “a few arrests of fleeing combatants, 
apparently including a commander from an Ethiopian separatist group and an Eritrean army 
colonel…” (Petrou 2007: i. d). This new dimension to the Somali conflict, in the light of the 
international terrorist connections of the Islamic Courts, raises the fear of a relapse into 
continued insurgency, imitating Afghanistan and Iraq, as it is becoming another rallying point 
for Islamist jihadists.     
 
3.3 The lingering conflict   
The Somali state showed signs of crisis from its inauguration. It exhibited serious lack of 
cohesion from the very beginning. The pull towards disintegration seemed to be stronger than 
that towards unity. Primary among the reasons for this lack of unity was the contest among 
the various clan families in Somalia for power and resources, which was centralized in the 
national government (Elmi and Barise 2006: 33). The over-centralization of post-
independence Somalia meant that the control and distribution of national resources became 
the monopoly of the government at the centre. Control of the state therefore, bestows access 
to, and control of, resources. The control of government institutions of policy decisions and 
implementation by any group places it at an advantage over the others. This explains the 
competition for capturing the state. The political elites see the clan as a viable platform for 
gaining political control of the state, and this provides access to the resources.  
 
The complaint of alienation from the polity (Somalia) very early in the life of the young 
Republic by the north (former British Somaliland) can be seen, not only from the point of 
clan interest and/or marginalization, but also from the feeling of a sense of marginalization by 
the northern political elite whose counterparts from the south (former Italian Somaliland) 
took the offices of the president, prime minister and major cabinet positions and are in the 
majority in the parliament. Samatar (1988: 62) explains that it was a case of pure „intra-class‟ 
struggle among the petite bourgeoisie on both sides, more than it was an issue of regional or 
inter-clan competition. Both Samatar (1988: 63) and Elmi and Barise (2006: 37) are of the 
opinion that the clan elements were only introduced by the various contending elites to 
legitimize their struggle and to create a fallback constituency. This position tends to be 
validated by the development of intra-clan conflicts and splits at some stages of the Somali 
crisis. The bitter conflict that ensued between Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi 
Mohamed, both of whom were from the same Hawiye clan, represents very clearly one of 
such elite competitions that were executed, in this case, on sub-clan platforms. 
 
The coming to power of General Mohammed Siad Barre in a bloodless coup in October 1969, 
following the assassination of the president, was to eventually become the catalyst that 
facilitated the beginning of open armed hostilities in Somalia. The early days of the 
administration enjoyed good support across clan lines because of its disposition to fighting 
corruption, which had by then eaten deep into the life of the young democratic system. The 
populace was weary of the ostentatious life-styles of politicians who were called to account 
by the new administration (WSP 2001: 8). The new military regime also mobilized the 
Somali masses around itself by its popular programmes, which included the introduction of a 
Latin script for the country in 1972, the launching of a successful mass literacy programme, 
the expansion of health and educational services, the introduction of a self-help community 
economic programme and the resettlement of the victims of the 1974/75 drought. The Barre 
administration condemned clannishness and continued to make its initial appointments across 
clan lines and seemingly on merit. These measures were not to last long, as the over-
centralization of power led to its abuse by the government and its officials, as corruption 
gradually crept in and clannish considerations for government appointment resurfaced (Ajulu 
2004: 77; Laitin and Samatar 1987: 79; WSP 2001: 9).  
 
Opposition started to mount and armed opposition groups began to spring up inside Somalia, 
and across its borders, in Ethiopia, its hostile neighbour. Somalia was not to be the same 
again, as this marked the turning point in the Somalia journey to imminent state collapse. 
With the opposition coming from clan-based groups, Barre himself resorted to clannishness, 
favoring his Darod clan in appointments.  „Rebel clans‟ were targeted, as was the experience 
of the Isaaq, Majerteen, Hawiye and other clans. The playing and arming of clans against one 
another, and the arming of militia groups against perceived opponents by Barre, was to be 
one of the major factors that eventually plunged Somalia into the intractable war that led to 
the fall of Barre and the eventual collapse of the Somali state (Ahmed and Green 2007: 118).  
This was so because most clans and militia that were armed eventually became part of the 
opposition that coalesced, armed with those weapons, and with military assistance from 
neighbouring states like Ethiopia in their final push against Siad Barre. This organized 
opposition included the Somalia National Movement (SNM), the Hawiye clan United Somali 
Congress (USC), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and the Ethiopian-based 
Somalia National Congress (SNC), led by Mohammed Farah Aideed – all clan-based 
parties/groups (Adam 1992: 18). 
 
The opposition against Siad Barre became a unifying factor for the armed opposition. This 
unity could not be sustained after the fall of Barre. Vinci (2006: 77) points out that the 
situation in Somalia at the point of collapse in 1991 “differed in important respects from civil 
wars in which the state is taken over by one of the factions which sought to over-throw it”. 
The ferocious inter group and intra group armed conflict which ensued among the groups in 
the struggle for the control of the government after the fall of Barre eventually led to the 
collapse of the state when none of the groups could take over state control (Ahmed, I. and 
Green, R. 1999: 119). The conflict soon degenerated into clan militia struggles, with each 
clan controlling a section of Somalia. Describing the situation, Lewis (1994: 231) explains 
that: 
 
In 1991/92, reactively influenced by the example of the Somali Salvation 
Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United 
Somali Congress (USC) and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the general 
tendency was for every major Somali                  clan to form its own militia 
movement. Thus clans were becoming effectively self-governing entities 
throughout the Somali region as they carved out spheres of influence in a 
process which, with the abundance of modern weapons, frequently entailed 
savage battles with a high toll of civilian casualties. 
 
The severity of the conflict, and the damage and losses inflicted on Somali society, was 
magnified by the factionalization of most of the groups to the levels of sub-clans. Yoh (2003: 
89) opines that the chaos, which trailed the defeat of Siad Barre was the result of the struggle 
among splinters for control and which has persisted, rendering Somalia ungovernable. Lack 
of central control and the enduring militia struggle for control softens the ground for the 
thriving of terrorist nodes and hub, and the possible penetration and involvement of foreign 
jihadists. The emergence and activities of the al-Itihaad al-Islaamiya (AIAI) in connection 
with terrorist activities inside Somalia and within the region points clearly to how far the 
administrative flux produced by state failure went in supporting terrorist activity. The AIAI‟s 
demise between the middle and late 1990s saw the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union, 
which absorbed the former members of AIAI leadership and radical jihadists within its ranks 
(International Crisis Group 2006: 9-10). The Islamic Courts took control of Mogadishu and 
its environs from the warlords in the bitter battle of June 2006 that left hundreds of civilians 
dead. By the middle of December that same year, the Courts had taken control of the entire 
southern Somalia, with the exception of Baioda, which was hosting the Transitional Federal 
Government, ably protected by Ethiopian soldiers. The attempt by the Islamic Courts to over-
run Baioda, and by implication the Transitional Federal Government, resulted in a disaster for 
the ICU, following the full-scale war between it and all Islamists they could mobilize on one 
side and the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian troops on the other. The ICU 
was defeated in less than two weeks of battle, with an estimated casualty of 2000 to 3000 
men and loss of a sizeable quantity of military equipment. Over 500 men and some 
equipment were estimated to have been lost on the side of the combined Ethiopian and TFG 
soldiers, all between the last week of December 2006 and the end of January 2007 
(International Crisis Group 2007: 1; Harper 2007: i. d). One thing stands out: that battle saw 
the highest level of mobilization of radical Islamists and Jihadists in the Somali conflict, both 
locally and internationally, since the conflict began in the early 1990s.  Also, it saw massive 
covert support of the TFG by the United States and the full-scale involvement of Ethiopian 
forces in the conflict. The Ethiopian contingent was made up of very experienced soldiers, 
specially trained by American instructors in their camp in Djibouti. They were highly 
equipped, including air cover.  The conflict has not abated even with the defeat of the Islamic 
Courts Union; rather, it has transformed into an insurgency, which escalated following the 
declaration of jihad by the Islamic Courts and the call for international Jihadis to become 
involved (Harper 2007: i. d), causing further deterioration in the security situation in Somalia 
and increasing the terrorist threat it poses to the region and globally (Hassan and Barnes 
2007: i. d). Incidents of suicide attacks on the Transitional Federal Government positions and 
foreign aid workers have become rampant since 2007. Armed skirmishes between Ethiopian 
soldiers inside Somalia and the Shabaab (Islamic Courts militia) are commonplace (Quaranto 
2008: 1). Added to this situation is the fear that the warlords are rearming and repositioning 
themselves to the post-June 2006 territorial controls (UN Monitoring Group Report 2007: 19-
20; See also the record of arms purchases in Tables A & B below). This will mean an 
accentuation of the conflict, worsening the security situation and throwing up new 
dimensions to the conflict, given the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia.         
     
3.4 The Collapse of the institutions of governance 
The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 has resulted in the collapse of all forms of central 
control and authority. In the absence of a central government that could exercise power over 
the whole territory, clan warlords control various segments of the country. Law enforcement 
in this situation has become impossible. In this scenario, some important common interests 
and values have collapsed, as individual and clan survival becomes paramount. Ali Mazrui 
was quoted in Jhazbhay (2003: 77) as saying that „the situation in Somalia now is a culture of 
rules without rulers, a stateless society‟. Menkhaus (1998: 220) explains that there emerged 
in Somalia “fluid localized polities involving authorities as diverse as clan elders, 
professionals, militia leaders, businessmen, traditional Muslim clerics, Islamic 
fundamentalists and women associations”. Since then Somalia has relapsed deeper into 
clannish territorial jurisdictions and militia controls, including the 2006 months of Islamic 
Courts Union control of most parts of southern Somalia. Whatever gains in nation and 
„national‟ consciousness building, made on the basis of the „Greater Somalia‟ project 
between 1961 and 1991, has been eroded.    
 
Not surprisingly, the political environment in Somalia is unpredictable and „volatile‟ (Little 
2003: 150). Militias, mostly under warlords, control the now segmented parts of Somalia, 
with each setting the rules within its territory of influence. This dismembered form of 
territoriality provides the warlords with a population to „tax and exploit‟ in what Little (2003) 
calls „economy of plunder and violence‟ (Reno 1998: 3; Little 2003: 150-151). Warlords 
employ the services of the many unemployed and impoverished youths – „the mooryaans‟, 
meaning the robbed or dispossessed - that roam the streets of Somalia. These youths are well 
armed and sometimes not really under the control of any particular warlord, but rendering 
security services on their own to those that may need it, such as the „merchants and 
development agencies‟ (Menkhaus 2000:191; Little 2003: 151). In this way, the youths 
(through their activities) have supplanted the local clan elders. 
 
The first Transitional National Government (TNG), headed by Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, 
which was the outcome of the Djibouti-brokered Arta conference of 2000, could not survive 
the arm-twisting policy of Ethiopia, which not only rejected the new Somali leadership but 
also facilitated the formation of the opposition Somali Reconciliation and Reconstruction 
Council (SRRC). The demise of that government saw the emergence in 2004 of the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) headed by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Seen as a 
surrogate of the Ethiopian government, the TFG was not able to impose its control over 
Somalia. It faces strong opposition from the Islamic Courts and other factional leaders who 
have continued to contest its legitimacy.  Until the very last week of 2006, the TFG was not 
able to operate from Mogadishu, the Somali capital, which was before then in the hands of 
the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). It took an onslaught by the Ethiopian military against the 
ICU between 26 December 2006 and 1 January 2007 to dislodge the ICU from the capital and 
for the TFG to move into Mogadishu. Ever since then, the TFG has not taken full control. By 
continuing to protect itself with Ethiopian troops, the Transnational Federal Government 
(TFG) faces legitimacy problems. Ethiopia has been a historical enemy of Somalia. 
Therefore, the involvement of its soldiers inside Somalia is seen as an unacceptable invasion 
by an enemy, assisted by the TFG. The TFG also continues to face a rising insurgency 
orchestrated by the Shabaab militia (the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union), which 
retained their military command and control, and the capability to conduct regular armed 
attacks, despite being pushed out of Mogadishu (Harper 2007: i. d; Crisis Group 2007: 3).  
 
Describing their flight from Mogadishu as only a “tactical withdrawal”, to be followed by “an 
Iraqi style insurgency”, the United Islamic Courts is promising an enduring struggle that will 
eventually lead to the termination of the TFG and the expulsion of its foreign backers from 
Somali soil. Mary Harper observed in the Social Science Research Council report of 20 
February 2007 that some radical Islamists across the world have started “adopting the UIC 
militiamen as their fellow Jihadists”. She highlighted the call on an internet audio recording 
in January 2007, believed to have been made by the al-Qaeda second-in-command. The 
content of that message was that “Muslims are called upon to join Somalis in launching 
ambushes, land mines, raids and suicidal combats against the crusader invading Ethiopian 
forces and to consume them as lions eat their prey” (Harper 2007: i. d). This call seems to 
have been heeded by the formation of an Islamist-led Somali opposition alliance in Eritrea in 
September 2007, whose aim is to force Ethiopian troops out of Somalia and to take the reigns 
of power in Mogadishu (www.insidesomalia.org). Fresh skirmishes, resulting in loss of lives 
and the taking over of many parts of Mogadishu and some other towns since late January 
2007, have been reported (Harper 2007: i. d; International Crisis Group 2007: 4). This 
development may portend new danger, as it predisposes Somalia towards serving as a target 
for foreign Islamist fighters. Events in Somalia since the beginning of 2008 seem to suggest 
that it is sliding into a full-blown insurgency (Quaranto 2008: 59; Ryu 2008: i. d; Nguyen 
2008: i. d).      
 
The existence and indeed the relevance of a state are not merely in its basic structures and 
functions. It also embodies a set of values -- a collection of deeply held principles -- which 
moderate the thinking and actions of its members. Apart from defining the individuals‟ 
perceptions of, and attitudes towards, the state, these values shape the lives and the 
expectations of the citizens within the context of the state. This very important factor, so 
crucial for social cohesion and development, is now lost in Somalia, which explains its slide 
into anarchy.  
 
The declaration of independence by Somaliland on the heels of the collapse of the Somali 
state in 1991, and the declaration by Puntland of its own autonomy from the „Republic of 
Somaliland‟, tended to have rendered the political entity “Somalia” non-existent (at least for 
now). The international community has been in the quagmire of whether or not to recognize 
Somaliland as a sovereign state which, according to Lewis (quoted in Jhazbhay 2003:78) has 
remained, and may for many years remain, the „only viable Somali state on offer‟. 
 
3.5 The availability of weapons          
The large-scale availability of weapons in Somalia has helped in configuring the Somali 
conflict and in determining its outcome. The emergence of many warlords with access to 
large quantities of weapons of various types contributed in no small measure to the escalation 
of the conflict leading to the defeat of Siad Barre and the eventual collapse of the Somali 
state. The availability of arms in Somalia has a grave security implication for Somalia and the 
entire region. It also holds global security concerns, given the attractiveness of such an 
enabling environment for sale and procurement of arms by terrorists. 
 
During the Cold War, the geo-strategic location of Somalia made it an attractive location for 
the United States and the former Soviet Union, the then two superpowers.  The two 
superpowers engaged in a debilitating competition over Somalia, with both presidents of the 
US Nixon and of the USSR Brezhnev wooing the Siad Barre government with massive 
military assistance. This support was in the form of arms and equipment, as well as training 
its forces and arming the security services and military forces. Bryden (1999: 134) called this 
competitive military support of the Barre regime by the two Cold War principal actors “a 
ruinous exercise”. He stated that those arms and equipment emboldened Siad Barre 
throughout his dictatorship, eventually plunging Somalia into its human tragedy (Bryden 
1999: 136). Elmi and Barise (2006: 37) pointed out that a good quantity of those arms ended 
in the hands of the warlords and militias after the collapse of the Barre administration.  
  
Somalia‟s other source of arms was Ethiopia. Even before the Somali independence and the 
unification of the northern and southern Somalia, the Ethiopian regime had been under 
consistent pressure by the desire of the Somalis to achieve their dream of the „Greater 
Somalia‟, which would include the Ogadeen region, The Ogadeen, which is considered by 
Somalis as part of Somalia, lies in part in Kenya and Ethiopia. This state of affairs has been 
argued to have disposed Ethiopia to supporting any activity that would destabilize Somalia 
(Marchal 2007: i. d). The support had been in the form of arms supplies, logistic and 
sometimes outright mobilization and sponsorship of opposition military activities against the 
regime in Mogadishu ((Elmi and Barise 2006: 38). The Ethiopian regime reasoned that 
consistent crisis in Somalia would keep the Somalis preoccupied with internal conflict and 
thereby take their attention off the quest for the unification of all Somalis. Ethiopia was, 
therefore, ever willing to allow Somali insurgents the use its territory from where they 
launched attacks against the government forces inside Somalia. For example, the Somali 
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) has its headquarters in Ethiopia and was said to be 
heavily sponsored by that country. Different other Somali dissident groups (SNM; USC and 
SPM) were encouraged in different locations, therefore, opening armed conflicts in many 
quarters at the same time (Elmi and Barise 2006: 39; Ahmed and Green 2007: 116). These 
weapons were not only used against the government forces, but were equally available for 
use against rival groups in the struggle for supremacy among the different armed groups after 
the ousting of Barre (Elmi and Barise 2006: 34-35). Some of those weapons ended up in the 
hands of unemployed independent youths, who were more involved in freelance security, 
providing services to whomever could afford their services. These weapons became part of 
the security problem as they were on many occasions used in intimidating and robbing 
ordinary citizens at roadblocks and house raids (Ahmed and Green 2007: 117).   
 
Again, there was the policy of the Siad Barre administration of arming clans that were loyal 
to the government of the day, against opposition clans. These were not members of the 
regular Somali military, but clan militias that were raised and armed to act as the first line of 
defense in the event of attacks against the state. Some of these weapons eventually ended up 
being used against the same government that provided them, when some of the clans that 
initially fought on the side of the government either completely turned against the 
government or factionalized and parted ways (Elmi and Barise 2006: 35). 
 
Following the fall of Siad Barre and an ensuing bitter factional war for control among the 
clan warlords, the use and domestic sale and importation of weapons became widespread. 
The clan warlords were stocking arms to defend their areas of control and to advance their 
influence in the contest for control at the centre. The Somali state had been strongly 
centralized, so control of the state would bestow access to, and control of, resources. The 
control by any clan group of governance institution responsible for policy decisions and 
implementation would place it at an advantage over the other contending clans. This explains 
the quest and competition for capturing the state by the different clan warlords, which 
motivated greatly an armaments race among the Somali warlords, depending heavily on 
[illegal] arms acquisition through external alliances. It was not long before Somalia became a 
field for competing external interests, especially among the Arab countries, each striving to 
have leverage over the others by supplying different factions in the conflict with military and 
technical support. Yoh (2003: 90) observes that Arab states were operating at “counter-
points”, conflicting interests which was encouraged by the desire by each of them, mostly 
Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Yemen, to place themselves in an advantaged position 
in Somalia, should a government emerge. Even with the UN‟s imposition of an arms embargo 
on both direct and indirect arms supplies to Somalia by way of the 1992 security Council 
Resolution 751(1992), the Somali arms situation did not improve; rather, it kept deteriorating 
in what the International Crisis Group called “The Culture of Impunity” in its April 2004 
Africa Report No 79 (International Crisis Group 2004: 14). While Saudi Arabia, Libya and 
Qatar concentrated mostly on the provision of funding for procurement of arms, Yemen was 
touted as the major source of commercial arms into Somalia. The Yemeni role can be 
explained  both as the result of its proximity and the presence (in Yemen) of radical Islamists 
that shared affinity with those inside Somalia and the unmanned and porous ports and borders 
of Somalia (UN Security Council 2003: 19; International Crisis Group 2004: 14). The cited 
UN Security Council report, which was reacting to the submission made to it by the Panel of 
Experts on Somalia, described Yemen as the “Somali Arms Supermarket” (UN Security 
Council 2003: 19).  
 
A number of other countries contributed to the arms proliferation in Somalia.  For instance, 
there were reports that on 25 July 2006 Iran shipped “PKM machine guns and M-79 grenade 
launchers, 1,000 machine guns and grenade launchers, an unknown quantity of mines and 
ammunition, and 45 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile[s]”. Syria was accused of not only 
training Somali Islamists in guerrilla warfare, but also delivering a large quantity of arms to 
the Islamic Courts Union in September 2006, which included surface-to-air missiles (UN 
Monitoring Group 2006: 21, 26). 
 
While Ethiopia had its troops inside Somalia on the invitation of the Transitional Federal 
Government, thereby possessing large quantity of arms inside Somalia, Eritrea has been 
named as “the principal clandestine source and conduit for arms supplies to the Shabaab” – 
the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union. (UN Monitoring Group 2007: 9). The Eritrean 
behaviour may have been encouraged by the overt involvement of its archenemy and 
neighbour, Ethiopia, which is fighting on the side of the Transitional Government, with US 
and UN tacit consent, against the Islamic Courts Union, suspected to be involved in terrorist 
activities inside Somalia and in the region. The activities of independent actors (businessmen) 
from countries such as Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Britain, Australia 
and Djibouti who engaged in moving arms into Somalia exacerbated the problem. 
 
The UN arms embargo did not in any way slow down the frequency of arms deliveries to 
Somalia. Newer models of assorted sophisticated weapons still made their way into Somalia 
in large quantity. They ranged from “large and expensive anti-aircraft gun to ocean freight 
containers filled with arms, explosives, ammunition, small arms, mines and anti-tank 
weapons” (UN News Service 2005: i. d; Lederer 2005: i. d). Writing in its June 2007 report 
on Somalia, the United Nations Monitoring Group observed: “Somalia is literally awash with 
arms. … The sheer quantities, numbers and diversity of arms, especially in central and 
southern Somalia, are greater than at any time since the early 1990s” (UN Monitoring Group 
2007: 3). In its 2006 report, the UN Monitoring Group not only notes with grave concern the 
increase in arms flow but also the introduction of “new and more sophisticated types of 
weapons … into Somalia, including man-portable surface-to-air missiles such as the Strela-2 
and 2M, also known as the SA 7a and 7b “Grail”, and the SA-6 “Gainful” low-to-medium 
altitude surface-to-air missile. Other new types of arms included multiple rocket launchers 
and second-generation infrared-guided anti-tank weapons. These weapons are readily 
available to the public in the “illegal” arms markets. Mogadishu, the Somali capital, was 
categorized as one of the most heavily armed cities in the world. The Bakaaraha arms market 
in Somalia has played a major role in both procurement and distribution of arms inside 
Somalia. It has taken the form of an “arms bazaar”, with all forms of arms available and as 
openly displayed as every other merchandise for whoever has the needs and the means. Idd 
Mohamed, Somalia‟s deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, said that “the 
problem was people could go and buy weapons at that market and sell them to whomever – 
anybody with money could buy them” (http://www.pbs.org).  The Bakaaraha arms market 
played a major role in the Somali conflict, serving as purchasing point for all the parties in 
the conflict, including the various clans and warlords, the Shabaab and even the Transitional 
Governments (UN Monitoring Group 2007: 190; UN Monitoring Group 2004: i. d) [See 
Tables A & B below]. These group and bulk purchases are complemented by private 
procurements that took place on a daily basis. Dealey (2006:) paints a picture of an arms shop 
in Bakaraaha market in late November 2006: 
 
A grenade rests against a box of ammunition next to a row of AK-47s and 
still more rifles hang from the nails beneath a patch of tin roofing. His 
booth occupies prime real estate in the centre of Mogadishu‟s Bakaraaha 
Arms Market, and he obsessively polishes his guns with an oil-stained rag 
in a battle against sand and grit. … Mohammed‟s average daily sales have 
dropped from 15 AKs to just three- and prices have fallen by almost half, to 
$300.  
 
Dealey quoted Mohammed, aged 24, as complaining, “The only good job was selling guns. 
Now I don‟t know what I‟ll do”. The UN Monitoring Group Report (2007: 19) observe that 
following the ouster of the Islamic Courts Union from power between December 2006 and 
January 2007 the arms market has bounced back and prices of both weapons and ammunition 
continue to go up (see Tables A, B &C). This development is attributed to the attempt by the 
various warlords to reconstitute and rearm their different militias in an attempt to regain their 
positions of influence, which they lost with their defeat by the ICU. The Shabaab (ICU) was 
equally procuring arms locally to complement external supplies and its abundant hidden 
stockpiles, those that escaped the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian army‟s 
detection, including an unknown number of surface-to-air missiles, suicide belts and 
explosives with timers and detonators (see Tables A & B).  
 
The quantity of arms inside Somalia is one of the major problems to finding a solution to the 
Somali conflict and the war on terror. Since the “defeat” of the Islamic Courts Union in its 
battle with the combined forces of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian troops, 
the security situation has not improved. Rather, the configuration of the conflict has changed 
to a guerrella war tactics – an insurgency. There has been a growing resort to car bombings 
and suicide attacks. A gloomy picture is painted of the unfolding events in Somalia if one 
considers the observations of the UN Monitoring Group that “the sheer numbers of arms 
currently in Somalia (central and southern Somalia, in particular) exceed those in the country 
since the early 1990s” (UN Monitoring Group 2007: 28). The above trend is reversible 
should the UN increase its commitment to enforcing the arms embargo it placed on Somalia 





Arms purchases and sales at the Bakaraaha Arms Market from April 2006 – September 
2006, investigated by the UN Monitoring Group      
 
Those conducting 
transaction at the Irtogte 
Market 
Type and quantity of arms 
and date of transaction 
Comments 
 
Qanyare Afrah Mohamed, 
Businessman and former 
Minister for National 
Security in TFG 
80 AK-47, 20 PKM, 20 RPG-7, 




45 AK-47, 24 PKM, 16 RPG-2 
and RPG-7, 2 DShK 
10-20 August 2006 
 
 





Bought through business people 
who are not suspected by the 
sharia courts in Mogadishu 
 
Rage Shiraar Bashir, 
Businessman  
150 AK-47, 22 PKM, 2 ZU-23 
and a variety of ammunition 
May 2006 
Purchased the arms 
 
Muse Sudi Yalahow 
Former Minister of Commerce 
in TFG 
145 AK-47, 33 PKM, 12 
mortars, 3 DShK, 2 B-10 and a 
variety of ammunition 
May 2006 




MP, Minister of TFG 
A variety of ammunition 
11 July 2006 
 
110 AK-47, 28 PKM, 3 B-10, 
20 RPG-2 and RPG-7, and a 
variety of ammunition 
20 Aug.-20 Sept. 2006 
Purchased the arms and brought 
them to Baidoa 
 
Purchased the arms 
 
Barre Aden Shire “Hirale”, 
Minister of Defence in TFG, 
formerly in charge of 
Kismaayo 
2 DShK and a variety of 
ammunition 
11 July 2006 
 
150 AK-47, 40 PKM, 50 RPG-
2/7, and mines 
20 Aug. - 20 Sept.2006 
Purchased the arms and brought 
them to Kismaayo 
 
 
Purchased the arms 
 
Abukar Omar Adaan, 
Businessman, financier AIAI 
A variety of ammunition worth 
US$500,000 
May 2006 
Purchased the arms 
 
Bakaraaha Arms Market 
traders 
1 ZP-39, 12 mortars, 6 DShK 
and a variety of ammunition 
29 April 2006 
 
360 AK-47, ammunition for 
ZU-23, B-10, RPG-2, RPG-7, 
DShK and ZP-39 




Many AK-47, 63 PKM, 12 
DShK, 4 ZU-23, 8 
Dhuunshilkea and ammunition 
15 May2006 
 
480 AK-47, 24 PKM, 26 RPG-
7, 24 mortars and a variety of 
ammunition 
27 May 2006 
From Somaliland via Puntland 
by road to BAM 
 
 
From Puntland via Galkayo and 










Shipped from Yemen by trading 





300 AK-47, 120 RPG-7 and a 
variety of ammunition 
12 June 2006 
 
250 pistols and ammunition 
20June 2006 
 
An unknown quantity of AK-
47, 
RPG-2 and ammunition 
23 June 2006 
 
Small arms, some anti-aircraft 
guns and a variety of 
ammunition 
19 July 2006 
 
680 AK-47, 132 PKM, 12 B-10, 
15 DShK, 25 82mm and 
120mm mortars, landmines, 
anti-tank mines and a large 
quantity of ammunition for AK-
47, ZP-39, DShK, PKM and 
RPG 
20 Aug.- 20 Sept. 2006 
Brought by traders to BAM on 
behalf of the sharia courts 
 
 
Brought by traders to BAM 
 
 





Brought by traders to BAM via 




Brought by traders to BAM 
 
Sheik Yusuf Mohamed 
Siyad “Indohaadde”, 
Warlord/businessman, 
governor of Lower Shabelle 
and associated with Al-Itihaad 
Al-Islaami 






03 August 2006 
Purchased the arms and gave 
them to Yusuf Mire Seerar, 
deputy of Barre Aden Shire 
“Hirale” 
 
Purchased the arms and brought 




235 AK-47, 45 PKM, 37 RPG-




185 AK-47, 70 RPG-2 and 
RPG-7 and a variety of 
ammunition 
16 June 2006 
 
 
2 DShK and a variety of 
ammunition 
22 June 2006 
 
50 AK-47, 6 PKM, 2 DShK and 
a variety of ammunition 
20 June 2006 
 
25 AK-47 and a variety of 
ammunition 
05 July 2006 
 
38 AK-47, 1 DShK and a 



















Sharia court at Saruur 
purchased the arms 
 
 
Sharia court at Jiiramiskiin 
variety of ammunition 
08 July 2006 
 
2 DShK and a variety of 
ammunition 
11 July 2006 
 
40 AK-47 and a variety of 
ammunition 
22 July 2006 
 
1 ZU-23-1 and ammunition 
24 July 2006 
 
An unknown quantity of mines 
28 July 2006 
 
1 ZU-23 
09 August 2006 
(Hawaale clan) purchased the 
arms 
 




Sharia court at Daynille 
purchased the arms 
 
 
Sharia court at Buuloburto 
purchased the arms 
 
Purchased the arms 
 
 
Purchased the arms 
Botan Ise Alin “Haaraan 
Kunaar”, former Minister 
for Rehabilitation and 
Training of Militias in TFG 




Purchased the arms 
 




Chief, Banadir region. He 
controlled checkpoints 
between Afgooye and 
Mogadishu. Was 
arrested/released in Sweden. 
Re-arming his militia near 
Galkayo 
200 AK-47, 15 PKM, 9 mortars 
and a variety of ammunition 
May 2006 
 
16 PKM, 14 RPG-7, 1 B-10 and 
a variety of ammunition 
22 June 2006 
 
7 RPG-7, 6 mortars and a 
variety of ammunition 
25 June 2006 
 
A variety of ammunition 
23 June 2006 
 
A variety of ammunition 
03 July 2006 
 
2 DShK and a variety of 
ammunition 
23 July 2006 
 
2 DShK 




50 AK-47, 16 PKM and 10 
RPG-7 
03 August 2006 
 
75 AK-47 
10-20 August 2006 
 












Purchased the arms 
 
 
Purchased the arms 
 
 





Purchased the arms through his 
clan representative. Will mount 
them on 4x4 vehicles he 
received from Ethiopia 
 
Purchased the arms and wants 
to bring them to his base at the 
Somali/Ethiopian border 
 
Bought through businesspeople 
who are not suspected by the 
170 AK-47, 25 PKM, 9 82mm 
or 120mm mortars, 28 RPG-2 
and RPG-7, mines and 
ammunition 
20 August-20 Sept. 2006 
sharia courts in Mogadishu 
Purchased the arms 
 
Abdirashid Ilqeyte, 
businessman, owner of the 
Sahafi Hotel now under the 
control of ICU 
95 AK-47 and a variety of 
ammunition 
May 2006 
Purchased the arms 
Abdi Nuur Siyad “Waal”, 
freelance militia leader 
45 AK-47, 9 PKM, 3 mortars 
and a variety of ammunition 
May 2006 
 
5 PKM, 3 DShK and a variety 
of ammunition 
10-20 August 2006 




Bought through business people 
who are not suspected by the 
sharia courts in Mogadishu 
 
Galjeel clan 
30 AK-47, 6 PKM and a variety 
of ammunition 
03 July 2006 
Purchased the arms 
 
Yusuf Mire Seeraar, 
Militia commander in Kismaayo 
100 AK-47, 9 DShK and a 
variety of ammunition 
May 2006 
Received from Sheik Yusuf 
Mohamed Siyad “Indohaadde”, 
who bought the arms at BAM 
 
Yusuf Dabageed, former 
governor of Hiraan region 
5 PKM and 1 DShK 
09 August 2006 
Purchased the arms 
 
Mohamed Omar Habeeb 
“Dheere”, 
 Former Governor, Middle 
Shabelle 
4 DShK and ammunition 
23 July 2006 
 
10 PKM 
31 July 2006 
 
65 AK-47 and 2 B-10 
10-20 August 2006 
 
90 AK-47, 27 PKM, 4 B-10, 6 
DShK, 40 RPG-2 and RPG-7, 
mines and a variety of 
ammunition 
20 Aug.-20 Sept. 2006 
Purchased the arms 
 
 
Purchased the arms and 
possibly brought them to his 
base in Quria Joome 
Bought through business people 
who are not suspected by ICU 
in Mogadishu 
Purchased the arms 
 
Abdishukri 
130 AK-47, 6 PKM, 3 120mm 
mortars, 2 DShK and a variety 
of ammunition  May 2006 
Purchased the arms 
 
Hussein Mohamed Aideed, 
Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Interior, TFG 
48 AK-47 and ammunition 
19 June 2006 
Purchased the arms 
Goobaanle, 
Militia commander in Kismaayo 
175 AK-47, 26 PKM, 7 120mm 
mortars, 3 DShK and a variety 
of ammunition 
20 Aug.- 20 Sept. 2006 
Purchased the arms 
 
Dhuunshilke = 1-barrel Zu-23 mounted on a tripod.           
 




Quantity of arms sold inside Somalia from December 2006 – May 2007 investigated by 
the UN Monitoring Group 
 
 
Identity of individual 
conducting transaction at the 
Irtogte Market 
 
Type and quantity of arms and 





Qanyare Afrah Mohamed 
Warlord, member of Parliament 




92 AK-47, 18 PKM, 22 RPG- 
2/7, a variety of ammunition 
20 Dec.2006-15 Jan.2007 
 
55 AK-47, 7 PKM, 17 RPG-2/7 
February 2007 
 




48 AK-47, 11 RPG-2/7, a 
variety of ammunition, 
magazines and belts 
20 March-20 April 2007 
 
320 AK-47, 8 PKM, 24 RPG- 
2/7, 8 M-79 grenade launchers, 
3 DShK, 1 Sekawe,* 40 boxes 
of ammunition for Zu-23, 
DShK, AK-47 and PKM 
20 April-20 May 2007 
 





















Mohamed Omar Habeeb 
“Dheere” 
Governor of Banadir region 
and Mayor of Mogadishu 
80 AK-47, 12 PKM, 19 RPG- 
2/7, 2 DShK, a variety of 
antitank 
mines, anti-personnel 
mines and hand grenades 
20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006 
 
105 AK-47, 21 PKM, 28 RPG- 
2/7, a variety of ammunition 
20 Dec. 2006-15 Jan. 2007 
 
21 RPG-2/7, 74 mortars, a 
variety of ammunition 
February 2007 
 




85 AK-47, 19 RPG-2/7, a 
variety of ammunition 
20 March-20 April 2007 
 
2015 AK-47, 35 RPG-2/7, 20 
























PKM, a variety of ammunition 
20 April-20 May 2007 
 
 





85 AK-47, 9 PKM, 20 RPG- 
2/7, 2 DShK and a variety of 
ammunition 
20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006 
Purchased the arms 
 
 
Muse Suudi Yalahow 
 
75 AK-47, a variety of 
ammunition 
February 2007 
Purchased the arms 
 
 
Barre Aden Shire "Hirale" 
Former minister in the 
Transitional Federal 
Government 
22 PKM, 40 RPG-2/7, 2 B-10, 
4 DShK, 2 dhuunshilke* 
20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006 
Purchased the arms 
 
 
Bakaraaha Arms Market 
traders 
 
2000 AK-47, 5 B-10, 11 DShK 
February 2007 
Shipment arrived at the 






9 B-10, 5 Waqle, 2 ZU-23 and 
 a variety of mines and hand 
grenades 
20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006 
 
74 AK-47, 17 PKM, 48 RPG- 
2/7, a variety of ammunition 
20 March-20 April 2007 
 
420 AK-47, 17 PKM, 48 RPG- 
2/7, 27 M-79 grenade 
launchers, 60 pistols, a variety 
of mines 
20 April-20 May 2007 
 














295 AK-47, 95 PKM, 130 
RPG-2/7, 11 DShK, 5 
dhuunshilke,* 14 B-10, 5 
Waqle, a variety of mines and 
ammunition 
20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006 
 
187 AK-47, 16 PKM, 48 RPG- 
2/7, a variety of ammunition 
and mines, 53 pistols 
20 Dec. 2006-15 Jan. 2007 
 
105 AK-47, 47 PKM, 72 RPG- 
2/7, 110 hand grenades, a 
variety of ammunition 
February 2007 
 
375 AK-47, 87 PKM, 47 RPG- 
2/7, 170 mines and hand 
grenades, a variety of 
ammunition especially for AK- 
47 and RPG-2/7 
























273 AK-47, 32 PKM, 41 RPG- 
2/7, a variety of ammunition 







Purchased the arms 
 
 
Col. Abdi Hassan Awale 
Qeybdiid 
Police Chief, Banadir region 
 
65 AK-47, 25 PKM, 30 RPG- 
2/7, 1 dhuunshilke,* 3 B-10 
and a variety of ammunition 
20 Nov.-20 Dec. 2006 
 
125 AK-47, 15 PKM, 30 RPG- 
2/7, a variety of ammunition 
20 Dec. 2006-15 Jan. 2007 
 
14 PKM, 5 82mm mortars, a 
variety of ammunition  
February 2007 
 
90 AK-47, 7 PKM, a variety of 
ammunition, magazines and 
belts 
20 March-20 April 2007 
 
287 AK-47, 22 PKM, 3 B-10, 
magazines for assault rifles, a 
variety of ammunition 
20 April-20 May 2007 
 

























11 PKM, 2 B-10, 10 RPG-2/7, 
a variety of ammunition 
20 April-20 May 2007 
 





198 AK-47, 16 PKM, 2 DShK, 
14 RPG-2/7, 1 dhuunshilke,* a 
variety of ammunition 
20 April-20 May 2007 
 
Purchased the arms 
 
 
* Dhuunshilke = 1-barrel Zu-23 mounted on a tripod 
Sekawe = 1-barrel Zu-23 with a seat for the gunner. 
 




Overview of prices at the Bakaraaha Arms Market 














Zu-23 70 000 10 000 5 000 25 000 
DShK 14 000   5 000 3 000   8 000 
B-10   7 000    2 000 1 500   6 000 
PKM 12 000   6 000 4 000   2 000 
AK-47      400      250    200      200 
RPG-2      500      300    150   1 500 
     
Ammunition 
piece 
    
Zu-23 7 3 0.50 3.20 
DShK 3.50 1 0.50 Not available 
B-10 120 30 3 Not available 
PKM 5 0.50 0.50 1 
AK-47 0.75 0.50 0.35 0.30 
RPG-2  150 100 25 120 
  
























The terrorist implication of the failed state of Somalia has been an issue of scholarly and 
expert debate. Some analysts have pointed out that the prevalent environment provided by a 
combination of the absence of a central government, collapse of all institutions of law 
enforcement, wide availability of arms in the hands of militias and unemployed youths, 
unmanned long borders and the enduring contention for power by clannish warlords, coupled 
with the steady growth of fundamentalist Islamism inside Somalia, makes Somalia an 
endearing destination for foreign terrorist elements.  Basically, it has become not only an 
ideal safe haven for wanted terrorists but also a transit point and a recruitment and training 
ground for the al-Qaeda global terror network (US State Department May 2002;World Peace 
Foundation  2005: 19; Elmi and Barise 2006: 37). On this premise, terrorist activities inside 
Somalia and/or its linkage with such activities in the region and beyond is not surprising. 
What seems a surprise is the fact that the level of terrorist activities within Somalia and the 
linkage of its territory to such activities in terms of direct involvement or the provision of safe 
passage and shielding to wanted al-Qaeda operatives, still lies below the projections of 
security pundits going by the real condition of anarchy created by the cessation of any form 
of mediating influence of formal governance that commands the loyalty of a majority of 
Somalis.  
 
This position is contested by those who argue that even though the environment of collapsed 
states like Somalia may appear attractive to terrorists, evidence has not confirmed that to be 
true. Menkhaus (2002: 11) points out that though failed states such as Somalia ordinarily look 
set to provide “a sanctuary beyond the rule of law, where terrorists can establish bases or 
staging grounds with little risk of detection” and where they will feel safe to operate under 
the “impunity of anarchy”, beyond “the reach of a national security and police force”, it only 
amounts to “a reasonable and compelling conventional wisdom” which, in some cases, like 
that of Somalia, leads to a “ misdiagnosis of the relationship between collapsed states and 
terrorism”. He concluded that there is no “credible evidence that such a threat existed in 
Somalia” (Menkhaus 2002: 12). The unfolding events in Somalia, however, seem to favour 
the argument that the realities thrown up by the failed-state-environment of Somalia actually 
provides an enabling setting for terrorism to not only take root but also to flourish (Tadesse 
2001: i.d). The discussion of the terrorist threat posed by Somalia is hinged on the steady rise 
of fundamentalist Islamism and the increase in number of jihadi elements within Somali 
territory since the collapse of the state, as well as on the established links of these domestic 
elements with the wider global jihadi network. This will form the point of departure for this 
chapter, as it endeavours to trace the trend of growth and development of fundamentalist 
Islam in Somalia and the extent to which this has affected the terrorist profile of Somalia and 
its regional and global security implications. 
 
4.2 Islamist Organizations inside Somalia   
Somalia is a Muslim nation. By tradition, nearly all Somalis are Sunni Muslims. While some 
accounts locate the beginning of Islamic tradition in Somalia to the 13th and 14th
     
 centuries, 
others place it at an earlier date, between the 9th and 10th centuries, or even much earlier. 
What is clear is that there is broad agreement that by the 1331 visit of the Islamic explorer, 
Ibn Battuta, and later, Zheng He, Islam had already taken root in Somalia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org). Islamism in Somalia was not rife until the late 1950s into the 1960s, 
following the decline in the roles of mainstream Islam, especially in education, which was 
hitherto the responsibility of Islamic teachers, as these roles started being transferred to the 
secular authorities (http://en.wikipedia.org). The origins of most of the Islamist organizations 
are tracable to two major sources, the Waxda al-Shabaab al-Islaami, and the Jama‟at al-Ahl 
al-Islaami, which arose in the late 1950s and early 1960s, respectively. Their membership and 
profile rose dramatically over the following decade, to their becoming important in the affairs 
of the state (Anouar Boukhars 2006: i.d). The Muslim Brotherhood inspired both 
organizations. The 1969 ascendancy to power of Siad Barre in Somalia affected the Islamist 
movements in two prominent ways. Firstly, it halted their spread and removed the Islamists 
from the hitherto important influences they commanded in state affairs. Barre‟s Marxist 
government emphasized a strong secular and centralized administration, which he believed 
was very important in the achievement of the unification of all Somalis in the “Greater 
Somalia project” (http://en.wikipedia.org). Secondly, the tough policies of the administration 
against Islamist fundamentalism forced the radical Islamists underground. With the 
organizations‟ structures intact, the Islamists carried out grassroot recruitment and 
mobilization, while some fled from Somalia for countries in the Middle East. This became a 
kind of blessing in disguise in the life of Islamism in Somalia, as many new radical Islamists 
were groomed out of the experience of the harsh realities of the Barre administration. By 
1980, the Islamists had grown underground so considerably that the fall of Barre in 1991 was 
only the trigger that unleashed them to resume overt activities (http://en.wikipedia.org).    
 
From the start there did not exist much rapport among the various Islamist groups. They have 
been more of “a diverse community characterized more by competition and contradiction 
than cooperation …”(International Crisis Group 2006: 9). This may explain not only why 
extremist jihadi Islamism has not been able, over the years, to forge a very broad and 
unifying hold on Somalia, but also why jihadi militancy had not gained as much ground as 
pundits would have expected, until the Islamic Courts Union came to prominence from 1996 
(International Crisis Group 2006: 9-10). This is especially so, given the seemingly 
conventional belief that Somalia had become a “fertile ground” for a radicalized population. 
Islamists in Somalia have as much diversity as there are diverse movements within Islam. 
Islamist organizations in Somalia fall under three major recognizable divisions.  
 
The first group includes Islamic movements like the Jama'at al-Tabligh and the Salafiyya 
Jadiida, whose motives are non-political but primarily missionary in character.  Organizations 
in this group are opposed to ideological and political extremism and rather settle for 
missionary activism, with the sole aim of bringing back Muslim backsliders to “the true path 
of their faith”. They have preference for a democratic Somalia that will have a “broad-base 
and responsive” government, but which will reflect Islamic ethos of “tolerance, moderation 
and respect for variations in religious observances” (International Crisis Group 2005a: 17-18; 
Boukhar 2006: i. d). A former leader of al-Itihaad, the most radical jihadi organization in 
Somalia, Sheikh Ali Wajis, now leading the Salafiyya movement, is a great opponent of al-
Itihaad‟s violent and armed approach. Ali Wajis‟ defection to Salafiyya and his commitment 
to, and passion for,  “a rational reassessment of Islamic rules of warfare and the prevailing 
realities on the ground” is not only a blow to al-Itihaad but to the entire jihadi movement in 
Somalia (International Crisis Group 2005a: 13-14).   It is pertinent to point out here that a 
greater number of Somali Muslims fall under this category (International Crisis Group 2005a: 
15; Boukhar 2006: i. d).   
 
The second cluster of organizations is made up of the likes of Harakaat al-Islah and Majma' 
'Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya. The groups within this second cluster are politically 
active, but reject violence and extremism. Their goal is “either the adoption of a Sharia-based 
system of government or the application of a certain interpretation of Islam within a modern, 
democratic framework of government” (Anouar Boukhars 2006: i. d), influencing the 
configuration of the Somali state and its political system. They concentrate on pursuing a 
reconciliation of the tenets of Islam with the ideals of modern-day democracy and cultural 
pluralism. These organizations have a reputation of including notable Somali elite in their 
membership. The Harakaat al-Islah is noted to have its membership dominated by high-
profile academics and businessmen who command international respect. An example is its 
chairman, Dr. Ali Sheikh, who is also the President of Mogadishu University 
(http://en.wikipedia.org).  The Majma' 'Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya itself is made up of 
predominantly notable Islamic scholars. While the Harakaat leaned more towards democratic 
ideals, the Majma‟ leaned more to the sharia system. This, over the years, has tended to 
engender disagreement between the two on the nature of the future Somali state, with the 
Harakaat being accused of having been influenced by the imperialist West. However, this 
disagreement has given way to a consensus on the need for Islam to play its role within a 
contemporary democratic “framework”.    
 
The third group of Islamists in Somalia represents the “Salafi-Jihadists”, of which the radical 
al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI) was the most significant, but includes all the new radical Islamist 
organizations such as al-Shabaab, the militia wing of the Islamic Courts Union led by Aden 
Hashi 'Ayro, which are believed to have links with the al-Qaeda jihadi network. The 
organizations under this group are committed to violence and armed resistance against all 
perceived enemies of Islam within Somalia. They resist the influence of neighbouring 
countries, especially Ethiopia, which is seen as an agent of the West. They are suspected of 
having links with al-Qaeda and the global jihadi movement. The al-Itihaad has been 
identified as collaborating with al-Qaeda in its attacks in 1998 and 2002 in Kenya and 
Tanzania against American and Israeli interests (International Crisis Group 2002: ii). Al-
Itihaad remains among organizations listed as terrorist organizations by the US. The jihadi 
organizations in Somalia have secured strong membership and support locally over the years, 
but they continue to recruit members and infiltrate the moderate organizations with a view to 
radicalizing them from within. Reputedly, these groups receive financial support from oil-
rich Gulf States (International Crisis Group 2005: 16).  
 
 4.3 The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) 
The Islamic Courts emerged on the Somali religio-political landscape from about 1993, in 
southern Somalia (International Crisis Group 2006: 9). Their emergence appears to be the net 
result of the need to stem the increasing level of violence, which had spread across the entire 
southern Somalia landscape/region following the sustained conflict among the warlords. The 
birth of the courts, therefore, may be argued to be incidental to the growing insecurity and 
gang violence in the war-torn Somali environment (Marchal 2007: i. d; International Crisis 
Group 2006: 9). The courts were originally clan-based institutions, each concerning itself 
with the restoration of order and maintenance of security within the specific clan where it 
existed. Each court existed independently of the others (Boukhar 2006: i. d). 
 
At inception, the Islamic Courts operated as independent sharia judicial systems. As time 
went by, these courts, in the absence of institutions for social services, started engaging in 
some social services like basic education and health care and later to providing security, 
fighting crime – robberies and drugs – and propagating the maintenance of some level of 
moral rectitude such as outlawing the presentation of films considered to contain 
pornography.  Four of these independent courts (Ifka Halan, Circolo, Warshaddad and 
Hararyaabe) felt the need to work together to promote and coordinate security in their 
domains. They integrated their security forces, agreeing to exchange (extradite) criminals 
caught in the different clans‟ court spere of influence (http://en.wikipedia.org).  
 
The Islamic Courts‟ pan-Somali inclination was never in doubt. The desire of an “Islamist 
Greater Somalia” – the eventual unification of all Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn 
within a single Islamic government – had usually been a strong point. Sheikh Hassan Dahir 
Aweys, the chairman of the ICU council, the shura, was quoted as stating in a June 2006 
interview with Newsweek that “Really, Ogaden is a Somali region and part of Somalia, and 
Somali governments have entered two wars with Ethiopia over it, and I hope that one day that 
region will be part of Somalia” (Nordland 2006 in International Crisis Group 2007: 5). Later 
that year Aweys was again quoted as charging in another interview to Radio Shabelle, based 
in Mogadishu, that “We will leave no stone unturned to integrate our Somali brothers in 
Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live with their ancestors in Somalia” 
(International Crisis Group 2007: 5).               
 
The rise of the courts was very dramatic. By 2005 the Courts Union had grown from four at 
inception to about eleven, asserting their independence of clan-warlords control and the 
mobilization for greater political activism. Determined to force power from the warlords and 
the Transitional Federal Government, the Courts started recruiting and building a strong 
military wing, the Shabaab (International Crisis Group 2006: 11). In April 2006, the UN 
Monitoring Group had in its report called the Courts “a third force” in Somalia, pointing to 
the Courts growing military capability, occasioned by massive arms purchases, and 
recruitment and military training (UN Security Council 2006: 39-40). Before the end of that 
month (April 2006), the ICU took control of the Mogadishu market and by July the whole of 
Mogadishu and adjoining surroundings were under the Courts‟ control, following its defeat of 
the warlords‟ alliance. Many factors played to the Courts‟ advantage. The availability of 
unemployed youths and independent young militiamen made the recruitment less 
cumbersome. The disposition of the ICU and its success in bringing some measure of peace 
and security in the areas under its control, which contrasted sharply with the lawlessness that 
characterized areas under the control of the contending warlords, and the growing criminality 
of the militiamen, attracted respect, support and followership for it  (International Crisis 
Group 2007: 1). Many young militiamen, who detached themselves from the control of the 
warlords with their weapons in their hands, were operating independently. They not only 
provided private security services to the emerging business class, who themselves were 
asserting their independence from the warlords, but also engaged in other criminal activities 
such as murder and robbery (International Crisis Group 2006: 15). Bringing a semblance of 
order into the system by the Islamic Courts was enough to attract the loyalty of Somalis who 
could not believe it could be possible to move through Mogadishu without being molested. 
The alleged covert involvement of the American CIA in the formation in 2006 and funding of 
the warlords forces‟ coalition, Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism 
(ARPCT), and the support of the Transitional Federal Government by Ethiopia, a reputed 
enemy of Somalia, bolstered the profile of the ICU as the only viable platform to contend 
with these “external aggressors” and expanded its support base (Hirsh 2006: 37; Dealey 
2006: i.d; International Crisis Group 2006: 14).  The formation and operation of that alliance, 
whose purpose was the clearing of the Somali environment of al-Qaeda elements and their 
collaborators inside Somalia, by arresting and turning them in (International Crisis Group 
2006:12), raised the anti-American sentiment to a level it had not reached before, mobilizing 
the greater majority of Somalis behind the Islamic Courts Union in the June 2006 battle for 
Mogadishu. Writing on the battle for Mogadishu, fought between the Islamic Courts Union 
and the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, Marchal (2007: i.d) 
observed that the  
 
American involvement mobilized Islamic movements well beyond 
Mogadishu. While these movements were very different in terms of rites, 
ideology and recruitment, they were united in their opposition to the United 
States. Hundreds of combatants arrived from Somaliland and others came 
from southern Somalia.     
 
The infiltration of the courts by powerful jihadi elements, such as the members of al-Itihaad 
Islamists, transformed them into a very strong politically motivated institution. Added to the 
above is the rise of radical young elements in the organization,particulalrly the Shabaab, 
which is the strike force of the organization, as well as the organ for the maintenance of 
internal discipline and order (International Crisis Group 2006: 10). These two factors portray 
the fundamentalist Islamist character the organization is known for among neighbouring 
states and in international security circles (Marchal 2007: i. d; Crisis Group 2007: 9). Among 
the leadership of the Shabaab were Aden Hashi „Ayro (the commander), Abdillahi Ma‟alin, 
Mokhtar Rooban, Ibrahim Haji Jama and Fou‟ad Mohamed Qald, all of whom were believed 
to have trained in Afghanistan and have connections with al-Qaeda (Crisis Group 2007: 9). In 
February 2006 the ICU mobilized and began a final push to take control of the capital and 
other major cities of Somalia. The cities fell one after the other as they fought the warlords 
who had hitherto held sway in their various clans and sub-clans. Until the last days of 
December 2006, the ICU was in control of most of the major cities of Somalia, including 
Jowhar, Kismayo, Beledweyne and the capital, Mogadishu. The northern part of Somalia, 
Somaliland and a part of Puntland and few jungle interiors did not come under ICU control 
(http://en.wikipedia.org).   
 
The emergence of the ICU on the Somali national political scene greatly affected the crisis 
landscape in three major ways. Firstly, it emerged as a viable alternative to the warlords‟ 
divisive and destructive struggle for control. Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, 
the Islamic Courts‟ Union had been the only organization or group that was able to command 
a broad appeal and support among the majority of Somalis (International Crisis Group 
2006:14-15). Therefore the ICU supposedly presented a platform through which the ideal 
dreams of the entire Somalia could be realized. Their imposition of Islamic laws in the areas 
they controlled, even when it did not go down well with many residents, were tolerated at 
least for as long as they were in power, in exchange for the peace and security they 
maintained and the social services they rendered all through the time they were in control, 
especially in Mogadishu and its environs (International Crisis Group 2006:10-11; 
International Crisis Group 2007: 1).  
 
Secondly, it led to the unification of warlords who, hitherto, were sworn enemies. The 
warlords shifted from fighting one another to coalescing into the Alliance for the Restoration 
of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), to fight the ICU which they perceived as a 
“common enemy” (International Crisis Group 2006:11). This was to define the many events 
that followed: the June 2006 battle for Mogadishu, the ICU capture of Mogadishu and the 
defeat of the alliance of the warlords, the move by the ICU to bring the entire southern 
Somalia under its control and the eventual loss of control by the ICU to the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), which benefited from Ethiopian intervention on its side. The 
Islamic Courts Union‟s defeat of the coalition of the warlords in Mogadishu, the swift 
military swing which it engaged to overrun the entire Somalia, its haste in implementing 
strict laws, especially the ban on the use of khat, the force with which it quelled 
demonstrations against the khat ban and its attempt to attack and sack the Transitional 
Federal Government, based in Baioda, which was backed by a significant deployment of 
Ethiopian soldiers, together with its declaration of jihad against Ethiopia and Western allies 
on 26 October 2006, combined to bring the Courts to a disastrous end, following the massive 
and overt involvement of the Ethiopian armed forces on the side of the TFG, overrunning the 
Courts in less than two weeks.  
 
Thirdly, and very importantly, the Islamic Courts Union tended to represent a grand coalition 
of all the radical Islamists in Somalia. At inception, the ICU – though fundamentalist in 
ideological leanings – had a sizable number of respectable “moderate fundamentalists” in full 
control. The Islamic Courts‟ Union exploited the feelings of frustration and hopelessness 
among ordinary Somalis on the one hand and the disenchantment and loss of faith in the 
system by the elite on the other hand. By early 2006, these feelings had reached breaking 
point and the ICU wasted no time in capitalizing on it to drive itself into reckoning 
(International Crisis Group 2007: 3; Marchal 2007: i. d).  
 
The early infiltration of the Courts by powerful jihadi elements, mostly the radical elements 
of the AIAI, who became key figures in the ICU, transformed it into a very strong politically 
motivated and ideologically driven institution. It launched fundamentalist Islamism in 
Somalia to new heights beyond the level AIAI had ever attained. It created a military (militia) 
wing, the Shabaab, which was made up of ruthless and war-hungry young men, trained in the 
art of war and insurgency (International Crisis Group 2006:10). This group was to be actively 
involved in acts of terrorism within Somalia, at the peak of the Courts‟ brief reign, and in 
insurgency after the ouster of the Courts in December 2006 (International Crisis Group 2007: 
8).  
 
The ICU took control of Mogadishu in June 2006, but its attempt to take control of the entire 
state of Somalia in December of the same year culminated in a two-week war that devastated 
the ICU and is believed to have disorganized the Islamists, at least in the interim 
(International Crisis Group 2006:11-14). The dimensions of the war were unprecedented. The 
evidence that some international jihadi organizations rendered assistance to the ICU tended to 
reflect the tacit support given to Ethiopia by the international community in its overt military 
engagement inside Somalia (International Crisis Group 2007: 4). It is reported that countries 
like Eritrea and Yemen supplied much of the weapons and equipment used to prosecute the 
war, while foreign fighters (Jihadists and al-Qaeda elements) were also involved 
(International Crisis Group 2007: 4-6; UN Security Council 2007: 9). The story of Daniel 
Maldonado, aged 28, an American Muslim convert who was reported in the New York Times 
of 20 March 2007 as having pleaded guilty in a Texas court to a charge of receiving terrorist 
training in an al-Qaeda-run camp in Somalia is an example. In the news report, captioned 
“National Briefing/ Southwest: Texas: Guilty Plea in Terrorism Case”, Maldonado confessed 
to having traveled to Somalia in December 2006, where he received training in the use of 
firearms and explosives, to fight on the side of the ICU in order to bring down the TFG and 
install an Islamic state. Maldonado was living in Egypt, from where he made the journey. He 
was captured by Kenyan security forces and repatriated to the United States (New York 
Times. 20 March 2007: 16).     
 
On 27 December 2006, the ICU announced, through the Council of Somali Islamic Courts, 
that it was dissolving itself (International Crisis Group 2007: 1). It was strongly felt that the 
ICU was disorganized and not disintegrated or dissolved. This is because all the “institutions 
and grassroots networks of revolutionary Islam in Somali, the mosques, schools, charities and 
private businesses”, that produced the likes of Shabaab, were still intact (International Crisis 
Group 2007: 1). Indeed, the Shabaab threat to engage in guerrilla war with the Transitional 
Federal Government and the Ethiopian troops inside Somalia was made good, as is evidenced 
by the growing incidence of hit-and-run attacks on TFG and Ethiopian troop targets (UN 
Security Council 2007: 17).  
 
4.4 Terrorist and al-Qaeda activities inside Somalia  
 
Since the Somali state‟s collapse, and especially over the past decade, Somalia developed a 
growing reputation as not only providing a congenial environment for terrorists but also as a 
place where terrorism can flourish. Indeed, arguments have raged over the years regarding 
the level of terrorist activities that can be ascribed to Somalia. Some analysts feel that 
Somalia is merely experiencing Islamist fundamentalism, which is not uncommon in many 
other countries where Islam is dominant.  Others maintain that it is simply one of the many 
examples of religious surges that have become commonplace across the world. That being the 
case, they argued, the rising Islamist hype does not pose any regional or international security 
threat, as some in the West would want the world to believe (Kaplan 2007: i.d). Ross (2006: 
i.d), writing from the vantage point of a past insider, a former employee of al Haramain 
Islamic Foundation in Somalia, pointed out that about seventeen active terrorist training 
camps have existed in Somalia for many years (Ross, D. and Roggio, B. 2006: i.d). This, 
coupled with the al-Qaeda-like propaganda tapes, the presence of foreign fighters inside 
Somalia and the revelations of Gouled Hassan Dourad, a Guantanamo detainee, concerning 
al-Itihaad planned attacks on US military bases in Djibouti, shooting down of Ethiopian 
airliners and the kidnappings of Western NGO aid workers, confirm that terrorist activities 
are rife within Somalia (International Crisis Group 2005b: 1). The US Institute of Peace 
(2004: 9) described Somalia as “a collapsed state, where terrorists can operate beyond the 
law”. In its 28 April 2006 release on terrorism, the US Department of State cited Somalia as a 
terrorist safe haven, defining a terrorist safe haven as “an area of relative security exploited 
by terrorists to indoctrinate, recruit, coalesce, train and regroup as well as prepare and support 
their operations” (US Department of State 2006: i. d).  
 
Not long after the state collapse in 1991, Somalia was fingered as providing an enabling 
environment for the 7 August 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya 
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in which two hundred and forty Kenyans, eleven Tanzanians 
and twelve Americans lost their lives, with over five thousand Kenyans and eighty-six 
Tanzanians injured. The US, which has since placed Somalia under surveillance, categorized 
Somalia as a terrorist safe haven soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US. The US 
placed Aden Hashi Ayro, the then leader of the al-Itihaad, who was trained in an al-Qaeda 
camp in Afghanistan, on the list of most wanted terrorists.  The terrorist attack on an Israeli-
owned hotel in Mombassa and an attempt on a passenger plane on the runway at the 
Mombassa International Airport, Kenya, in November 2002 featured Somalia as providing 
the operational environment for the terrorists who carried out those attacks to finalize their 
plans. They were shielded inside Somalia before the attacks, shielded in their movements 
across the Somali borders into the countries where the attacks took place and then shielded 
back into Somalia after the attacks (International Crisis Group 2005: 1). There was to be 
another attack on the American embassy in Nairobi in 2003. The attack, which would have 
involved the use of a light aircraft, was foiled by Kenyan security operatives (Dempsey 2006: 
14; Menkhaus 2004: 71; International Crisis Group 2005: 9). In all these incidents, for which 
al-Qaeda claimed responsibility, “Somalia was a trans-shipment site and safe haven” which 
provided shielding for the terrorist (International Crisis Group 2006: 11; 
http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org; US Institute of Peace 2004: 4), while al-Qaeda funded and 
provided the “expertise to the attackers, procuring sophisticated weapons for the attacks, and 
acting as a source of ideological inspiration for the attackers” (Dempsey 2006: 15). Ayro had 
been credited with terrorist activities inside Somalia, including assassinations of foreign aid 
workers and Somalis suspected of collaborating with America and Ethiopia (International 
Crisis Group 2005b: 5). These attacks heightened the fear of the danger the failed state of 
Somalia posed to the neighbouring region and global security, in general. For example, al-
Itihaad al-Islaami (IAIA) conducted several terrorist attacks inside Ethiopia in the 1990s, 
including the assassination attempt on the Minister of the Interior in 1996, which it made bold 
to claim. Although some analysts tend to see such attacks by the Somali Islamist organization 
as a mark of Somali irredentism against its neighbours (International Crisis Group 2007: 5), 
the argument fails to explain those terrorist acts committed inside Somalia itself. The 
involvement of Somalia in terrorism may be more of, but not completely limited to, acting as 
a training ground, safe passage and safe targets cognizance environment. As current events 
inside Somalia may suggest, it may be gladiating towards a hard-line Islamic state, which is 
the stated ultimate goal of the Islamist hardliners within Somalia. 
 
It is difficult to qualify the extent of terrorist operations in Somalia, because of the fluidity of 
the environment. One point which seems clear is that some elements in the Islamist 
organizations inside Somalia have connections with al-Qaeda. The US has pointed repeatedly 
to the existence of an al-Qaeda cell inside Somalia which appears to be shielding foreign al-
Qaeda operatives who are not only involved in the training of local Jihadists but also provide 
the link between these local islamists and the foreign jihadi outside Somalia (Crisis Group 
2005b: 8; Crisis Group 2006: 11; http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org). For instance, evidence of 
terrorist activities linked to individuals such as Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl (former al-Qaeda 
member) and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed (a Tanzanian arrested in 1999 following the 1998 
bombings) and others that have emerged over the years in the conflict inside Somalia itself 
tend to justify this claim. Mohamed testified in a US court that al-Qaeda operatives were 
training Somali Islamists at the AIAI camp in Luug between 1991 and 1996 (Ross, D. and 
Roggio, B 2006: i.d), and that the operatives involved in the 1998 embassies‟ attacks stayed 
at the Ras Kiamboni camp in the Lower Juba region in 1997, while preparing for attacks 
(Golden and Weiser 2001: i.d). The Ethiopian military over-ran the AIAI camp in Luug 
following a terrorist attack in Ethiopia and recovered some documents said to confirm the 
presence of al-Qaeda elements in the camp. AIAI in 1991 took over the Bosaaso Port in an 
offensive, and used it as an important camp. It also established training camps in many parts 
of Somalia.  
 
Some of the al-Qaeda elements believed to be operating inside Somalia include Jamaa Ali 
Isma‟il (Kutiye) a former Somali commando who fought with al-Itihaad from 1992; Ibrahim 
al-Afghani, who reportedly fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir and later returned to Somalia 
to join al-Itihaad; Da‟ud Salah Iidle, the former deputy manager of the local branch of the Al 
Haramain Islamic Foundation, which Somali office the US charged in 2003 with being linked 
to al-Qaeda; and Farhan Abdulle Mohamed, who was a student at a school run by the 
Tablighi Jamaat and later joined the freelance militias. These men are listed as Ayro‟s hit 
men inside Somalia (Ross 2006: i.d;). The murders of two British teachers, one Italian nurse 
(a nun), a notable BBC correspondent and a German aid worker have been traced to Ayro and 
his men since 2003 (Dempsey 2006: 13-14; International Crisis Group 2005b: 5-6). Other al-
Qaeda operatives believed to be operating in Somalia include Ali Saleh Nabhan and Fazul 
Abdullah Mohamed, who were mentored by Tariq Abdullah (Abu Talha al-Sudani), the 
Sudanese close associate of Bin Laden. Abu Talha al-Sudani is the head of al-Qaeda in East 
Africa (International Crisis Group 2005b: 5; International Crisis Group 2005a: 14). Both men 
were key operatives in the Mombasa attack of November 2002 and were involved in the 
preparations for the attacks on the 1998 US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 
according to the testimonies of Suleiman Ahmed (Issa Tanzania captured in April 2003). 
Suleiman was a co-participant, together with Issa Osman, in the Mombassa attack. 
 
 It is important to take note of the significance of the testimony that the terrorists that carried 
out the attacks returned to Somalia at the end of each of the attacks (International Crisis 
Group 2005b: 8; Ross 2006: i.d). Hassan Turki and Hassan Dahir Aweys, both leaders of the 
al-Itihaad, are believed to be involved in the al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S embassies, 
coordinating the preparations on the ground, leading to the attack (International Crisis Group 
2005b: 6). Both men are on the US list of most wanted terrorists; Aweys was placed in 2001 
and Turki in 2004 (International Crisis Group 2005b: 8).  Godane Abdi, who fought in 
Afghanistan, Mohamed Mwakuuuza Kuza; Ali Swedhan and Samir Said are also believed to 
be hiding inside Somalia. Rohan Gunaratna, in his book, Inside Al-Qaeda Global Network of 
Terror, recounted the case of al-Qaeda‟s first military commander and Emir, Ali al-Rashidi, 
popularly called Abu Ubadiah al-Banshiri, who died in the Bukova-Mwanza ferry accident of 
21 May 1996 on Lake Victoria, Kenya, along with another 479 passengers on board. He was 
said to be preparing for the embassy attacks when he was involved in the accident (Gunaratna 
2002: 26). Linking al-Banshiri to Somalia, Gunaratna (2002:26) writes: “Al Banshiri had 
been traveling on a Dutch passport, attending to a host of al-Qaeda matters, both military and 
business, in Africa, from the Somalia operation to dealing in gold and diamonds”.  
 
The al-Qaeda Somalia cell is believed to be very active and poses a continued threat to the 
entire region. Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, the accused Comorean mastermind of the 1998 US 
East African embassies attacks and the 2002 attacks in Mombassa, is said to have been 
sighted in Kenya in 2003 and 2004 and is believed to have returned to Mogadishu with Ali 
Saleh Nabhan. The US security forces are looking for the duo, together with Abu Taha al-
Sudani  (Quaranto 2008: 28). According to the International Crisis Group (2005b: 9), “[t]he 
members of al-Qaeda‟s Somalia cell are today among the most wanted fugitives on the 
planet”.  
The International Crisis Group notes in its Africa’s Briefing No. 45 that the Somali Islamists 
connections with al-Qaeda may not be compared to that of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, but avers that the fact of protection with “hard-to-trace financial transactions 
and transportation of goods and personnel”, which a failed state‟s environment offers is the 
major attraction for al-Qaeda to Somalia (International Crisis Group 2007: 6). The complete 
absence of “functioning police, immigration, customs and intelligence agencies”, the 
unmanned beach ports and the very long and unguarded coast-lines of Somalia have provided 
a shield for people and materials to move in undetected and then inland into the Somali 
heartland, Kenya or Ethiopia (International Crisis Group 2005b: 1). Also critical is the 
presence of many landing strips that are capable of taking light airplanes. Airlifts are the most 
convenient and fastest way of movement in and out of the region. Money transfer and 
telecommunication companies are also implicated as being involved in financial facilitations 
for al-Qaeda. In the absence of a regular banking system, these companies transact financial 
businesses without keeping documentation, thereby foreclosing any possibility of tracing 
transactions (UN Security Council 2006: 9, 18-20; Congressional Research Service 2002: 
16). The United States Institute of Peace, in its January 2004 report, titled “Terrorism in the 
Horn of Africa”, observes that Somalia plays a specialized role in Islamic [sic] terrorism, 
being that it serves “primarily as a short-term transit point for the movement of people and 
materials through the porous and corrupt border between Somalia into [sic] Kenya, which has 
been a preferred site of terrorist attacks” (United States Institute of Peace 2004: 9). 
The presence of foreign fighters (Jihadists) inside Somalia seems to have been corroborated 
over the years by different independent sources. In its 17 January 2002 report to the US 
Congress on “Africa and the War on Terror”, the Congressional Research Service reported 
the capture of Afghan and Arab fighters and the impounding of documents and pictures in an 
Ethiopian operation inside Somalia, following several terrorist attacks inside Ethiopia from 
across the Somali border (Congressional Research Service 2002: 2). Most recently, in the 
December 2006 fight between the Islamic Courts Union and the Transitional Federal 
Government, backed by Ethiopian forces, it is reported the a large number of foreign Islamist 
fighters fought on the side of the Islamic Courts (International Crisis Group: 2007: 4). The 
overt involvement of the Ethiopian forces, and the circulation in the public domain of 
America‟s covert involvement, was enough to mobilize both domestic and foreign fighters 
behind the Islamic Courts. The 2006 move by the radical Islamic Courts Union to wrest 
control of the entire Somalia from the warlords in the first instance, and later from the 
Transitional Federal Government (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007: 65; Quaranto 2008: 
27), saw the greatest mobilization of foreign jihadis into Somalia (International Crisis Group: 
2007: 4).  
In 2004, the US Institute of Peace stated, in its “Special Report: Terrorism in the Horn of 
Africa”, that the risks presented by the lawless nature of the Somali environment and the 
absence of Western targets inside Somalia portrays a Somalia that may only be used as a 
transit by terrorists (US Institute of Peace 2004: 9). This statement may well have been 
overtaken by events, as Somalia gradually (but steadily) gravitates towards becoming part of 
a formidable terrorist axis, with thriving al-Qaeda hub and nodes, executing attacks inside 
Somalia against Western aid workers and locals suspected of collaborating with America and 
Ethiopia (Dempsey 2006: 13-14). A web message claiming to be from Osama bin Laden was 
posted on the web on 1 July 2006, urging Somalis to rise to the occasion of building Somalia 
into an Islamic state, while at the same time warning the US and its allies of the preparedness 
of al-Qaeda to fight them in defense of Somalia (Tadesse 2001: i.d). On 10 October 2006, a 
local Sharia court in Beledweyne called for a jihad against Ethiopia, and the Islamic Courts 
leadership declared the same on the 26 October 2006.  Following these three events, there 
was an influx of foreign fighters into Somalia, mostly from the middle-east and the “Northern 
Tier” countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Yemen and Pakistan 
(Tadesse 2001: i.d Ross, D. and Roggio, B 2006: i.d; http://en.wikipedia.org).  
The Islamic Courts have continued to send mixed signals regarding the presence of foreign 
fighters inside Somalia. While it officially denies their existence, some of its leadership, 
allude in their statements to their existence. For example, Sheikh Yusuf Indohaadde, one of 
the Islamic Courts‟ leaders, was quoted as saying, “We want to say in a loud voice that we 
have no enemies, we have no enmity towards anyone. There are no foreign terrorists here” 
(Ross, D. and Roggio, B 2006: i.d). By contrast, Sheikh Hassan Abdullah Hersi was quoted 
while addressing Islamist fighters and Islamic Courts supporters after they captured Kismayo, 
as saying, “Brothers in Islam, we came from Mogadishu and we have thousands of fighters, 
some are Somalis and others are from the Muslim world. If Christian-led America brought its 
infidels, we now call our Muslim holy fighters to come [and] join us” (Ross, D. and Roggio, 
B 2006: i.d). The content of an audio tape that was released in June 2006, claiming to be from 
bin Laden, declared the current struggle in Somalia an affair of the global jihad, stating, “We 
will continue, God willing, to fight you and your allies everywhere, in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and in Somalia and Sudan, until we waste all your money and kill your men and you return to 
your country in defeat as we defeated you before in Somalia”. Following a United Nations 
consideration of a hybrid African Union peacekeeping mission for Somalia, bin Laden, in 
July 2006, issued yet another statement saying: “we warn all the countries in the world from 
accepting a US proposal to send international forces to Somalia. We swear to God that we 
will fight their soldiers in Somalia and we reserve the right to punish them on their lands and 
every accessible place at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner” (Ross, D. and 
Roggio, B 2006: i.d). Between these statements, credited to bin Laden, and the December 
2006 battle between the Islamic Courts and the Transitional Federal Government, supported 
by large Ethiopian forces, many Diaspora Somalis and foreign Jihadis were attracted into 
Somalia (International Crisis Group 2007: 4). It was alleged that by the time of the battle in 
December 2006 about 2000 Eritrean soldiers and between 4000 and 5000 other foreign 
Jihadists were involved on the side of the Islamic Courts Union (http://en.wikipedia.org).  
Given the above context, it is not surprising that a growing insurgency, characterized by 
incidents of suicide bombings, car bombings, ambushes and other forms of guerrilla tactics, 
typical of international Jihadis, which has become rampant since the “defeat” of the Islamic 
Courts Union in December 2006, is threatening to take the significance of terrorist activities 
in Somalia to a higher level.   It is also unsurprising that Somalia has become a target of 
significant counter-terrorism initiatives spear-headed by the American government.  It is to 















COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVES IN SOMALIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Terrorism in the Horn of Africa was inaugurated with the December 1980 terrorist bombing 
of the Norfolk Hotel, owned by an Israeli, in Nairobi, Kenya, in which 16 people were killed 
and over one hundred injured. There were also scattered terrorist incidents in Kenya and 
Ethiopia in the early 1990s. But it was the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi, 
Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania that seized global attention, and compelled the United 
States of America to unleash its counterterrorism programme to address the possible danger 
the Horn of Africa, particularly the failed state of Somalia, poses to international security. 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon – in the 
heart of the US -- defined by US officialdom as an act of war, marked the beginning of a 
more robust and decisive United States counterterrorism effort to deal with a “war against the 
United States, peaceful people throughout the world, and the very principles of liberty and 
human dignity” (National Strategy: 2). This saw the initiation of numerous programmes, and 
the overhauling of some existing ones, geared towards combating terrorism globally. It also 
resulted in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) becoming a cardinal element in US foreign 
policy. The US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, first published in February 2003 
and reviewed in March 2006, stated: “America is at war with transnational terrorist 
movement” (National Strategy 2006: 1). The achievement of the targeted goals of America‟s 
global war on terror would entail success in the following areas: the defeat of terrorists and 
their organizations; denial of sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; diminishing or 
eliminating the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and defending US 
citizens and interests at home and abroad (US National Strategy 2006: 1; Piombo 2007: i.d). 
Specifically, the US National Strategy (2006: 1) outlines the short-term and long-term 
components of the War on Terror: 
 
Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of 
terrorism; Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; Deny weapons of mass 
destruction to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them; Deny 
terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; Deny terrorists control 
of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and lay 
the foundation and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the 
fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.  
  
It is in the light of the above tasks which America‟s National Strategy enumerated for the 
War on Terror that the global thrust of the United States of America can be understood, the 
war on terror being primarily U.S. global engagement targeted at the protection of US 
citizens and property all around the world. This, therefore, explains the affirmation in the 
same U.S. National Strategy for combating terrorism that “the paradigm for combating 
terrorism” currently “involves the application of all elements of our national power” 
(National Strategy 2006: I). With the above resolve, the U.S. expresses its intention to 
cooperate with other states in this “war”, but at the same time stresses its readiness to go it 
alone in defending its interests and citizens worldwide (National Strategy 2006: 6; Dempsey 
2008: i.d).  
 
5.2 US Counterterrorism programmes in Africa  
Since the 1998 East African embassy bombings, Africa has attracted a higher degree of 
consideration as an important environment in discussions of global terrorism and the United 
States‟ global counterterrorism initiative. Though this work focuses on the Horn of Africa, 
and Somalia in particular, it is relevant to observe that Africa as a whole has occupied an 
important place in the general security calculus of the United States of America in its war 
against terrorism. Many problems confronting African states such as poverty, disease, 
prolonged wars and armed conflicts, weak governments, lack of adequate democratic space 
and issues of ungoverned spaces have attracted special concerns of the US security strategists 
in its global war on terror. These problems are viewed as inherently predisposing the region 
to terrorism and transforming almost the entire African continent into an “emerging haven” 
for terrorists (Wycoff 2004: i.d; Pope 2004: i.d; www.globalsecurity.org). Therefore, since 
2002 the US has engaged Africa in diverse initiatives geared towards combating and 
containing terrorism all over Africa. Some of these programmes include: the 2002Pan Sahel 
Initiative (PSI); the 2003Joint Task Force AZTEC SILENCE; the 2003 East African 
Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI); and the 2005 Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative 
(TSCTI).  
 
The Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) was initiated by the United States as an anti-terrorist 
programme involving the four Saharan states of Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Placed 
under the US European Command (EUCOM) by the US Department of Defense (DOD), the 
PSI was mandated to train and equip at least one rapid-response company of about 150 
soldiers in each of the participating African states. This programme was ended in 2004. The 
Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) was established in 2005, building on the 
programmes of the defunct Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). In establishing the Trans Sahara 
Counterterrorism Initiative, the US Department of Defense took into consideration the 
seeming vulnerability of the entire Maghreb and Sahel regions of Africa with their vast 
expanse of desert, the porous borders and the ancient trade routes that have been maintained 
across the regions. Informing this consideration is the security implications of a continued use 
of these tracks by transnational criminals for illicit businesses and arms trades and free 
passage and safe haven for terrorists (Motlagh 2004: i.d). The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism 
Initiative was expanded to a ten-nation programme that includes Chad, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia. The major tasks of TSCTI included 
the building of military capacity in intelligence and quick response, developing collaboration 
among the participating states and with the United States, as willing partners towards security 
and other stability-threatening issues as they arise in the region. The aim was to develop 
among the participants the capacity and the will for information sharing and collaboration in 
the planning and execution of operations. In this regard the TSCTI aims to strengthen 
“regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhance and institutionalize cooperation among the 
region‟s security forces, and promote democratic governance” (Wycoff 2004: i.d; Pope 2004: 
i.d; www.globalsecurity.org). The major US commitment in this programme is centered on 
improving security capacities within the region for “detecting and deterring” terrorists 
through the provision of training and equipment. The regulation of financial transactions 
which support international and transnational terrorism, airport security and other social 
issues such as educational assistance, form components of the TSCTI with the Department of 
Treasury (DOT), Department of State (DOS), and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) taking responsibility, respectively. Therefore, the TSCTI is an 
interagency programme with a military component codenamed Operation Enduring Freedom 
– Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). This initiative has been funded to the tune of one hundred million 
US dollars ($100million) per year since 2005 and would run for an initial five years (Wycoff 
2004: i.d; Dempsey 2006: 22).  
 
The Joint Task Force (JTF) Aztec Silence was another counterterrorism programme initiated 
and established by the United States in 2003, primarily targeting transnational terrorism in the 
“under-governed” areas of North Africa. The high point of this programme is the 
establishment of an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance base (station) in Sicily, 
which aims at detecting, tracking and intercepting the mobile satellite and technical 
communication equipment employed by the terrorist groups in the region in the execution of 
their plans. This project aimed at sharing any such information gathered among all the 
partnering states for collaborative action against transnational terrorist groups 
(www.globalsecurity.org). The US, aims by these capacity-building initiatives, at reducing as 
much as practicable, its physical military involvement in Africa.  
 
Southern and Central Africa do not feature that much in the international counterterrorism 
programmes. These two regions tend not to be among the high-risk areas in terrorism, 
according to security reports (Piombo 2007: i.d). The only counterterrorism-oriented 
programme meant for these two regions is the International Law Enforcement Agency 
(ILEA) established in the Botswana capital, Gaborone, and run by the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). This programme is focused on enhancing the “general law enforcement” 
capabilities of the regional states. To achieve this, programmes were drawn for training the 
states‟ law enforcement and security personnel in intelligence gathering and operations, and 
equipping them for their counterterrorism operations (Piombo 2007: i.d).  
 
Generally, the US Departments engage with individual countries in Africa, the AU and the 
sub-regional organizations in counterterrorism initiatives with the aim of building enduring 
human and institutional capacities. This, the US hopes, will impact further actions towards 
increased bilateral and regional security initiatives. The Department of State assisted 
financially and through the provision of expertise in the establishment of the AU‟s African 
Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, which was sited in Algiers, the Algerian 
capital, in 2004 (Wycoff 2004: i.d). Several conferences and workshops on terrorism and 
counterterrorism have been hosted by the African Union, resourced and funded by US 
agencies. The Department of State and the National Defense University‟s African Centre for 
Strategic Studies assisted the AU technically and financially in organizing many of its 
counterterrorism events. These programmes include the Small Arms and Light Weapons 
Workshop in Burkina Faso in December 2006; Counterterrorism Workshop in Algeria, 
January 2007; Workshop on Managing Security Resources in Africa in Malawi, September 
2007; Counterterrorism Seminar in Ethiopia, November 2007; and with that in Tanzania, 
scheduled for April 2008  (Fields 2007: 9). The National Defense University‟s African Centre 
for Strategic Studies opened its first African annex in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, early in 
December 2006. The “Community Chapters” were later to follow in 19 other countries that 
include Benin Republic, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, Mozambique, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, 
Rwanda and Uganda (Fields 2007: 6).               
 
          
5.3 Counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa  
The Horn of Africa has been considered by terrorism experts and counterterrorism concerns 
as being the most terrorist-prone region in Africa and thus poses the greatest challenge to 
global peace and security in Africa, among other regions, in comparative security analysis 
(Pope 2004: i.d).  Testifying on the Horn of Africa before the House International Relations 
Committee, Karl Wycoff, an associate coordinator in the Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism in the US Department of State, declared that “although we [the US] are 
concerned about attacks elsewhere in Africa, we consider the Horn Of Africa – Djibouti, 
Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Kenya, and Tanzania – to be the area of most risk” (Wycoff 
2004: i.d). William Pope, the US Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism, expressed the 
same opinion at the 21 April 2004 East African Counterterrorism Initiative Conference in 
Uganda, when he stated that “the continent of Africa is vulnerable to the threat of 
international terrorism and  ... of particular importance in the global effort to counter terrorist 
threats” but pointed out that “East Africa and the Horn” were “at particular risk” (Pope 2004: 
i.d). Quaranto (2008:35) reflected the attitude of US officials towards the Horn as that of “a 
front line of the war on terror”. This region seems to witness the most robust forms of US 
counterterrorism activities in Africa. Both the above assessment and the perceived higher US 
counterterrorism involvement in this region can be understood in the light of the 1980 
terrorist attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya, the August 27, 1998 attacks on the US 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the November 2002 
simultaneous attacks in Mombassa, Kenya, on an Israeli-owned hotel and on an Israel bound 
aircraft at take-off from the Mombassa International Airport, Kenya (US Institute of Peace 
2004: 2). Other factors that have been pointed out as having specially predisposed the Horn 
of Africa as a high security risk area include its proximity to the Arabian Peninsular, the 
events in Somalia – the rising Islamist fundamentalism, continuing armed conflict and the 
enduring state collapse. Also significant is the very large areas with weak or no government 
controls and the seeming lack of capacity by the local security agencies of the states in the 
region to effectively contend with the threat of terrorism ( Menkhaus 2004: 67; Pope 2004: 
i.d; Wycoff 2004: i.d). The 2002 Mombassa attacks were like a “wake-up call” for the US 
comprehensive counterterrorism interest and involvement in Africa, as the attacks signaled 
the fact that the terrorist cells involved in the earlier attacks may still be intact and widening 
their reach on local populations in the region and the possibility of future attacks on Western 
interests (Wycoff 2004: i.d). These events and the accompanying security perceptions were to 
define dramatically and permanently the course of US foreign policy thrust in this region, 
with a great measure of securitization of almost every aspect of interaction with all the 
regional states (Quaranto 2008: 11).   
 
In June 2003, the East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) was established with a 
US$100 million take-off fund; it is scheduled to run for an initial five years. This programme 
was primarily “designed to strengthen the capabilities of [US] partners in the region to 
combat terrorism and foster cooperation among these governments” (International Crisis 
Group 2005: 9; Wycoff 2004: i.d). Specific areas targeted by the programme include the 
training of the military of the regional states and other capacity-building programmes for the 
local military and security forces in border, coastal and aviation security. Also targeted was 
the building of capacity for regional cooperation against terrorist financing. Serious attention 
was given to the need to put in place programmes that were aimed at strengthening 
democratic institutions and effective governance (Wycoff 2004: i.d). This explains why the 
US counterterrorism involvement in East Africa unfolded in a wide range of cooperative 
programmes, with the region as a block and also with some of the individual states.  
 
The programme implementation focused on law enforcement training for regional states. It 
was designed to enable these states to acquire and develop their own domestic capabilities in 
a number of areas:  the detection of explosive devices and safe rendering, investigating 
attacks, hostage negotiations, protection of VIPs, and crisis management. Kenya, not 
surprisingly -- going by the spate of terrorist incidents it has experienced and perceived 
continued terrorist interest in the country, seems to be ahead of other regional states in 
receiving attention in these programmes. Through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance executed by 
the US Department of State, Kenya had about 594 of its security officers trained abroad in the 
most current intelligence gathering, counterterrorism and general security methods. About 
four and half million US Dollars worth of security assistance was extended to it between June 
2003 and March 2003 (Pope 2004: i. d). The US interagency Terrorist Finance Working 
Group (TFWG) in the office of the Associate Coordinator for Counterterrorism collaborated 
with Kenya to develop Kenya‟s Anti-Money Laundering/Counterterrorism Financing System. 
In 2004, a team of experts comprising one representative each from the US Department of 
Justice, the Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Programme (CALP) and a “legal expert from 
the United Kingdom” supported Kenya in drafting its anti-money 
laundering/counterterrorism finance legislation. Later Kenya was able to put in place an Anti-
Terrorism Police Unit and the National Security Advisory Committee, to oversee all the 
national counterterrorism structures. It also established the National Counter-Terrorism 
Centre (Wycoff 2004: i.d).   
 
In aviation counterterrorism, the US introduced the Terrorist Interdiction Programme (TIP), 
which enables a country‟s security and immigration officials to check the identities of 
travelers leaving or entering their respective countries against the most current international 
“terrorist watch-list”, via the TIP computer systems installed in airports, seaports and border 
posts. This has enhanced the ability to share information on suspected individuals. The 
measure is aimed at curtailing the ability of terrorists to move undetected through the official 
entry ports of one country into another. The project connects national airports and border 
posts security monitoring to INTERPOL, enhancing collection, comparison and analysis of 
information on travelers. It enhances the “global effort to understand terrorist methods and 
track their movements” (Wycoff 2004: i.d). This programme in East Africa is credited to the 
Kenyan government‟s desire to monitor all its entry ports and border posts following the 
1998 and 2002 terrorist attacks within its borders. By the end of 2004, this programme was 
up and running in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda. 
 
Earlier in 2002, the US had established the Combined Joined Task Force-Horn of Africa 
(CJTF-HOA). CJTF-HOA has remained the most comprehensive, strategic and robust US 
counterterrorism programme in Africa. With a base in Camp Lemonire, Djibouti, the 
programme is targeted at “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating” terrorist groups 
operating in the Horn of Africa. It has about 1600 personnel, made up of military, civilians 
and representatives of the coalition partners about 1500 of whom are US citizens (Quaranto 
2008: 38; www.globalsecurity.org). African forces are not involved in its operations, despite 
being named “Combined Joint Task Force”. The force‟s areas of responsibility include the 
“total airspace and land areas of Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia, in 
Africa, and Yemen, in the Arabian Peninsula” (Cox 2003: i.d). As part of its designed 
program, the CJTF-HOA has since set up what is called “lily pads” in Uganda and Kenya 
(Quaranto 2008: 38; Ploch 2007: 7). In line with the US policy shift in war on terror, the 
programme emphasizes the training of national security forces, to enhance their capacities to 
combat terrorism and ensure regional security and stability, the militaries of Ethiopia, 
Djibouti and Kenya receiving more attention in this regard than other countries in the region 
(Shinn 2004: 41; Quaranto 2008: 38). As a reflection of the same US policy shift, the CJTF-
HOA has initiated some human security involvement in the region that focuses on certain 
peculiar problems facing the people. They have delved into water provision (drilling wells), 
medical care and renovation of medical and educational infrastructure (Hill 2006: 634; Pope 
2004: i.d; Quaranto 2008: 39; www.globalsecurity.org). This fits into the battle for the 
“hearts and minds” (International Crisis Group 2005b: 11) of the population in the region. 
This new policy thrust tends to have acknowledged that certain discomforting human security 
conditions prevailing in weak and collapsed states tend to “create an environment more 
conducive for terrorism” (Pope 2004: i.d). The establishment of the African Command 
(AFRICOM) in 2007 falls under a wider securitization of Africa and is still unfolding.         
 
5.4 IGAD and counterterrorism 
The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) came into being as a 
development assessment and cooperation organization among some East African states which 
include Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. Its main aims are “to 
promote joint development strategies and to create an environment for foreign, cross-border 
and domestic trade and investment” (Cox 2003: i.d). Following the security challenges posed 
by conflicts within some member states and some other neighboring non-member states, and 
the terrorist incidents in the region, security issues became incorporated into the agenda of 
IGAD. The initial security concern of IGAD was to find lasting solutions to the protracted 
conflicts in Somalia and Southern Sudan which, in themselves, were perceived as “conditions 
conducive to the spread of terrorism” in the region (Centre on Global Counterterrorism 
Cooperation 2008: 15). The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US, the consequent 
reactions of the global community to the attack, and the various initiatives that were to follow 
on a global, regional and sub-regional level meant that IGAD had to include terrorism as a 
frontline issue in its programme (Abraham 2005: i.d).  
 
The 9th IGAD Summit, which was hosted by Sudan in January 2002 focused extensively on 
the threat of terrorism in the region and the regional response to terrorist incidents within the 
region (Institute for Security Studies 2003: i.d).  This Summit gave rise to the IGAD 
Counterterrorism Conference of June 2003 in Addis Ababa, to explore how much terrorism 
had affected the individual states and the region and to formulate a regional plan of action 
against terrorism. The outcome of this Conference was the “Draft Implementation Plan to 
Counter Terrorism in the IGAD Region” which was approved and adopted at the 10th IGAD 
Summit on October 24, 2003 (Institute for Security Studies 2003: i.d). The issues addressed 
by this document, according to the Institute for Security Studies (2003), include that of  
 
enhancing operational capacity to control illegal cross border movement; 
enhancing operational capacity to record and share information; measures 
to ensure the protection of human rights during counterterrorism operations; 
and education programmes to enhance public support.   
 
The meeting of Ministers of Justice of the IGAD member states in Kampala on September 
20-21, 2007 on the theme “Legal Cooperation against Terrorism” evaluated the 
implementation of the various aspects of the Counterterrorism Plan and the activities of the 
IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) (http://www.igad.org). 
ICPAT, with headquarters in Addis Ababa, was launched on 14 June 2006 as a four-year 
programme. Its objectives included: the enhancement of judicial measures among member 
states; the optimization of interdepartmental cooperation; the improvement of border security; 
general capacity-building by training of security forces; information sharing; and the 
promotion of strategic cooperation among the security and intelligence operatives of member 
states (IGAD 2006: i.d). ICPAT has been playing an important role in individual member 
states and regionally in IGAD‟s modest counterterrorism initiatives. The publication of the 
Compendium of International and Regional Legal Instruments Related to the Prevention and 
Suppression of International Terrorism by ICPAT, with technical assistance from the 
Institute for Security Studies, is seen as an important contribution. The publication dwelt on 
familiarizing both the judicial and legislative authorities of all the member states with various 
international antiterrorism initiatives. Held in Addis Ababa on 4-5 March 2008, it specially 
emphasized the need to lay the foundation for concerted combat against terrorism, by 
“ensuring that the relevant international and regional conventions and protocols are signed, 
ratified and implemented in the IGAD region” (Institute for Security Studies: i. d).  
 
ICPAT, in conjunction with the East African Police Chiefs Coordination Organization 
(EAPCCO), developed a training programme on counterterrorism for selected law 
enforcement officers in the member states. This four-week programme covers courses in 
terrorism, migration and transnational crime, international conventions, community policing, 
mutual legal assistance, crisis management, border security management, terrorist financing 
and money laundering, crime scene management, respect for human rights, alternate 
strategies to resist terrorism and the role of INTERPOL. Interestingly, Somali police officers 
began their four weeks training on October 30, 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This is an 
important development. It suggests an acceptance that Somalia is not irredeemable and shows 
that efforts are being made by the IGAD and the TFG of Somalia  to address the problems 
within Somalia. Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan have all had the same course for their law 
enforcement officers, the latest being Ethiopia, beginning on 1 August 2008 and others are to 
follow (IGAD 2006: i.d).  That the ICPAT programmes have attracted foreign donor and 
partnering organizations shows the extent of the confidence it commands. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Denmark funded a two-day conference on “Implementing the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy in East Africa – Building National Capacities”, organized by 
ICPAT in collaboration with the Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation in Addis 
Ababa on 4-5 March 2008. The conference, which had in attendance all the ministries and 
parastatals security stakeholders in all the IGAD member states, was geared towards forging 
an understanding among member states, relevant multilateral bodies and all stakeholders in 
the region in the implementation of the UN Counterterrorism Strategy by strengthening 
“cooperative counterterrorism” initiatives in the region. The conference also targeted 
identifying the needs of individual member states for more counterterrorism efficiency to 
guide its drive to “secure tangible and relevant international support for this important task of 
assuring security in the region” (Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 2008: 1).   
 
The IGAD counterterrorism efforts have been regionally focused, but also without specific 
attention to any particular territory such as Somalia. IGAD involvement in Somalia has been 
more on the issue of conflict resolution. This can be understood in the light of the divergent 
views of some of the member states. Ethiopia and Sudan, for example, view the issue of 
terrorism differently and so differ on solutions to terrorism, especially where it concerns the 
involvement of the US. Through its efforts at capacity building, IGAD has not only made an 
invaluable contribution to counterterrorism in the region but also has the potential to produce 
an integrated counterterrorism mantle in the region, given consistence and commitment by all 






5.5 Counterterrorism in Somalia  
Somalia was the focal point in the war against terror in the Horn of Africa. The collapse of 
the Somali state and the security implications of such a collapse domestically, regionally and 
globally, are not lost to a world that has witnessed a rise in high-profile terrorist attacks. The 
linkage of Somalia to the 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
and the 2002 Mombassa hotel and airport attacks, in all of which Somalia served as the 
operational base, raised Somali terrorist-risk and threat level. Added to these were the 
activities of the radical al-Itihaad al-Islaami (AIAI), especially in the 1990s. Al-Itihaad was 
an Islamist organization propagating the transformation of Somalia into an Islamic state to be 
governed under strict Islamic law. The counterterrorism attention, which Somalia has 
attracted from both its neighbors and the international community since 2000, is not 
unconnected with the rise to prominence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). From the early 
2000s, ICU‟s top leadership included the radical elements and former leaders of the AIAI. 
The speed at which the ICU was being embraced, its political posturing and eventual capture 
of political power in Mogadishu and its surrounding towns, following its defeat of the 
warlords‟ alliance in June 2006, and the Islamist Courts‟ lightening military offensive 
brought almost the whole of Somalia under its control by the middle of December 2006.  The 
following sub-sections will explore the various counterterrorism efforts in Somalia, with 
special focus on seeing how far these efforts impacted the terrorism profile of Somalia.           
 
5.5.1 Ethiopia’s involvements in Somalia  
Ethiopia, of all the countries in the Horn of Africa, has had a peculiar counterterrorism 
experience. While most other states are involved in pursuing domestic counterterrorism 
measures and engagements, and/or bilateral and regional collaborative involvement, Ethiopia, 
in addition to those, has sought extensively to externalize its activities by taking overt actions 
beyond its borders against suspected terrorists whenever it deems it necessary. Its 
counterterrorism engagements have seen it making military incursions into Somalia on many 
occasions, in pursuit of suspected Islamist terrorists. Ethiopia has experienced a series of 
terrorist attacks from the mid-1990s. In 1995 it foiled an assassination attempt by some 
members of the Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt on the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 
Addis Ababa. Five of the suspects were killed and three captured by Ethiopian security forces 
in the foiled plot (US Institute of Peace 2004: 5). The terrorists‟ weapons are said to have 
been flown into Ethiopia by Sudan Airways, originating from Sudan, where the terrorists‟ 
travel documents were prepared (Abraham 2005: i.d). The internal tension created by the 
domestic armed conflict by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF) that are conducted from outside its borders has also kept Ethiopia 
on constant security alert. At the peak of its influence, the Somali radical Islamist 
organization, al-Itihaad al-Islaami, was not only involved in the training of combatants for the 
Ethiopian rebel groups but had itself conducted a series of direct attacks inside Ethiopia, 
resulting in Ethiopia‟s cross-border reprisal attacks on known AIAI training camps close to 
its border inside Somalia (International Crisis Group 2007: 6). 
Ethiopia‟s counterterrorism was its own affair at the early stage . It received no support, 
assistance or cooperation from any regional states or the international community. Kinfe 
Abraham, in a paper presented in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in January 2005, on “The Challenge 
of Terrorism to Africa and the Perspectives of African States” quotes an Ethiopian minister as 
commenting that “as a victim of a series of terrorist attacks in the last ten years, Ethiopia has 
been fighting it alone without any kind of material, political or moral support from the 
international community” (Abraham 2005: i.d). This could be understood as it was difficult to 
differentiate between Ethiopia‟s internal insurgency – which was also an on-going experience 
of some other regional states like Uganda and Sudan – and terrorist activities that do not have 
much to do with internal grievances of its citizens.  
The whole scenario was to change with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US 
homeland. The US had, over the years, been concerned about the terrorist potential of the 
failed state of Somalia, with special reference to the growing significance and activities of the 
radical Islamist organization, the AIAI, an organization that expressed its intention of pushing 
for the realization of the “Greater Somalia” dream, under a fully-fledged Islamic state, with 
the Sharia legal system. It was not until after September 11 2001 that it took action against 
the organization. Very importantly, Ethiopia‟s counterterrorism efforts benefited from the 
fallout of the attacks on the US. Ethiopia‟s efforts started receiving a boost from the support 
and assistance in materials and logistics from the various US government departments and 
agencies saddled with countering global terrorism. It thus became a strong US ally in the 
Horn of Africa in the Global War on Terror, with great attention given to the rising radical 
Islamism in Somalia. The Islamists inside Somalia were already suspected of giving safe 
passage and protection to terrorists, and the environment serving as a staging ground for the 
1998 US embassies‟ bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The rise to prominence and the 
popularity and military strength of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, controlled by the 
radical elements of the “defunct” AIAI, with jihadi ideology, raised the terrorist threat level 
in the region and portended grave danger to Ethiopia, considering the already existing 
internal contestations. Ethiopia stands out in the US counterterrorism initiatives in Somalia, 
being propped up as a regional power and receiving much assistance to enable it to perform 
the role effectively. William Pope had stated at the 2004 Ugandan Conference that the CJTF-
HOA and the US Army Special Forces “continued to provide training to enhance Ethiopia 
border patrol and security skills” and to “enhance physical security, conduct investigations 
and provide surveillance in response to threat information directed at US citizens” (Pope 
2004: i. d).   
Ethiopia‟s role in Somalia had a „boost‟ in late 2006, with its the invitation by the TFG for 
assistance and protection against the Islamic Courts Union, which had taken over more than 
ninety percent of the important towns in southern Somalia and was gradually encircling it 
(the TFG) in Baioda. Ethiopian forces moved in and, in a fierce battle that lasted a little less 
than two weeks, overpowered and defeated the Islamic Courts forces. It is possible to see this 
latest Ethiopian intervention from its security perspective, rather than from the prism of its 
preference for any of the political platforms in the Somali conflict. The dangerous national, 
regional and global security implication of the emergence of a Somalia under the Jihadi 
Islamist government through the barrel of the gun, as the Islamic Courts Union were 
appearing to become, was not lost on Ethiopia, its US ally and other sensitive security 
watchers in the region. Ethiopia, in looking at the Islamic Courts from a security perspective, 
must have been suspicious of the external agenda of the organization. The Crisis Group in its 
Africa Report No. 45, while expressing Ethiopia‟s concern for the long-term implication of an 
Islamic government in Somalia, may include the possibility of stimulating Islamic radicalism 
within Ethiopia, argued that the “Courts‟ links to transnational terrorism” may have been a 
more important part of Ethiopia‟s “immediate consideration” for fighting the Courts inside 
Somalia (Crisis Group 2007: 4). The US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
Jendayi Frazer, and Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, were reported as having emphasized at an 
Addis Ababa meeting in June 2006 the commitment of the US in supporting an Ethiopian 
military action should the Jihadists take over in Somalia (Quaranto 2008: 42). The events 
leading to the Ethiopian intervention on the invitation of the TFG,  – the ICU take-over of 
virtually all the major cities in Somalia, its encircling and attempt to attack the TFG in 
Baioda – tend to support this security motive argument above every other motive Ethiopia 
may be said to have for intervening.  
5.5.2 US Counterterrorism in Somalia  
The first direct involvement of the US in Somalia was in the 1992 humanitarian intervention, 
along with the United Nations in UNISOM I and II. That outing ended in a humiliating 
experience for the US, following the killing of 18 US Marines in a Mogadishu street fight on 
3-4 October 1993 while attempting to arrest a warlord, Farah Aideed. This tragic Somali 
street battle has come to be known as the “Black Hawk Down” incident. Al-Qaeda leader, 
Osama bin Laden, claimed responsibility for the fierce battle and those killings. Whether bin 
Laden did spearhead the battle or not has been contentious, but the demoralizing impact of 
the incident led to an early end of the programme and the exit of the UN in 1995 following 
the  US pullout (International Crisis Group 2002: 1). The US intelligence officials believe 
strongly that there was a connection between the attack and bin Laden, believing that bin 
Laden provided the “training, organizational and logistical support to al-Itihaad forces in 
order to counter the American presence in Somalia” (International Crisis Group 2002: 5).  
Since the US pulled out of Somalia in 1995, it has shown serious security concern to the 
steadily growing influence and activities of the AIAI, the radical Islamist organization in 
Somalia. This organization is strongly believed by the United States to have links with al-
Qaeda. The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States bolstered this security interest 
of the US security in Somalia, as it immediately designated al-Itihaad a terrorist organization, 
pointing to the organization‟s alleged involvement in the 1998 bombing of the US embassies 
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, and an earlier attempt on the life of an 
Ethiopian minister (International Crisis Group 2002: 12). The US counterterrorism mounted 
intense intelligence at unraveling the link between al-Itihaad and al-Qaeda. It contended that 
al-Itihaad, operating as al-Qaeda cell inside Somalia, provided the shield for the terrorists, 
while they prepared for the embassy attacks and sheltered them after the attacks. The US 
continues to seek the suspects, whom it believes to be still under the protective cover of the 
Somali Islamists.  Much of the US counterterrorist interest in Somalia remain focused on the 
apprehension of wanted al-Qaeda terrorists believed to be hiding inside Somalia, including 
some local Somali Jihadis (mostly former al-Itihaad leadership), believed not only to have 
links with al-Qaeda but also thought to be protecting some wanted terrorists. Also targeted in 
Somalia are individuals and organizations believed to be involved in financing terrorism.  
The United States‟ Somali counterterrorism takes a three-fold pattern. These are the use of 
allied frontline states, the engagement of local Somali proxies, and direct involvement. The 
US considered strongly military actions against Somalia in 2001, immediately after 
September 11, but had to put it off on the realization that it lacked enough intelligence and 
knowledge of the terrain (Menkhaus 2004: 68; Cooke and Henek 2007: 4). It decided instead 
to limit its military operations to conducting surveillance over-flights and coastline patrols off 
Somalia. On 23 September 2001, twelve days after the September 11 attacks, the US included 
AIAI in the “Executive Order 13224”, which listed the names of terrorist organizations and 
had their assets frozen (Quaranto 2008: 36). In November of 2001, the former AIAI leader, 
Hassan Dahir Aweys, was placed on the US list of most wanted terrorists (Quaranto 2008: 
36; Crisis Group 2005b: 9). On 7 November 2001 the Department of Treasury  froze the 
assets of al-Barakaat, the most prominent Somali company in remittance and 
telecommunication, suspected of rendering assistance to al-Qaeda with fund raising, 
distribution and management of its finances, illegal arms shipments, and the extension of 
“secure telephone” and internet facilities to terrorists and their supporters (Menkhaus 2004: 
67; Quaranto 2008: 37).  
The incursions conducted by Ethiopia inside Somalia against the AIAI in the mid-and late-
1990s, and the 2006 overt and massive Ethiopian military engagement inside Somalia against 
the Islamic Courts Union and its continued presence in the country are believed in many 
quarters to have been approved and financed by the US (Quaranto 2008: 40; International 
Crisis Group 2007: 7). The US understands that it is limited in its operational choices to air 
strikes by the circumstances presented by the peculiarity of Somalia and recognizes that air 
strikes in themselves are is not very effective in conducting the kind of operation the Somali 
environment demands. It, therefore, greatly values the role of an ally like Ethiopia, as a 
neighbour to Somalia. This explains the heavy investment and support the US extends to 
Ethiopia in military equipment, training and logistics (Tynes 2006: 111). 
Inside Somalia, the US, partnered by some influential figures, seeks to put in place an 
intelligence network for carrying out surveillance and arrests of suspected terrorists, as in the 
case in Puntland (International Crisis Group 2005a: 9). Deeper south, a coalition of some 
warlords, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism, (ARPCT) emerged, 
believed to have been put in place and funded by the US, with Ethiopian authorities as the 
middlemen. The alliance was given the task of monitoring terrorist suspects and conducting 
“snatch and grab operations” on suspects (Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007: 68; 
Quaranto 2008: 41). It is believed that the US was, by 2006, running a monthly bill of over 
150 000 dollars on the warlords (Quaranto 2008: 41). The ARPCT targeting the suspected 
Somali local Jihadis with terrorist connections, had very little success, while it raised the 
stakes in the Somali conflict, pitching the Alliance against the Islamic Courts Union and 
other militias opposed to the involvement of the US and Ethiopia in Somalia. It was this bitter 
struggle which culminated in the May-June 2006 Mogadishu battle that saw the Alliance 
roundly defeated and the Courts taking control of Mogadishu.  
The resort to direct military action in 2007 was contemplated for a very long time. By mid-
2006, the US was becoming worried not only about the takeover of Mogadishu by the Islamic 
Courts and their rising popularity but also, and most importantly, by their introduction and 
enforcement of strict Islamic laws (Quaranto 2008: 42). In pursuit of the three al-Qaeda 
suspects believed to be holed up inside Somalia and protected by the Islamists and some of 
the leadership core of the retreating Islamic Courts Union, the US military launched a two-
day (7-8 January 2007) attack on some facilities in Afmadow, a southern Somali town close 
to the Kenyan border. This first overt US military operation in Somalia involved two US Air 
Force AC-130 gunships, which took off from the CJTF-HOA headquarters in Djibouti. The 
two-day aerial attack was said by US officials to be targeting buildings and areas suspected to 
be harboring foreign fighters and local Jihadists escaping from the fire-power of the 
Ethiopian soldiers in its war with the Islamic Courts (Harper 2007: i. d; Quaranto 2008: 43; 
UN Security Council 2007: 17). The death toll was given by US officials as between 5 and 
10, including one of the three wanted terrorists believed to be hiding inside Somalia. Locals 
claimed that 31 civilians were killed in the attack. The island of Badmado and the village of 
Hayo were reported hit (http://www.cbsnews.com; http://www.news.bbc.co.uk).  
A number of factors combined to trigger further US military actions inside Somalia. They 
included:  the emergent and gradually intensifying insurgence; the increased suicide attacks 
on the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces; and the increasing incidence of 
assassinations of foreign aid workers and some prominent local businessmen considered 
allies of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces.  Two other military 
actions had since been taken by the US against targets inside Somalia. These were the missile 
strikes of Dobley, a border town with Kenya, on 27 February 2007, and the air strikes of 1 
June 2008 on Dusamareb town. These air strikes have attracted condemnation from many 
Somalis, especially from the Islamists and those sympathetic to them. The last attack 
attracted a wide protest inside Somalia against the US and Ethiopia 
(http://www.democracynow.org; http://www.msnbc.msn.com).  
The next sub-section shall assess the successes or otherwise of these counterterrorism 
methods adopted in the Horn of Africa, with special attention to Somalia. The stated goals of 
these counterterrorism efforts of defeating terrorists and their organizations, denying them 
sponsors, support and sanctuaries, diminishing the underlying conditions which terrorists 
seek to exploit, and defending US citizens and interests both at home and abroad, will be a 
guide in such assessment.     
 
5.5. 3 Assessing Ethiopian and US counterterrorism in Somalia 
This segment focuses on the successes, failures and implications of the various dimensions of 
the counterterrorism initiatives applied in Somalia by Ethiopia and the US.  Each of the 
program shall be assessed to determine the extent and nature of their impact on the existing 
terrorist threat which the failed state of Somalia poses to regional and global security. 
Firstly, Ethiopia‟s involvement in Somalia is complex. For a long time, Ethiopia has not 
known peaceful coexistence with its Somali neighbor. It is very difficult for Ethiopia to draw 
a clear line between its actions directed at containing the activities of its nationals seeking 
self-governance, as is the case with the Oromo, or seeking integration with their kith and kin 
in Somalia, as is the case with the Ogadenis.  As such its externalized regional security 
concerns, occasioned in part by the presence and activities of radical Islamists in Somalia 
serve to further obfuscate the conflict situation in the Horn of Africa. The overt Ethiopian 
military involvement in Somalia since December 2006 (on the invitation of the struggling 
TFG) not only raised the already existing tension in the region as a whole, and in Somalia, in 
particular but also afforded Eritrea a leeway to become involved in Somalia by bolstering its 
military, material and logistics support for the Islamic Courts inside Somalia to spite Ethiopia 
(Ray 2007: i. d). This dealt a blow to the counterterrorism initiatives targeted against the 
growth of radical Islamist organizations and individuals that support terrorism in Somalia and 
the Horn in general. The enemy image, which had crystallized over the years in the minds of 
average Somalis, continues to stimulate Somali resentment of Ethiopia‟s involvement and 
continued presence. The International Crisis Group (2005a: 21; 2005b: 3) quoted a 
respondent as stating bluntly that 
 
From Ethiopia‟s perspective, it will be a war between Ethiopia and the 
Islamists (Ikhwaan). But for we [sic] Somalis, it is not so simple. I have to 
fight side by side with anyone who is fighting Ethiopia … People do not 
want to join the Islamists (wadaado)…. but if it comes to that, how can you 
refuse a coalition with them? It won‟t matter who chews the qaad and who 
doesn‟t when the enemy is just over the horizon. 
 
The physical presence of Ethiopian forces since they expelled the Islamic Courts from 
Mogadishu in late December of 2006 has boosted (rather than reduced) the activities of the 
Courts and a gradual but steady and deadly Iraqi-style insurgency has been initiated by the 
“ousted” Islamists. This gravitation is highly in favour of the al-Qaeda strategy: to continue 
penetrating, recruiting, mobilizing and forging a viable Islamist resistance to the US-led 
counterterrorism around the blunders that may occur in the course of counterterrorism 
operations themselves. The involvement and, most importantly, the continuing presence of 
Ethiopian troops in Somalia may be posing one of the greatest challenges to the effort at 
countering terrorism in Somalia and the Horn as a whole.  
 
The use of air strikes by the US in Somalia has not paid off. While the strikes are said to 
primarily target three al-Qaeda operatives involved in the 1998 bombings of the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2002 attacks on a hotel and an aircraft in 
Mombassa, Kenya, there is no evidence that the air strikes hit the targets. US officials 
maintain that these men are still holed-up inside Somalia even after those deadly air strikes 
(Quaranto 2008: 43; Cooke and Henek 2007: 3). Reports of civilian casualties in those air 
strikes not only served to increase anti-American sentiments but also played to the advantage 
of the Islamists who used the attacks to rally support and sympathy to their cause in resisting 
the actions and presence of Ethiopian troops, while denouncing their American backers 
(Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007: 69). It has provided a tool around which the Islamists 
campaign and recruit fighters. Thomas Dempsey (a retired US Army Colonel, a professor at 
the Security Sector Reform US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and 
former Director, African Studies, US Army War College), while testifying on 11 March 2008 
before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the US Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on “Evaluating US Policy Objectives and Options on the Horn of Africa”, argued 
that the “US response to terrorist hubs operating in African failed states, like Somalia, had 
been less than adequate” (Dempsey 2008: i.d). He notes that very little success has ever been 
achieved by using air strikes to directly target terrorists in failed state environments while 
such strikes “have tended to legitimate terrorist groups by providing them combatant 
status…and promoting them in the eyes of the ordinary citizens” (Dempsey 2008: i.d). While 
concluding that Somalia was providing a “platform for terrorist recruitment and operational 
planning” and portends a very serious security danger, he charged that the adoption and the 
use of air strikes by the US in Somalia has “generated significant levels of controversy, 
skepticism and outright mistrust…” (Dempsey 2008: i.d).  Noting the complexities and 
problems of the Somali conflict environment, given the context of the underlying clan politics 
and alliances, Dempsey advances the argument that the loss of innocent lives and other 
damages inflicted on Somalia in military strikes challenge the moral basis for the 
counterterrorism operations and “contributes to the ongoing recruitment efforts of the 
terrorist groups themselves” (Dempsey 2008: i.d). Al-Qaeda wasted no time in tapping into 
the opportunity presented it by the security quagmire facing the US and Ethiopia in Somalia. 
It was quick to portray Somalia as yet another theatre for the United States‟ orchestrated war 
to conquer Islam and the Muslim world, which must be resisted through a global jihad. The 
January 2007 posted message credited to the al-Qaeda number two, al-Zawahiri, drew a 
connection between the involvement of the US in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, calling on 
Jihadis to give themselves to resist America in Somalia (Black 2007: 14).   
 
One other blunder, and possibly the worst, of the US counterterrorism efforts in Somalia 
remains its involvement with the formation and funding of the coalition of warlords that came 
to be known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPCT). The 
putting in place of this coalition may have been necessitated by the difficulty of the 
counterterrorism agencies in penetrating Somalia for information, surveillance, tracking and 
apprehending suspected terrorists. The security risk of such tasks inside Somalia by external 
operatives is real and high. The primary assignment of the alliance, which was to mount 
surveillance and apprehend terrorist suspects in the “snatch and grab” operation style, and to 
act as a wedge to the rising Islamism exacerbated the security problem in Somalia (Quaranto 
2008: 41). Bipasha Ray, writing in his article, “US Aids to Somali Warlords,” argued that the 
US financial commitment for counterterrorism was “misguided”, as the warlords only 
pretended to be interested in the project for the sole reason of retaining control of their 
various fiefdoms (Ray 2007: i.d). On 30 June 2004, a warlord was reportedly offered four 
million US Dollars ($4 million) by the US for the apprehension of Tariq Abdallah (a.k.a. Abu 
Talha al-Sudani), a highly sought-after senior al-Qaeda suspect believed to be hiding in an 
identified building in a Somali suburb. The operation was not successful as far as capturing 
al-Sudani was concerned (International Crisis Group 2005b: 10). The argument by Bipasha 
Ray tends to make sense, when it is observed that a good number of the warlords engaged 
separately in huge arms purchases between March and June 2006, when the alliance 
operations were supposedly running (UN Monitoring Group 2006: 69-73), ostensibly using 
the funds received from this program (See Table A in Chapter Three).  Nevertheless, the 
program achieved few successes,  with the most valuable being the April 2003 ambush and 
eventual capture of Suleiman Ahmed Hemed (Issa Tanzania) in Mogadishu by a warlord, 
Mohamed Dheere (International Crisis Group 2005b: 10). There were a few other arrests. The 
mastermind of the killing that took place in Somaliland in 2004 and the brother in-law to 
Ayro were picked up in one of such operations primarily targeted at al-Sudan. They were 
caught with bomb-making manuals. Also to be mentioned are cases of intelligence sharing 
between the members of the alliance and the US intelligence, which, on some occasions, 
enabled the foiling of planned attacks (International Crisis Group 2005b: 10).  
 
The activities of the warlords‟ alliance impinged negatively on counterterrorism in Somalia. 
Firstly, the public profile of the Islamists (Islamic Courts Union) was positively enhanced by 
targeting them in the first place, increasing their public acceptability and popularity among 
ordinary Somalis. The coalition by the US, Ethiopia and the warlords against the radical 
Islamists elevated them in the eyes of average Somalis to the status of patriots, fighting to 
defend their land against foreign invaders who had found allies in the discredited warlords 
and the Ethiopians. Local Somalis not only supported the ICU but many joined their militia 
(Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen 2007: 68). Secondly, the Islamists adopted reprisal attacks, 
not only against the collaborating warlords but also against all influential Somalis that failed 
to cooperate with them. The International Crisis Group (2005b: 11) observes: “a number of 
Somalis believed to have been working for foreign counter-terrorism networks have been 
assassinated”. A fierce conflict, which ensued between the Courts and the Alliance, led to the 
warlords being completely defeated in June 2006 by the Courts, who took control of 
Mogadishu and its neighbourhoods (Lyons 2006: 17; International Crisis Group 2007: 7). 
This loss by the Alliance was to the great discredit of the US, which was known to be 
sponsoring the warlords. It also triggered a lightening level of Islamist activity throughout 
southern Somalia, so that by 20 December 2006, the Islamic Courts Union had taken control 
of virtually all the major cities in Somalia. Its attempt to attack the city of Baioda, which was 
hosting the Transitional Federal Government, resulted not only in the overt military 
involvement of the Ethiopian forces, on the invitation of the TFG, but also raised the profile 
of both the Courts and the conflict itself. It was declared a jihad and it was strongly believed 
that foreign fighters participated in the battle (Tadesse 2001: i.d).  
 
The overt involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia brought to the fore the existing problem 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea‟s show of resentment for Ethiopia‟s presence inside 
Somalia manifests itself in Eritrea‟s support for the Courts in the form of arms supplies, 
training, logistics and material provisions. Both the 2006 and 2007 reports of the UN 
Monitoring Group on Somalia find Eritrea culpable of arming the Islamists in Somalia and 
also clandestinely facilitating deliveries from other sources (UN Monitoring Group 2006: 11-
14; UN Monitoring Group 2007: 8-10). This turn of events has greatly imperiled 
counterterrorism in Somalia, as some want to see it as a proxy war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea (International Crisis Group 2007: 6). The physical presence of Ethiopia in Somalia is 
generating resentment following the rising insurgency targeting Ethiopian and TFG forces. 
Growing civilian casualties resulting from Ethiopia‟s artillery responses to insurgent attacks 
have served to increase support for the insurgents and caused disdain for the TFG, Ethiopian 
forces and the US.  
 
Generally, the counterterrorism initiatives in Somalia have not been a success; rather, they 
have tended to escalate the security threat profile of Somalia, which has continued to 
deteriorate, gradually slipping into a protracted insurgency. The UN Monitoring Group on 
Somalia, in its October 2006 report to the Security Council (UN Security Council 2006: 40) 
regarding the turn of events in Somalia, stated:  
 
Importantly, foreign volunteers also provide training in guerrilla warfare 
and special topics and techniques, including the making of bombs and their 
use against different targets, such as different types of transport and 
buildings. Other techniques include kidnapping and the conduct of 
assassination by ambush and sniping. It is the view of the Monitoring 
Group that ICU is fully capable of turning Somalia into an Iraq-type 
situation, replete with roadside and suicide bombers, assassinations and 
other forms of terrorist and insurgent-type activities. 
 
The above fears were confirmed in its July 2007 report (UN Security Council 2007: 16), 
which reads: 
 
Assassinations and attempted assassinations became virtually a daily 
occurrence during the latter part of May and the first week of June 2007. 
…the Shabaab waged a continuous campaign of hit-and-run attacks against 
Ethiopian, Transitional Federal Government and Ugandan military forces. 
They also made use of improvised explosive devices as part of their 
strategy during their attacks. Several prominent individuals were targeted in 
those attacks, including the Prime Minister, and the Mayor and Deputy 
Mayor of Mogadishu. 
 
It is, therefore, clear that counterterrorism operations in Somalia have not been a success. 
There is an urgent need for a review of the whole process, with a view to employing models 
that can guarantee security inside Somalia and the entire Horn of Africa, the fallout of which 
will impact global security positively.   
 
CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This work has endeavored to engage robustly the challenge presented by the failed state of 
Somalia and its steadily rising terrorist profile, the security concerns, and the various 
initiatives targeted at dealing with the security situation. The complete collapse of the Somali 
state has meant the absence of all forms of formal control and regulation by a generally 
acceptable government overseeing institutions vested with the responsibility for the 
application of law and order, including the employment of a coercive force in the interests of 
the state and its people. The unmanned borders and ports have resulted in an uncontrolled 
inflow of people and materials, including a wide variety of small arms and light weapons. 
Security and order are known to pose serious challenges to many states with fully working 
government apparatuses. Clearly, for a collapsed state like Somalia the situation is far more 
calamitous. The impact of the absence of a state in Somalia, the consistent rise of its security 
profile – the threat it poses to neighboring states, the Horn of Africa and the genuine concerns 
about its threat to international peace and security, with special attention to the established 
exploitation of the permissive Somali environment by the al-Qaeda network – cannot be 
underestimated. The securitization of Somalia has been the result of established involvement 
of Somali territory in terrorist activity. While terrorism has become a global phenomenon, 
threatening international peace and security, the situation in the Horn of Africa seems critical 
owing to the conducive environment presented by the failed state of Somalia.  As a terrorist 
staging ground, Somalia was linked with the 1998 US embassy attacks and the 2002 
Mombassa airport and hotel attack. There has also been a gradual, but consistent 
development of a radical Jihadi, movement inside Somalia. Since the beginning of 2007, this 
movement has adopted the Iraqi model of insurgency in dealing with its defeat by the 
combined forces of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia. Its consequent loss of 
power has stepped up global attention.  
 
 It is important to note the perils associated with the involvement of neighboring states in 
Somalia‟s internal conflict. But it is equally pertinent to observe that some of these external 
actions were triggered by the dangerous security risk which Somalia itself imposed on these 
neighbors, including terrorist attacks and increased levels of violent criminality. In many 
ways, most of these external engagements by neighbors escalated the conflict to more 
dangerous dimensions. For instance, the poor security profile of Somalia may not have 
reached the present level if not for the exploitation of the conflict environment by Ethiopia 
and Eritrea to engage in a proxy war. Indeed, there may be some truth in the allegation that 
Ethiopia‟s involvement in Somalia is laced with a selfish survival motive – the belief that as 
long as the conflict in Somalia lasts, Somalis will be distracted from pursuing the “Greater 
Somalia” project. Eritrea, for its part, is accused of supporting the Islamists and other forces 
fighting the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces inside Somalia, as a way 
of keeping Ethiopia busy with those conflict fronts and, thereby, distracting it from the border 
issue between it and Eritrea.   
 
The counterterrorism methods so far adopted in Somalia – the use of neighboring states as 
surrogates by the US, the US employment of local warlords for tracking and apprehending 
terrorists and direct air strikes by the US military – are all problematic military strategies, 
which are riddled with consequences that impact negatively on the war on terrorism itself. 
There is ample evidence that these counterterrorism measures have actually contributed to the 
steady metamorphosis of the terrorist profile of Somalia, from serving merely as a staging 
ground from the middle of the 1990s to its position in 2007, which is marked by the 
emergence and steadily rising domestic insurgency propelled by strong domestic Jihadists 
and buoyed by foreign Islamists.   
 
Somalia seems to portend a real and serious threat to peace and security for its neighbors in 
particular, and the global community in general. It should, therefore, not be underplayed, 
taking cognizance of the consistency in the rise and mutation of a radical, fundamentalist 
Islam in Somalia. The security alert and the concern and involvement of the US in the events 
in Somalia are, in the light of the above, not without seemingly sufficient reason. The 
question of whose peace and security are at risk in an international order which delegitimizes 
and distorts grievances, criminalizing any line of redress that tends to challenge the status 
quo, is of currency. This should not be debated here, so as not to veer off the focus on the 
conduct of counterterrorism activities.  What seems clear is the fact that the antidotes so far 
employed by the US in dealing with the security situation presented by the Somalia 
environment have failed. An assessment of the measures adopted thus far shows the 
preference for military option in dealing with the terrorist threat posed by Somalia. 
Experience of the many hot-pots of the world in 2008 seems to suggest that, with respect to 
the “war on terror”, the military option has not paid much dividend.  This is particularly clear 
when one considers the extent to which these operations have encouraged further recruitment 
and the global appeal which the localized conflicts now attract. Military responses tend to 
expand the scope of conflicts and the sympathy they attract, be it the Palestinian conflict or 
the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the Israeli attack on southern Lebanon 
in 2007, in pursuit of the Hezbollah who abducted two Israeli soldiers, achieved very little (if 
anything) for Israel. Israel did not rescue the abducted soldiers, lost more soldiers in the 
conflict, exposed civilians living in most of its northern region to constant Hezbollah rocket 
attacks that resulted in Israeli casualties and shored up the Hezbollah profile within Lebanon 
as heroes and the defenders of the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Military options to security 
threats, therefore, demand a critical reappraisal. Current trends favor undertakings that are 
more holistic, inclusive and transformative of any existing conflict or any peace and security-
threatening situation, wherever it may exist.     
 
Since the emergence of Somalia as a threat to international peace and security is a product of 
the collapse of the Somali state and the attendant permissiveness the situation provides, any 
conscious effort at obliterating this threat should address the issue of rebuilding the Somali 
state. Such rebuilding effort must go beyond putting together and backing a transitional 
administration against other domestic oppositions.  To be effective, peace-building in 
Somalia must include a serious effort at addressing the issue of power, particularly its 
vestment and distribution among the contending forces in the country. Any arrangement in 
Somalia that is short of an inclusive option is very likely to fail. This requires a special 
multilateral approach. The unilateral engagement by the US has manifested enormous 
weaknesses and impropriety, driving contenders farther apart and further complicating and 
escalating the conflict. It may require robust United Nations involvement in the area of a 
peace mission, a mission strongly and legally mandated with peacemaking, peace-
enforcement and peace-building initiatives in Somalia and with the capacity to bring all the 
contending forces in Somalia under a well thought out and all-inclusive UN program. To 
succeed, such a program should be adequately funded, with a stern stance against any form of 
interference from neighboring states. The UN should consider using an African Union force 
for the operation, which should not include personnel from neighboring states.  This is 
because of the already existing contentious involvement of some of the regional states like 
Ethiopia and Eritrea since the Somali conflict began and the “understandable” interest of 
others such as Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Djibouti. Clearly, if such a mission is 
not properly constituted and handled, it could jeopardize any effort at implementing 
effectively whatever plan the international community may have for Somalia, no matter what 
its other merits are. The way and manner the United Nations‟ mission in Somalia, UNISOM, 
hurriedly ended its activities in the early 1990s (following the tragic death of eighteen U.S. 
Marines) without achieving its objectives,, was unacceptable and not to be repeated. The 
withdrawal, the incident leading to it and the manner in which it was done led to the 
degeneration of Somalia into a wider conflict. It suggests a lack of concern for the human 
tragedy and commitment by the international community to resolving the conflict.  
  
To deal decisively with the terrorist threat which Somalia poses, there must be a restoration 
of internal law and order through the re-establishment of transparent institutions, including a 
justice system that will be able to deal with violent and criminal actions in a manner that 
causes such actions to be discredited among the people. The engagement should be 
transformative. The issues of human security are of paramount importance in the Somali 
environment where lawlessness and war, criminality and vandalism, and intimidation and 
territorial confinement have conditioned the lives of the ordinary Somalis since 1991, when 
the Somali state collapsed. A rebuilt Somalia may not guarantee peace and security if issues 
of poverty, education, displacement, fear, hunger, loss of livelihood and hopelessness 
occasioned by the protracted state collapse are not addressed effectively.  State rebuilding is 
very important as it creates a basis for encountering and working with people via the 
institutions of governance, administration and social service delivery. Counterterrorism 
measures that focus on military options have generally failed to achieve the goal of deterring 
terrorists and stamping out terrorism. The war against terrorism should be concentrated on the 
battle for the “hearts and minds” of people. If the global fight against terrorism is to be 
transparent, credible and result-oriented, attention should be paid to the factors that create a 
global environment in which terrorism thrives and remains appealing to some individuals in 
certain circumstances.  
 
Finally, the world needs a global culture and initiative that is orientated towards the well-
being of the human race, that which promotes human-flourishing, a global system that is 
mindful of individual and group experiences which are capable of instigating and disposing 
the individual or group to violent responses. It is this kind of system that can deal with the 
grievances which the world is experiencing today by containing the deep-seated hatreds and 
the often associated recourse to violence, criminality and terrorism. 
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